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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL
AGAINST

BLACKS

LAW IN

CIVIL RIGHTS -

ADMISSIONS TO

PRIVATE

DISCRIMINATION
SCHOOLS VIOLATES

THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT GUARANTEED BY SECTION 1981.

McCrary v. Runyon (4th Cir. 1975)
Fairfax-Brewster School (Fairfax-Brewster) and Bobbe's Private
School (Bobbe's) are private educational institutions.' In May 1969, the
parents of Colin M. Gonzales attempted to have their son admitted to the
first grade of Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's, 2 but were rejected by both
because Colin was black.3 In August 1972, Michael McCrary was also
refused admission at Bobbe's because of his race.4 Claiming a violation of
their civil right to contract under section 1981, 5 Colin Gonzales filed suits
1. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1201 (E.D. Va.
1973). "Neither school receives any assistance, financial or otherwise, from any state,
local or federal agency; and each relies entirely on funds derived from tuition paid
by students to support its operations." Id.
2. Colin Gonzales' parents learned of Fairfax-Brewster through a mass mailing,
an advertisement in the classified section of the telephone directory, and from a friend.
McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1084 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354
(1975). The Fourth Circuit consolidated five cases on appeal, 515 F.2d at 1082, and
in four of the cases certiorari was applied for and granted by the Supreme Court of the
United States; Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (No. 75-62); FairfaxBrewster School, Inc. v. Gonzales, id. (No. 75-66) ; Southern Indep. School Assoc. v.
McCrary, id. (No. 75-278) ; McCrary v. Runyon, id. (No. 75-306). For a summary
of the questions presented in each case, see 44 U.S.L.W. 3270-71 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975).
3. 515 F.2d at 1085-86. The Gonzaleses had applied for admission to FairfaxBrewster's summer camp with a view towards having Colin admitted to the first grade.
Id. at 1084. The school testified that the reason for rejecting the application was that
the kindergarten that Colin had attended gave him insufficient preparation for the first
grade, and therefore it would be useless to allow him to enter the summer camp only
to have to "yank him out" at the beginning of the academic year. Id. at 1085. However,
the trial court found this testimony to be "unbelievable," and it concluded that the
real reason for the rejection was because Colin was black. 363 F. Supp. at 1202.
On telephoning Bobbe's, the Gonzaleses were told that the school did not accept
blacks. 515 F.2d at 1085. The trial court held that it was of "no moment that no
formal application was filed." 363 F. Supp. at 1203.
4. 515 F.2d at 1085. Mrs. McCrary learned of Bobbe's from an advertisement
in the classified section of the telephone directory. 363 F. Supp. at 1202. No formal
application was made since, upon inquiry, Mrs. McCrary was told that Bobbe's did not
accept blacks. 515 F.2d at 1085.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
Id.

(271)
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against both Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's while Mr. and Mrs. McCrary
and Michael filed suit solely against Bobbe's. 6 The actions were consolidated for trial 7 before the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia which, in addition to permanently enjoining the defendants from discriminating against blacks in enrollment in their schools,
awarded damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish to
the plaintiffs.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding of a section 1981 violation, 9 holding
that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private contractual
arrangements and that consequently the defendants had violated the
plaintiffs' civil rights by denying them admission to these private schools
solely upon the basis of race. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) (Nos. 75-62, 75-66, 75-278,
75-306).
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1866 Act) 10 was enacted pursuant to
the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment" in order to guarantee for blacks the benefits of citizenship which were incident to the
freedom which that amendment declared. 1 2 However, during the century
after its passage, the statute was ineffective in accomplishing its purpose,
6. 363 F. Supp. at 1203.
7. 515 F.2d at 1084. The Southern Independent School Association intervened,
claiming that section 1981 did not prohibit racial discrimination in private schools.
Id. As of 1971, the Association represented 396 schools with a combined enrollment
of 176,000. Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1448
(1973). These schools were located in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
8. 363 F. Supp. at 1205. The court also awarded attorney's fees. Id.
9. However, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees since there was no
finding of "obstinate obduracy" on the part of the defendant. 515 F.2d at 1089.
10. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
provides in pertinent part:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power . . .
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every
race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property . . .
as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Id. § 1.
There is some confusion as to the exact derivation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
but it was determined in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), that it
is derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 441 n.78. For further
discussion on the derivation of section 1981, see note 24 infra.
11. The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
12. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Micr.
L. REV. 1323, 1325-28 (1952); tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. Rsv. 171, 186 (1951).
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largely due to the fact that the United States Supreme Court in Hodges
v. United States'3 held that the 1866 Act could not be interpreted to give
4

one individual a right of redress against another.'
It was not until 1968 that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was put to
effective use. 5 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 6 the plaintiff alleged a
section 198217 violation in that the defendant refused to sell him a house
because he was black.' 8 In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court

held that in view of the text' 9 and of the legislative history20 of the
statute, section 1982 was intended to reach private discrimination, 2 1 and

that, so construed, the statute was a valid exercise of Congress' power
under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment.2 2 In so holding,
13. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The Hodges Court reversed convictions under sections
1977 and 5508 of the Revised Statutes, U.S. Rrv. STAT. §§ 1977, 5508 (1874) (now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) respectively). The
defendants had been charged with conspiring to deny blacks their right to contract
for employment. 203 U.S. at 2.
14. 203 U.S. at 18. Such an interpretation would follow from the Court's holding
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that although the thirteenth amendment
empowered Congress to enact "primary and direct" legislation "for the obliteration
and prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents," it only guaranteed that
blacks would not be subject to compulsory servitude or hindered by legal incapacity
or disability. Id. at 21-22; see Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendinents, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 449, 453 (1974).
15. Most advances in the civil rights movement since the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), have come about through judicial enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment, which applies to state action. Note, note 14 supra, at 450-51.
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Id.
18. 392 U.S. at 412.
19. The Jones Court viewed section 2 of the 1866 Act, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 2, 14 Stat. 27, which provided criminal penalties for violating section 1, as exempting
private violations from criminal sanctions. Id. at 424-25. The Court reasoned that
such an exemption would not be necessary if section 1 was not intended to reach
private discrimination. Id. at 425-26.
The defendants' contention that the 1866 Act was enacted solely to prohibit
such discriminatory legislation as the Black Codes was dismissed since the language
of the 1866 Act "was far broader than would have been necessary to strike down
discriminatory statutes." Id. at 426-27.
20. The Jones Court based its analysis of the legislative history upon three factors.
The first was a report before Congress stressing "the prevalence of private hostility
toward Negroes and the need to protect them from the resulting persecution and
discrimination." Id. at 428. Second, the Court reasoned that congressional rejection
of three proposals to invalidate discriminatory state statutes as being "too narrowly
conceived" supported the inference that Congress' intent in passing the 1866 Act was
broader than merely invalidating such statutes. Id. at 429. Third, the Court relied
upon statements by members of Congress, particularly Senator Trumbull, the sponsor
of the Act, who felt that it would "'break down all discrimination between black men
and white men.'" Id. at 432, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1866)
(remarks of Senator Trumbull) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
21. Id. at 436-37.
22. Id. at 438-39. For the text of the thirteenth amendment, see note 11 supra.
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the Court expressly overruled Hodges,23 which ruling, combined with the
Court's reference to the common origin of sections 1981 and 1982, sug24
gested that section 1981 also applied to private discrimination.
The Court had an opportunity to expand on this holding in Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. 2 5 and in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc.26 In Sullivan, the Court found that a nonstock mem-

bership corporation, which had set up a community park for the benefit of
residents in the community but had refused membership to a black resident, 27 violated section 198228 since the park's recreational facilities were
so intimately related to the property and since there was no "plan or
purpose of exclusiveness" other than race. 29 Confronted with a similar
23. Id. at 441 n.78. The Court held that the Hodges Court had defined Congress'
thirteenth amendment enforcement power too narrowly in holding that only conduct
which actually enslaves someone could be subject to legislation under the thirteenth
amendment. Id. Such a holding, the Court reasoned, was inconsistent with the view
taken in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the thirteenth amendment
authorized Congress "to eradicate the last vestiges and incidents of a society half
slave and half free." 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Jones Court, however, may have
misinterpreted the Civil Rights Cases since it appears that that case characterized the
1866 Act only as a legal capacity measure. See 109 U.S. at 22.
24. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Court implied that since both sections 1981 and
1982 were derived from section 1 of the 1866 Act, section 1981 should likewise apply
to private discrimination. Id.
This analysis, however, is not without its pitfalls. Although section 1981
covers the same subject matter as section one of the 1866 Act, the language of section
1981 is nearly identical to section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (1870 Act), Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. The 1870 Act, which was essentially a
voting rights act, was passed to secure rights for aliens, particularly the Chinese, and
it has been held that it was based upon the fourteenth rather than the thirteenth
amendment. Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on
other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). For a good discussion of the 1870
Act and its relation to the 1866 Act, see Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour
Come Round At Last, 55 VA. L. REv. 272, 295-99 (1969).
The derivation of section 1981 is further confused by the fact that the historical note under section 1981 in the United States Code lists the 1870 Act as its
source without reference to the 1866 Act, while under section 1982, only the 1866 Act
is listed. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), with id. § 1982. This confusion, however,
is probably attributable to a mistake of the codifier. Note, Section 1981 and Private
Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GFo. WASH. L.
REV. 1024, 1036-43 (1974). In 1866, Congress authorized the codification of statutes
and in 1874 the Revised Statutes were approved. Id. at 1037. The argument has been
made that in making this codification, the codifier erred in deleting the "right to contract" language from section one of the 1866 Act and in assuming that the 1870 Act
covered the same subject matter as the 1866 Act. Id. at 1038-39. See also Young v.
ITT, 438 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir. 1971).
25. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
26. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
27. 396 U.S. at 234-35. Although members were entitled to assign their share to
their lessee, plaintiff was expelled from membership when he attempted to assign his
share to his black lessee, a co-plaintiff. Id.
28. Id. at 237. Suit was also brought under section 1981, but the Court did not
discuss that statute. See id. at 235.
29. Id. The Court reasoned that since there was no "plan or purpose of exclusiveness," there was no need to consider whether or not the defendant was entitled to a
private club exemption under section 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). 396 U.S. at 236.
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situation, 0 the Tillnan Court reinforced the holding in Sullivan,31 and
expanded it further by implicitly holding that a refusal to admit black guests
to a privately owned community swimming pool denied a potential black
guest his right to contract under section 1981.32
It was against this background that the McCrary court confronted the
question of whether to extend the protection afforded by section 1981 so
as to prohibit racial discrimination in admissions to private schools. 33 In
answering this question in the affirmative, the court made two key determinations: first, in light of the legislative history of section 1981 and the
judicial precedent interpreting that statute, section 1981 prohibited such
discrimination

;34 and second, that so construed, the statute was not violative
35
of the constitutional rights of association and privacy.

Although the court seemed to disagree with the Jones Court's reading
of the legislative history,3 6 it nevertheless felt bound by that interpretation
and by the Sullivan and Tillman decisions.3 7 In particular, the court
reasoned that since Tillman implicitly authorized the application of section
contractual arrangements,3 8 and that
since admission is a part of the process of forming the contractual relationship between the school on the one hand and a pupil and his parents
1981 to private discrimination

in

30. In Tillman, an association organized for the purpose of operating a swimming
pool extended membership preference to those living within a certain geographic area,
although persons living outside the area were allowed to join upon the recommendation of a member. 410 U.S. at 432-33. Plaintiff Press bought a home within the
preference area but was denied membership because he was black. Id. at 433-34.
Plaintiff Tillman brought a black guest to the pool and the following day the guest
policy was changed in order to exclude blacks. Id. at 434. Press, Tillman, and the
guest brought suit under sections 1981 and 1982 to enjoin such activities. Id.
31. The Court held that Sullivan was controlling with respect to the section 1982
claims of Press and Tillman. Id. at 435, 438.
32. Id. at 439-40. It should be noted that the Tillman Court specifically dealt
only with the claim that Wheaton-Haven was exempt from section 1981 because it
was a private club. Id. at 440. Concluding that it was not, the Court refused to rule
on whether section 1981 contained a private club exemption, but instead it remanded
the case in order for the trial court to determine whether there was in fact discrimination. Id. It is submitted that, in making this ruling, the Supreme Court tacitly determined that section 1981 proscribed private discrimination.
33. Two district court cases had previously dealt with this problem. In Grier v.
Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), section 1981 was applied
so as to prohibit discrimination in admission to a barber training school. Riley v.
Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), involved facts
very similar to those in McCrary, but it held that the black plaintiffs were not entitled
to relief since they did not meet the admission requirements.
34. 515 F.2d at 1087.
35. Id. at 1087-88.
36. Id. at 1087. For an outline of the Jones interpretation of the legislative
history of sections 1981 and 1982, see note 20 supra.
The Jones decision generated much discussion among legal commentators.
For a good analysis supporting the holding in Jones, see Kohl, note 24 supra, at 283-92.
For a contrary view, see Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism

Run Riot, 22

VAND.

L. REV. 485 (1969).

37. 515 F.2d at 1087. For an analysis of the Sullivan and Tillman cases, see
notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
38. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
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on the other hand,8 9 a denial of admission to a private school would violate
4
a black's right to contract that is guaranteed by section 1981 .0
Having interpreted section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination in private contractual arrangements, 41 the court considered whether section 1981,
as interpreted, violated the constitutional rights of privacy and association.
In recognizing a constitutionally protected right of free association, 42 the
court viewed that right as inextricably linked to freedom of speech. 43
Since there was no showing that "discontinuance of their discriminatory
admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools
of any ideas or dogma," 44 and since section 1981 did not impede parents
in their exercise of a choice of a private school which presented ideas or
utilized educational methods not available in the public schools, the court
45
concluded that freedom of association was not infringed.
The court also concluded that its interpretation of section 1981 was
not violative of the right of privacy, 46 reasoning that such a right has
been deemed constitutionally protected only when it related to "a few
39. 515 F.2d at 1087. Although the court did not cite any authorities on this
point, several cases have held that the relationship between a pupil and a private school
is contractual in nature. E.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637
(1924) ; Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 104 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1958); People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ.,
333 Ill.
App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345 (1947); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College.
156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
40. 515 F.2d at 1087. The court, however, did provide a final caveat to its inter-

pretation when it noted that section 1981 was not intended to restrict the school in its
use of racially neutral qualifications. Id. As the court pointed out:
All that is contended and all that we hold is that § 1981 prohibits the rejection of
a black applicant when his qualifications meet all other requirements and race is
the only basis for his rejection.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
42. 515 F.2d at 1087.
43. Id. The court stated: "'It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of * * * freedom
of speech.'" Id., quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
44. 515 F.2d at 1087.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1087-88. In reaching its conclusion that section 1981, as interpreted,
was not unconstitutional, the court dismissed the contention of the defendants that
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), compelled a different result. The court
reasoned that Norwood, on its facts, did not present the question of whether private,
segregated schools violated section 1981. 515 F.2d at 1087. In Norwood, the Supreme
Court struck down a Mississippi statute giving free textbooks to all students in both
public schools and private segregated schools. 413 U.S. at 466.
The defendants in McCrary relied on dicta in Norwood that "private bias is
not barred by the Constitution," id. at 469, and, in fact, "may be characterized as a
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment," id.
at 470, to support their argument that the students' rights of privacy and association
would be violated if racial discrimination in private schools was prohibited. 515 F.2d
at 1088; 363 F. Supp. at 1204.
The McCrary court, noting that Norwood dealt with the question of whether
a state could give aid to a private, segregated school and not whether citizens had a
right to maintain such schools, concluded that "the observation in Norwood [that
private bias may be constitutionally protected] is far from a holding that segregation
in a private school is constitutionally protected." 515 F.2d at 1088.
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people . . . involved in an activity unintended for the public view." 47
Concluding that admission to private schools did not fall within the zone
of privacy, the court bolstered its argument by noting that a school48which
utilizes advertisements to attract students cannot be truly private.
While the rights of privacy and association may ultimately determine
the validity of a statute, the pivotal issue which confronted the McCrary
court was whether the right to contract guaranteed by section 1981 included the right to attend a private school. In light of Jones and Tillman,
the conclusion that section 1981 applies to private discrimination is inescapable. 49 However, there are at least two routes that the McCrary
court could have taken in defining "contract," as employed in section
1981.50
First, "contract" could be defined, according to its ordinary usage, as
any "agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing."5' 1 This broad approach, apparently adopted by the McCrary
majority, 52 is supported by the seemingly sweeping language of the 1866
47. Id. at 1088, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. 515 F.2d at 1089. The McCrary court left open the possibility that some
schools may be so private as to possess a rule of exclusivity inoffensive to section 1981.
Id. at 1088. In particular, the court would exclude from the scope of section 1981 the
situation where a family employs tutors for their children, but would not exclude
Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's since "It]heir actual and potential constituency . . . is
more public than private. They appeal to the parents of all children in the area who
can meet their academic and other admission requirements." Id. at 1088-89 (emphasis added).
49. The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the interpretation of section
1981. Since Jones was decided under section 1982 (see notes 16-24 and accompanying
text supra) a narrow interpretation of its holding would leave open the question of
whether section 1981 would necessarily apply to private discrimination. Tillman,
while holding that the defendant was not a private club, and thus not exempt from
section 1981, only implied in its holding that section 1981 applies to private discrimination. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra. In light of references in both
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78, and Tillman, 410 U.S. at 440, as to the common derivation
of sections 1981 and 1982, and in light of the Jones Court's reliance on remarks in the
congressional debates that the 1866 Act would abrogate "'all discrimination,'" 392
(remarks of
U.S. at 432, quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1866)
Senator Trumbull) (emphasis supplied by the Court), it would be difficult to hold
that section 1982 proscribes private discrimination while section 1981 does not.
50. Certainly, a thorough examination of the legislative debates would have to
be made before definitively interpreting any statute. However, it is questionable
whether such an examination would reveal much in the instant case, in light of the
confusion surrounding the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Compare Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426-36 (1968) (majority opinion) (debates show
1866 Act proscribed private discrimination), with id. at 454-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(debates show 1866 Act did not proscribe private discrimniation).
51. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. Professor Williston, on the other
hand, defines contract as "a promise, or set of promises, for breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty." 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957).
52. For a discussion of the majority's analysis of section 1981, see notes 36-40
and accompanying text supra. In contrast, the dissent urged that a distinction should
be made between purely commercial contracts, such as buying and selling property, and
status contracts, such as that involved between a teacher and a student, which might
involve a more personal relationship. 515 F.2d at 1093 (Russell, Field & Widener, J.J.,
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Act. 3 However, unless it can be said that discrimination in every contractual arrangement is a badge or incident of slavery, it appears that the
statute, construed in this way, exceeds the enforcement powers granted
54
Congress by the thirteenth amendment.
In view of these constitutional difficulties, a more desirable alternative
may be to limit the scope of section 1981 to those contracts essential in
maintaining the freedom guaranteed to blacks by the thirteenth amendment. 55 While this approach offers little in the way of tangible guidelines,
it does have the advantage of providing the flexibility needed to determine
with each new case whether the contract under review is necessary in
maintaining the status of a free citizen. It may be observed, however,
that those contracts dealing with employment, 50 property, 57 and the use
dissenting in part and concurring in part). The dissent distinguished Jones by noting
that, while it is necessary to compel whites to sell property to blacks, since otherwise
there might be no other source from which blacks could purchase property, there is
no such necessity with regard to education since "[t]he overwhelming portion of the
burden of educating our people is borne by public schools, which by law are nonsegregated." Id. at 1095-96. "
53. For the text of the 1866 Act, see note 10 supra.
54. It should be noted that Congress' power under the thirteenth amendment is
potentially very broad. It was held in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
that it was limited to enacting legislation "for the obliteration and prevention of
slavery with all its badges and incidents." Id. at 21. However, the rones Court held
that "Congress has the power . . . rationally to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery." 392 U.S. at 440. In light of this deference to the legislative
judgment, it may be a rare occasion that the Supreme Court declares that Congress
has exceeded its thirteenth amendment enforcement power.
55. The need for a statute to remedy the evils of slavery still existing after the
passage of the thirteenth amendment can be aptly summarized as follows:
Because the slave was a chattel he could not himself own anything, either other
chattels or real property. Moreover, the slave could neither contract nor be contracted with. Since he could not enter into contracts, the slave could not have
claims against others, and conversely, no one could have legal claims against him.
He could neither sue nor be sued, nor could he inherit or devise property. And
since marriage is a contract, the slave could not marry. In short, the slave was
not a "person" in the contemplation of the law; he had no personal or "civil"
rights. . . . [I]f these disabilities were to be imposed on the newly "freed" slave,
his condition would not differ greatly from what it was prior to his emancipation.
Kohl, note 24 supra, at 275-76 (footnotes omitted).
The inability to purchase land seemed to have been the biggest detriment to
the newly freed slave since "[w]ithout land, the black man was still bound to the
white; with land, he could chart his own course. The white knew this, and he 'instinctively' refused to sell land to the black." Id. at 280.
56. There is evidence in the congressional debates that the right to contract for
employment was intended by Congress to be secured by the 1866 Act. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866)
(remarks of Representative Lawrence).
In addition, several lower courts have held that section 1981 prohibits private discrimination in employment. E.g., Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th
Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971) ; Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works
of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970) ;
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). But see Smith v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970) (section 1981 not
applicable to private discrimination in employment contracts).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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of hotels, restaurants, and transportation facilities5" would generally be
includable under this approach, while those contracts which are at most
tenuously related to maintaining freedom - e.g., access to theatres and
private clubs 59 - would generally be excluded. Since education has been
recognized as having special significance in maintaining freedom,6 0 it
would seem that section 1981 would encompass contracts of that nature.
Although section 1981, as construed by the McCrary majority, grants
to blacks the right to be free from discrimination in admission to private
schools, the interests of the white students in free association cannot be
unduly impaired. Freedom of association, as correctly pointed out by the
McCrary court, 1 has traditionally been defined as ancillary to freedom
of speech. 0 2 However, since the Supreme Court has dealt with associational
rights primarily in terms of those groups engaged in "the advancement of beliefs and ideas,"0' 8 the question has been left open as to whether or not members of an organization which does not engage in such advocacy come within
the protection of the first amendment 64 on the basis that membership in
the organization is, in itself, an expression of approval of the group's
activities. Thus, although the McCrary court found NAACP v. Alabama6 5
to be controlling on this issue, 6 that case did not foreclose the issue as to
58. Senator Trumbull, the sponsor of the 1866 Act, indicated that the right to
"go and come at pleasure" would be secured by the statute. CONG. REC., 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43 (1866) (remarks of Senator Trumbull). Presumably, such a right would
also include the means of effectuating it, e.g., access to travel accommodations.
59. Had the McCrary court analyzed section 1981 in this way, it would have been
faced with the additional problem of reconciling Tillman with this analysis. See notes
30-32 and accompanying text supra. It is at best questionable whether the right to
be a guest at an all white recreational center, which the Court characterized as a
right to contract, is within the class of contracts which were intended to insure that
blacks would forever remain free. Since, however, the framers of the 1866 Act
specifically singled out the right to buy and sell property from the other contract
rights, see note 11 supra, it is arguable that they intended that any property right is
so fundamental that it must be safeguarded in order to guarantee for blacks the
freedom afforded by the thirteenth amendment. Further, since the right to be a guest
at a swimming pool is a right to access to property, it is at least arguable that the
guest in Tillman was merely being afforded his right to freedom within the meaning
of the 1866 Act.
60. Professor Larson has stated that education is a crucial element in the law
of race relations, hypothesizing that blacks "live in a poorer housing area, because in
turn they have poorer jobs, because in turn they have poorer education." Larson, The
New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 470, 473. He viewed education,
employment, and housing as so interrelated that the black's problems could not be
solved except by confronting all three of these areas of concern. Id.
61. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
62. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
63. Id. at 460. Most cases dealing with freedom of association have involved
groups whose primary purpose was political expression. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See generally
Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right
to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1190-1200.
64. See Comment, note 65 supra, at 1202.
65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
66. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text supra.
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whether or not freedom of association is limited to the situation of group
advocacy. 67 Indeed, there is dicta in other cases to the effect that simply
banding together is a protected associational right. 68
Even if an associational right could be found in this case, the question
would have to be confronted as to whether or not there would be an
interest sufficient to override that right. 69 Since the government has an
interest in insuring equal treatment of all citizens regardless of race, 70
that interest may override the students' associational rights, especially
since, as the McCrary court 'pointed out, the schools would not be prohibited
71
from promulgating any ideas or theories.
Some commentators have submitted that the right of privacy, and not
72
the right of association, is involved in dealing with desegregation cases.
The right of privacy is predicated on the belief that at some point an
individual's activities should be free from governmental interference,7 3
while on the other hand k person should not be heard to complain if there
is interference with an activity which he has in effect made public. 74 This

75
right has been dealt with only in terms of the most intimate relationships,

67. It is interesting to note that the portion of NAACP v. Alabama relied upon
by the McCrary court does not limit the right of association to the area protected by
freedom of speech but merely, underscores the relationship between the two. See
note 43 supra.

68. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe right of 'association,' . . . includes
the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by
affiliation with it or by other lawful means." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965) ; see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("The associational rights which our system honors permit all white,
all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.").
69. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
91 (1961).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

71. See notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
72.
The right of the government to compel personal associations, as by forbidding
racial discrimination in schools . . . is surely not subject to resolution in terms of
a blanket right of association or non-association. Rather such problems . . .
must be framed in terms of drawing the line between the public and private sectors
of our common life. The question is, in short, one of the right of privacy ....
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 20
(1964) (emphasis in original). But see Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1410, 1420 (1974) (freedom of association includes the right not to associate).
73. See Henkin, note 72 supra, at 1413.
74. Such a rationale has been used in cases dealing with the right of privacy,
where it has been held that an inherently private activity divests itself from immunity
from government interference when it is conducted in a public manner. See, e.g.,
Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974) ; Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp.
620 (E.D. Va. 1973); Harris v. United States, 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
75. The Supreme Court, has recognized a right of privacy with respect to the
use of contraceptives, Griswold, v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), obtaining an
abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), possessing obscene materials in the
home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and freedom from electronic surveillance, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a survey of cases dealing
with the right of privacy, see Comment, The Constitutional Right of Privacy: An
Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 263 (1974).
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although it appears that it may be extended further.7 6 Indeed, the majority
in McCrary seemed to suggest that the right of privacy might require
constitutional tolerance of segregated schools in some limited circum77
stances.
Perhaps, however, neither the right of privacy nor freedom of association is an appropriate matter for consideration when dealing with section 1981. Since, of necessity, badges and incidents of slavery must be
involved in any section 1981 action, 78 it is arguable that any rights secured
thereunder are always superior. If this analysis is accepted, the impact
of McCrary will be to proscribe racial discrimination in virtually every
aspect of life.
However, if the privacy limitation which the McCrary court placed
upon section 1981 has validity, the least that McCrary holds is, not that
section 1981 prohibits segregation in private schools, but that the schools
involved in McCrary were not truly "private. '79 Viewed in this light,
McCrary may be a small but significant step in formulating a workable
definition of privacy.
On the other hand, McCrary may be read as standing for the broader
proposition that no school whose enrollment is not limited to the immediate
family 0 can be truly private, 8 ' and thus cannot escape the grasp of section
1981. If construed in this way, McCrary is a great step forward for the
civil rights movement. Following the landmark cases of Brown v. Board
of Education8 2 and Green v. New Kent County School Board,8s many
76. The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the scope of the right of privacy.
The only clear limitation that has been placed on this right is that an activity which
normally would fall within its scope may lose its immunity from governmental interference if it is conducted in a public manner. See note 74 supra.
However, the rationale of the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), might militate against an
expanded concept of privacy. In Griswold, the Court was concerned with the
repugnancy of police enforcement of a ban against contraceptives, 381 U.S. at 485,
while in Wade, the Court emphasized the magnitude of the physical and mental harm
that the state would impose upon a woman who was prohibited from obtaining an
abortion, 410 U.S. at 153. See Comment, note 75 supra, at 277.
77. See note 48 supra.
78. See note 54 supra.
79. 515 F.2d at 1089. See also note 48 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 48 supra.
81. 515 F.2d at 1088-89. This proposition is illustrated by the following quote:
In a country dedicated to the creed that education is the only "sure foundation * *
of freedom," "without which no republic can maintain itself in strength," institutions of learning are not things of purely private concern.
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. La.), new
trial granted, (unreported opinion, E.D. La.), aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962)
(footnotes omitted), quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Whythe,
Aug. 13, 1786, in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 396 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh
eds. 1907) and Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler, May 26, 1810,
in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 393 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1907).
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown held that racial segregation in public schools
was proscribed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 495.
83. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Green took the Brown ruling one step further by
holding that the state has an affirmative duty to desegregate its schools. Id. at 437-38.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 4
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21

white pupils, especially in the South, flocked to private schools in order
that they might isolate themselves from such forced interaction.84 Until
the McCrary decision, this mass exodus remained a "significant threat to
the existence of an effective system of desegregated public education in
much of the South. 85 The impact of the McCrary decision, therefore,
may not only be to allow blacks to be educated in previously all-white
private schools but it may also have a reflex effect of achieving true desegregation in the public school systems.
Joseph S. Bodoff

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - BOND REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED UPON PLAINTIFFS SUING PUBLIC ENTITIES
HELD TO VIOLATE DUE PROCESS WHEN No PRIOR HEARING Is
PROVIDED TO DETERMINE NECESSITY OR REASONABLENESS OF BOND.

Beaudreau v. Superior Court (Cal. 1975)
Plaintiffs, a group of students and parents, brought an action against
a school district and certain of its employees.' Defendants demanded that
plaintiffs post undertakings as security for costs pursuant to sections 9472
and 9513 of the California Government Code, which permit public entities
84. Note, note 7 supra, at 1441.
85. Id. at 1440.
1. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1975). Plaintiffs alleged a deprivation of rights in violation of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. (1970). Since the
instant case involved a pretrial challenge to the bond requirement, the merits of
the plaintiffs' claim under these statutes were not addressed by the court.
2. CAL. GOVT CODE § 947(a) (West 1966). Section 947(a) provides in pertinent part:
At any time after the filing of the complaint in any action against a public
entity, the public entity may file and serve a demand for a written undertaking
on the part of each plaintiff as security for the allowable costs which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. The undertaking shall be in the amount of one
hundred dollars ($100) for each plaintiff or in the case of multiple plaintiffs
in the amount of two hundred dollars ($200) or such greater sum as the court
shall fix upon good cause shown, with at least two sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court. Unless the plaintiff files such undertaking within 20 days
after service of a demand therefor, his action shall be dismissed.
Id.

3. Id. § 951 (a). Section 951 (a) provides in pertinent part:
At any time after the filing of the complaint in any action against a public employee or former public employee, if a public entity undertakes to provide for the
defense of the action, the attorney for the public employee may file and serve a
demand for a written undertaking on the part of each plaintiff as security for the
allowable costs which may be awarded against such plaintiff. The undertaking
shall be in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100), or such greater sum as the
court shall fix upon good cause shown, with at least two sufficient sureties, to be
approved by the court. Unless the plaintiff files such undertaking within 20 days
after service of the demand therefor, his action shall be dismissed.
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and public employees to make a demand for undertakings without a prior
4
court order in any action brought against them.
Upon plaintiffs' motion to quash defendants' demands, the trial court
upheld sections 947 and 951 against due process and equal protection
attacks, 5 reduced the amount demanded, and ordered the filing of the reduced
demand within 20 days upon penalty of dismissal.6 Upon plaintiffs' petition for relief, 7 the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding the
statutes which required plaintiffs to post, upon a defendant's demand, a
written undertaking as security for allowable costs in actions filed against
public entities or employees deprived plaintiffs of property without due
process of law because the statutes failed to provide for a prior hearing
with regard to the merits of a plaintiff's case, the necessity of an undertaking, or its reasonableness. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d
448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
Prior to its consideration of sections 947 and 9518 in Beaudreau, the
California Supreme Court in Brooks v. Small Claims Court9 had held an
analogous statutory requirement that appellants post a bond for costs before
4. 14 Cal. 3d at 451, 535 P.2d at 714, 121 ,Cal. Rptr. at 586.
5. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

6. 14 Cal. 3d at 451-52, 535 P.2d at 714, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 586. Defendants had
served seven documents upon plaintiffs demanding undertakings in amounts totaling
$25,700. The trial court reduced this amount to $20,900 after determining the original
demand to be in excess of statutory limitations absent a showing of good cause. Id.
7. Id. at 451, 535 P.2d at 714, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 586. The plaintiffs abandoned

the equal protection argument in their petition and sought relief solely upon the alleged
denial of due process. Id.
8. For the text of these sections, see notes 2 & 3 supra. By enacting these
statutes requiring plaintiffs to file an undertaking in any action against a public entity
or employee, the California legislature apparently intended to deter frivolous suits.
14 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 535 P.2d at 715, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 587. The court noted that
although the purpose underlying the statute was to protect public entities, the legislature did not intend to place an unreasonable burden upon plaintiffs with meritorious
claims. Id. at n.6.
Sections 947 and 951 were enacted as part of a comprehensive statutory
scheme to control government tort liability. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810 et seq.
(West 1966). The statutory design was, in part, a response to the judicial abrogation
of governmental immunity pronounced by the California Supreme Court in Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). In
response to Muskopf, the state legislature enacted a "moratorium" which stayed the
effect of Muskopf until the spring of 1963 when the present scheme of governmental
tort liability became effective. Law of Sept. 15, 1961, ch. 1404, § 1, [19611 Cal. Laws
22.3 (expired 1963). In essence, the legislation provides for complete governmental
immunity, absent express statutory waiver. Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281,
57 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1967). In Sava, the court explained that "by section 815 [of the
California Government Code,] immunity becomes the rule, and we must look to the
sections of the act following that section for exceptions." Id. at 284, 57 Cal. Rptr. at
313. For extensive analysis of the available avenues of relief under these statutes, see
Comment, Our Sufferance is a Gain to Them: An Analysis of the Constitutionality
of California's Scheme for Suing the Government in Tort, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L, REV.
611 (1974).
9. 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973).
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appealing the adverse decision of a small claims court to violate due process.
Stating that the landmark decisions of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.10
and Fuentes v. Shevin" had expanded the development of the constitutional
right of due process to include ex parte seizures of property without procedural safeguards, 12 the Brooks court noted that California had, as a result
of these decisions, struck down various ex parte summary procedures as
violative of due process.' 3 Analogizing a bond requirement to the seizures
by creditors in Sniadach and Fuentes, the Brooks court reasoned that in
both situations the ex parte demand had resulted in a taking of property,
and that even if the taking were only temporary, interim deprivations of
property had become firmly imbedded in the due process calculus. 14 Thus,
by extending the reach of the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale to the Brooks
situation, the California Supreme Court had established a substantial
precedent for the Beaudreau decision.
The Beaudreau court first considered the purpose and function of
sections 947 and 951, noting that although these statutes purported to
deter unmeritorious litigation, they applied to all claims against a public
entity, regardless of merit. 15 The court observed that if a defendant limited
his demand to the amount automatically allowed by statute, 16 no prior
or subsequent judicial approval was required. 17 Further, the court noted
that defendants in an ex parte proceeding could, if good cause were shown,
have the court fix undertakings in greater amounts.' 8 The court determined that unless the plaintiff were indigent, 19 failure to meet either the
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

11. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
12. 8 Cal. 3d at 666, 504 P.2d at 1252, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 788; see Note,
Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment is a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach
Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 986 (1970) ;
Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023 (1973).
13. The California progeny of the Sniadach rationale include Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (invalidating prejudgment attachment procedure) ; Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (invalidating prejudgment replevin claim and delivery remedy);
Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970) (invalidating prejudgment wage garnishment procedure); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal.
3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970) (invalidating prejudgment attachment of wages). Although affirming the proposition that an individual must be
afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, these cases left intact the exception announced by Sniadach
for extraordinary circumstances. See 395 U.S. at 339.
14. 8 Cal. 3d at 667, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 789; see Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
15. 14 Cal. 3d at 453, 535 P.2d at 715, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
16. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
17. 14 Cal. 3d at 453, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
18. Id. at 453-54, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
19. Id. The court pointed out that plaintiffs qualifying to proceed in forma
pauperis might be relieved from the undertaking requirement. Id; see Conover v.
Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 523 P.2d 682, 114 'Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974) ; County of Sutter v.
Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966). In Brooks, the
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defendant's statutory demand, or one fixed after a showing of good cause,
would result in dismissal of plaintiff's action.20 The court then recognized
21
that California had consistently struck down similar summary procedures
since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Sniadach.22 Applying the
Sniadach rationale, and also its own decision in Brooks, the court reasoned
that an undertaking requirement could result in a denial of due process
23
by temporarily depriving the plaintiff of the funds used for the bond.
The court held, therefore, that the statutes required an unconstitutional
taking of property if the plaintiff complied with the statute by filing the
24
undertaking.
The court also concluded that the statutes allowed an unconstitutional
deprivation of property where the plaintiff refused to file the undertaking
and incurred a dismissal of his action. 25 Relying principally upon Board
of Regents v. Roth,26 the court stated that a meritorious action against a
public entity or employee was a "legitimate claim of entitlement" 2 7 and
therefore was a protected property interest.
Having concluded that sections 947 and 951 effectuated a dual taking
of property, the court's analysis shifted to the issue of what process was
due the plaintiffs. The court noted that, although formality and procedural
requisites could vary, 2s some form of appropriate notice and meaningful
hearing was required 29 before the plaintiff could be deprived of the property
interest.3 0 Under the instant facts, the court determined that a meaningful
hearing would require inquiry into whether the statutory purpose was
promoted by the imposition of the undertaking requirement. 8 ' The focus
of the inquiry should be upon a determination of the meritorious nature
California Supreme Court found that it was immaterial whether a person could afford
the deprivation of his property, stating that a denial of due process affects the rich
as well as the poor. 8 Cal. 3d at 670, 504 P.2d at 1255, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
20. 14 Cal. 3d at 454, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
21. See note 12 supra.
22. 14 Cal. 3d at 455, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
23. 14 Cal. 3d at 456, 535 P.2d at 717, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The court further
stated that if a corporate surety was used, plaintiffs would suffer a deprivation of the
nonrefundable premium. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Court held that a nontenured teacher had
no property interest in reemployment following the expiration of his 1 year contract,
and therefore no due process hearing was mandated when he was not rehired. In so
concluding, the Court asserted that the fourteenth amendment protects only those
property interests to which the individual has "a legitimate claim of entitlement."
Id. at 577.
27. 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
28. Id. at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 591, citing Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
29. 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 591, citing Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
30. 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 591, citing Brooks v.
Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973).
31. 14 Cal. 3d at 460, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
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of the action as well as the necessity and reasonableness of the under32
taking to protect and reimburse the defendant.
The court concluded by rejecting the defendants' remaining arguments. First, the court declined to distinguish between "rights" and
"privileges," in response to the defendants' contention that, as a "privilege,"
the ability to bring an action against a public entity could be made conditional.3 3 The court also dismissed defendants' argument that a similar
bond requirement, imposed in shareholders' derivative suits, had been
upheld as constitutional3 4 since the relevant statute contained notice and
hearing provisions.3 5 Finally, although the defendants' urged that the
Supreme Court had retreated from the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale in
37
recent decisions, 36 the court stated that this rationale had been reaffirmed
3
5
in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chent, Inc., which invalidated a
garnishment statute, and in Goss v. Lopez, 3 9 which held that high school
students facing temporary suspensions from public schools had a protected
property interest under the due process clause.
In Beaudreau, the property interests were twofold: the use of the
undertaking funds and the maintenance of a claim against a public entity
or its employees. 40 The Beaudreau court found a due process violation
32. Id.
33. Id. at 461, 535 P.2d at 721, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 593. The concept that constitutional rights are contingent upon characterization of a governmental benefit as a
"right" or "privilege" has been abrogated by the United States Supreme Court.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 (1970).
34. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). For the text of the
statute, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 834(b) (West 1955). Moreover, in Cohen, a shareholders derivative action, plaintiff did not raise the procedural due process issue.
35. 14 Cal. 3d at 462, 535 P.2d at 721-22, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
36. Id. at 463-65, 535 P.2d at 722-24, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 594-96. Defendants contended that the rulings in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding
an ex parte sequestration creditor remedy), and in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974) (holding a provision prohibiting removal without cause of nonprobationary
governmental employees as not creating a protected expectancy in job retention),
reduced the potency of the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale. 14 Cal. 3d at 463-65, 535 P.2d
at 722-24, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 594-96.
37. The instant court held that even if such a retreat was occurring, the Beaudreau
decision was supported under the California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13,
cl. 6. 14 Cal. 3d at 462-63, 535 P.2d at 722-23, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95. Moreover, the
Beaudreau court found that Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), and

Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), were factually distinguishable. Claiming that

the Grant and Arnett statutes provided for pre-deprivation procedural safeguards,
involved situations requiring prompt action, and permitted a prompt post-deprivation
due process hearing, the Beaudreau court found those cases inapposite to the present
case, which lacked such safeguards.
38. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
39. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), noted in 20 VILL. L. REV. 1069 (1975).
40. 14 Cal, 3d at 456, 535 P.2d at 717, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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287

through an application of the Sniadach-Fuentesrationale that a temporary
deprivation of a property interest requires due process safeguards. 41 However, in doing so, the court deemphasized the requisite initial determination
of whether the property was of a type protected by the due process clause.
In making this determination, distinct property interests should receive
differentiated due process analysis. 42 For example, when deciding whether
procedural due process rights attached to a public employee's interest in
continued employment, the Supreme Court in Arnett v. Kennedy43 relied
upon Roth,44 and Perry v. Sinderman,45 both of which dealt with the governmental employer-employee relationship and requirements regarding its
termination. The Arnett Court rejected arguments that its decision should
be guided by Sniadach or Fuentes, which, according to the Arnett Court,
4
involved a separate sphere of due process.
By injecting the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale into the facts of Brooks
and the instant case, the California Supreme Court may have transplanted
a fertile concept to a field requiring a different analytical seed. A review
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Sniadach, Fuentes, and subsequent
cases reveals that this line of cases primarily involved debtors' rights with
regard to temporary deprivations of property affected by ex parte creditor
remedies. 47 Although the demands by an appellee in Brooks and by the
41. Id.
42. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154-55 (1974). In Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Supreme Court noted that a due
process analysis "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected." Id.
at 895.
43. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
44. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
45. 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (a college teacher should be permitted to show a property interest in his continued employment by proving the existence of a de facto
tenure system).
46. 416 U.S. at 154-55.
47. In Sniadach, the court struck down as violative of due process a statute which
allowed garnishment of wages without notice and a prior hearing. 395 U.S. at 342.
Replevin statutes were held unconstitutional upon similar grounds in Fuentes. 407
U.S. at 96. Fuentes was arguably "repossessed" 2 years later by Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), which upheld a Louisiana sequestration statute. See
Newton and Timmons, Fuentes "Repossessed," 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 469 (1974). In
his concurring opinion in Mitchell, Justice Powell stated that "[tihe Court's decision
today withdraws significantly from the full reach of the [Fuentes] principle, and to
this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled." 416 U.S. at 623
(Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). However, in 1975, the Court either "resuscitated" Fuentes or narrowed the implications of Mitchell by deciding North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The majority opinion limited the Mitchell holding
to the situation where the seizure was preceded by a writ issued by a judge after affidavits were filed clearly showing facts entitling the creditor to sequestration, and where
the debtor was entitled to an immediate hearing subsequent to the seizure in which the
creditor had the burden of proof to uphold the sequestration order. Id. at 606-07.
In the California progeny of Sniadach, the California Supreme Court solely
addressed the problem of ex parte seizures of debtors' property by creditors. See
cases cited in note 13 supra.
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defendants in Beaudreau were ex parte, there was no accompanying
seizure of property, which arguably, constituted the sine qua non of the
Sniadach-Fuentesrationale.4 8 Rather, the result of the ex parte proceeding
4 9
in Beaudreau was an undertaking demand upon penalty of dismissal.
Although the foregoing strongly suggests that the Sniadach-Fuentes
analysis was inapposite, other arguments are supportive of the court's
approach. The taking in Beaudreau, like the seizures in Sniadach and
Fuentes, benefited one party to the detriment of the other. Furthermore,
by analogy, the taking of the plaintiffs' cause of action in Beaudreau for
failure to post the undertaking was similar to the seizure of the debtor's
property in Sniadach and Fuentes and the temporary deprivation of the
undertaking funds resembled the interim deprivations of property in
Sniadach and Fuentes. Hence, the only substantive distinction between
Sniadach and Beaudreau was with regard to the nature of the property
interests involved. However, it is precisely this distinction that arguably
should determine the nature of the application of due process, since, as
has been stated, different property interests necessitate individualized due
process analysis.
The second taking aspect found by the court was the potential dismissal of the action for failure to file the undertaking. The court stated:
"A meritorious action against a public entity or public employee clearly
connotes a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' within the meaning of Roth."50
It is submitted, that the legitimate claim of entitlement to which the court
referred, 51 may be described more accurately as a person's right-of-access
to the courts. Both the undertaking requirement in the instant case and
the appeal bond in Brooks created obstacles in the path of such access
and arguably should have been subject to scrutiny on the basis of whether
such obstacles created constitutionally impermissible burdens upon the
parties involved. 52 The Beaudreau court, however, based its decision
53
regarding both alleged taking aspects upon the Sniadach-Fuentesrationale.
Doctrinal analysis respecting the right of access could be cast in
terms of due process.5 4 Under this approach the Sniadach-Fuentesrationale
48. But cf. Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After
Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 571 (1973).
49. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
50. 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590, quoting 408 U.S.
at 577.
51. Id. at 455, 535 P.2d at 717, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
52. See Driscoll v. Plymouth Twp., 13 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 320 A.2d 444 (1974)
(holding a constitutional challenge of an appeal bond to a zoning hearing to stand
or fall under a right-of-access analysis).
53. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
54. The right of access has been recently treated with fifth and fourteenth amendment due process approaches in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, reh. denied, 411
U.S. 922 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); and Boddie v.
Connedticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court found required filing and
service-of-process fees violative of the fourteenth amendment due process rights of

indigent divorce plaintiffs. Id. at 382.
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would be inapposite, since it applies to issues of procedural due process
and not to problems involving substantive rights such as the access right.55
If the court had adopted the right-of-access analysis, this would have led to
an inquiry of whether the undertaking requirement contravened the substantive right-of-access per se, rather than whether the requirement caused
a taking of property necessitating prior procedural safeguards. Such an
inquiry may have led the court to uphold the bond requirement. 56
However, the court may have avoided the right-of-access approach
due to the lack of precedent for application of that proposition in factual
settings not involving indigents.5 7 Furthermore, the Sniadach-Fuentes
approach afforded the further benefit of permitting the court to tailor a
type of hearing in accord with the statutes' legislative purpose, by ensuring
that the merits of plaintiffs' claim, as well as the reciprocal questions
regarding the necessity and reasonableness of any undertaking, be the
58
focus of the due process hearing.
However, since the Beaudreau court did not further elaborate on what
process is due, both practitioners and legislators are left to speculate as
to the exact type of procedure which would satisfy this mandate. Standards
and procedures to be applied in these hearings may have to be developed
on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the exact substantive claim alleged.
Unlike the ordinary debtor-creditor situation where a meaningful hearing
simply focuses upon a single inquiry, i.e., the debtor's defenses to the
creditor's action,59 a Beaudreau-type hearing would necessarily be more
55. The Boddie Court did not rely upon the Sniadach "taking" analysis, but rather,
viewed this right as substantive. 401 U.S. at 382-83.
56. It is submitted that this doctrinal approach should have been addressed by
the Beaudreau court, since the Beaudreau plaintiffs arguably had a substantive right
of access to the courts as well as the procedural right not to be denied such access
without a hearing. The problem with this approach is twofold. First, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions may have limited Boddie's application to cases where the
obstacle to court-access involves an "exclusive precondition" or a "fundamental relationship." See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973)
(upholding fee requirements as applied to indigents seeking to appeal welfare agency
decisions) ; United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding fee requirements
against indigents seeking discharges in bankruptcy); Comment, supra note 48.
Secondly, the right-of-access approach has apparently been restricted to cases involving indigents. The Beaudreau plaintiffs had available the in forma pauperis
procedure, so indigent access was not in issue. See note 19 supra. Hence, it is submitted that, since the Beaudreau plaintiffs did not assert a fundamental relationship
and since they did not proceed as indigents, the Beaudreau court would have had to
uphold the bond requirement under the right-of-access analysis.
The right-of-access issue could also be raised under the first amendment. See
generally Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents,
82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973). The benefit of this approach would be to anchor the
access right to a specific constitutional safeguard, thereby placing a heavier burden
of justification upon governmental restrictions. Id. at 1071.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. 14 Cal. 3d at 460, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (1975). Any hearing
on the merits obviously would further the statutory intent by weeding out frivolous
and unmeritorious claims.
59. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) ; Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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problematic. The formulation of procedural standards, as proposed by
Beaudreau, would involve a twofold inquiry, taking into account both the
reasonableness of the undertaking and the nonfrivolous nature of the
claim.
Whether a protracted inquiry into a plaintiff's claim is now required
remains unclear and perhaps will be a source of contention in future
litigation. It is possible that the hearings will serve the purposes of the
statute in that once a claim has been determined frivolous, it would be
infrequent that a plaintiff would continue his action. Thus, depending
upon the particular procedures which are developed, the Beaudreau court
may have effectuated the aim of the statute to deter unmeritorious litigation while employing the tool of due process.
Practically, the Beaudreau decision may lead to future challenges of
bond requirements by plaintiffs who, under various statutes, are required to
post bonds after ex parte proceedings before they may maintain their
actions. Statutory bond requirements in taxpayer actions, for temporary
restraining orders, in shareholder actions,6 0 in actions by nonresidents,
and for appeal bonds0 ' might all suffer from constitutional infirmity if
62
the Beaudreau rationale is widely adopted.
Furthermore, the reasoning in Beaudreau may have an impact upon
the future use of the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale in other than creditordebtor ex parte remedy situations. Specifically, Brooks and Beaudreau
may have opened the courtroom doors to right-of-access claims, while
utilizing a procedural due process approach in finding a protected property
interest.
In conclusion, the Beaudreau decision furthers the firm stance of
the present California Supreme Court against ex parte procedures involving
alleged takings of property. Although this stance would have arguably
been firmer if analyzed as a substantive right-of-access problem, the
California Supreme Court should nevertheless be applauded for its novel
application of the Sniadach-Fuentes rationale.
David E. Worby

60. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) ; see note 34 supra.
61. See note 52 supra. For an analysis of the effects of Beaudreau upon other
California statutorily required court bonds, see Comment, Due Process and Security
for Expense Statutes: An Analysis of California Statutes in Light of Recent Trends,
7 PAc. L.J. 176 (1976).
62. If the Beaudreau analysis is adopted by other jurisdictions, this would require
redrafting of statutes. See Comment, supra note 60. It appears difficult to limit the
Beaudreau holding to the facts of the case, since all ex parte bond requirements suffer
from the same constitutional infirmities which the Supreme Court of California emphasized in invalidating the statute in the instant case: denial of use of funds and
the deprivation of a cause of action.
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-

SCHOOL

BOARD

POLICY

REQUIRING

CHILDREN OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO ATTEND DESEGREGATED
PUBLIC SCHOOLS RATHER THAN PRIVATE SEGREGATED SCHOOLS HELD
NOT VIOLATIVE

OF FIRST AMENDMENT

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

OR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION.

Cook v. Hudson (5th Cir. 1975)
Prior to the beginning of the school term, the principal of a Mississippi
public school refused to recommend three public school teachers for reemployment' since the teachers violated the terms of an unwritten school
board policy that prohibited public school teachers from enrolling their own
children in racially segregated schools. 2 Seeking reinstatement and ancillary
relief, the teachers brought suit against the county board of education and
other school officials,8 challenging the constitutionality of both the policy

itself and their dismissals pursuant thereto. 4 Specifically, plaintiffs argued
two major theories of allegedly unconstitutional board action: 1) the board

1. Cook v. Hudson, 511 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W.
4246 (U.S. March 2, 1976) (No. 75-503). Under Mississippi law, reemployment of
teachers involves a two-step recommendation process. First, the school principal
recommends teachers to the superintendent. Second, the superintendent recommends
those teachers whom he approves to the school board. Since no tenure system exists
in the State, each recommendation is critical in the decision to reemploy the teacher.
Failure to obtain a recommendation results in the termination of employment upon
the expiration of the prior contract. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-9-17 (1972). For an
application of Mississippi's statutory procedure in which the court refused to compel
the school board to contract with a teacher, see Jennings v. Meridian Municipal
Separate School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Miss.),.aff'd, 453 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.
1971).
2. 511 F.2d at 744. Although the board policy was never formally reduced to
writing, testimony established that the policy adoptedwas as follows:
Prior to the employment of a new teacher, or the reemployment of an existing
teacher, the children of any such teacher, if living in Calhoun County, Mississippi,
will be required to attend the public schools of Calhoun County or said teacher
will not be employed or reemployed.
Id. at 746. At the time of the policy's enactment, the teachers' children attended
Calhoun Academy, found by the lower court to be the only private school located
in the county then or in preceding years and thus, the prime target of the board's
policy. Id.
3. Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Miss. 1973). Federal court jurisdiction was exercised under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The teachers, alleging an
unconstitutional deprivation of their rights, based their claim for relief upon 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. 365 F. Supp. at 856, 858. In 1968, after a court-ordered "freedom of choice"
plan fell short of achieving true desegregation, the district court directed the county
school officials to act affirmatively to transform the dual system into a unitary school
system by, inter alia, taking proper care in selecting and dismissing faculty. Id. at 856.
The adoption of the policy was motivated by the board's endeavor to comply with
the 1968 order. It embodied the board's fear that allowing public school teachers to
enroll their children in private schools would necessarily subject the teachers to
divided loyalties where absolute dedication was desirable. More importantly, the board
felt that the black students would suffer a decrease in their learning ability upon
perceiving the teachers' prejudice against integrated schools. Id. at 860. For a more
extensive development of the general background in Cook, see id. at 856.
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policy infringed their first amendment5 right to select the school in which to
educate their children, and 2) the policy violated the fourteenth amendment
as an arbitrary and capricious regulation. 7 Defendants asserted in response
the absence of viable first amendment rights in the teachers' continuing
employment and the rationality of the board policy under traditional equal
protection scrutiny." The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi dismissed the complaint and upheld the board policy,
finding its enactment to have been justified by the board's paramount educational interest in achieving integration, despite the policy's impingement
upon the teachers' rights as parents. 9 Moreover, the court found the equal
protection objections to be hurdled by discerning a rational relationship
between the policy and several valid state objectives.' 0
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
6. U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 365 F. Supp. at 858.
8. Id. The United States Supreme Court has employed the doctrine of reasonable classification to test laws, ordinances, or policies for violations of the equal
protection clause. Under this doctrine, often denominated "the rational relation
test," the decisive questions are: 1) did the legislature or board have a constitutionally

permissible purpose in taking its action, and 2) is the resultant classification reasonably
related to accomplishing that purpose? The court need take only a cursory look at
the nature of the classification, since it must assume the existence of any set of facts
which can reasonably be conceived to sustain the law. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970). However, if the classification is labeled "suspect" or
if it interferes with a "fundamental right," the Supreme Court has required a showing
of a compelling state interest to justify the classification. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]. Chief
Judge Keady of the district court asserted that the rational relation test was the
proper standard by which to weigh the validity of the school board policy in Cook.
365 F. Supp. at 860.
9. 365 F. Supp. at 860. Chief Judge Keady also conveniently disposed of two
additional claims, namely, that the regulation was overbroad and that it violated the
procedural due process rights of the claimants by failing to afford them a hearing.
With regard to the overbreadth issue, he easily construed the policy in the "limited
terms intended by the board," thus avoiding a frontal constitutional attack, and
expressed no opinion as to its potential applications to children attending schools
other than Calhoun Academy. Id. at 859-60. He rejected the due process claim,
stating that no hearing was necessary under the circumstances. Id. at 861, citing
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(no requirement that a nontenured
teacher be afforded a hearing unless the nonretention deprived the teacher of some
interest in liberty or property protected by fourteenth amendment). Even conceding
that a hearing was necessary, Chief Judge Keady observed that the teachers had
received a full hearing at trial. 365 F. Supp. at 861.
10. 365 F. Supp. at 860. The rational relationship was established by the testimony of two educational psychologists who espoused the following concerns:
[T]he challenged policy was significantly related to a teacher's effectiveness and
job performance: students in desegregated classes are likely to perceive rejection,
and experience a sense of inferiority, from a teacher whose own children attend
a nearby racially segregated school, and be inclined to perform at a lower
educational level.
Id. In addition to the state's interest in preserving teacher effectiveness, the district
court also noted two other legitimate state interests served by the board policy:
prevention of white flight from the school system and cultivation of teacher loyalty

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss2/4

22

Denbo: Constitutional Law - Civil Rights - Discrimination against Blacks

1975-1976]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On appeal, a divided" Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the school board policy requiring the children of public school
teachers to attend public schools and the non-renewal of the teachers'
contracts for failure to comply with the policy did not violate the teachers'
first amendment or fourteenth amendment rights. Cook v. Hudson, 511
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. March
2, 1976) (No. 75-503).
Along with other public employees, public school teachers had been
excluded by the courts from the sweep of full constitutional protection by
virtue of the right-privilege doctrine.' 2 Under this doctrine, since public
employment was a privilege which could be lawfully withheld, the state
or its affiliated agencies could condition employment in any manner, even
in derogation of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 1 3 Justice Holmes'
blunt declaration in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,1 4 in 1892, epitomized the right-privilege distinction through which the judiciary viewed
public employment for almost 80 years :15"the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
to the public schools. Id. For a complete and well-documented commentary on the
district court opinion, see Comment, Cook v. Hudson: State's Interest in Integration
versus the First Amendment Rights of the Public Schoolteacher, 45 Miss. L.J. 953
(1974).
11. Judges Coleman and Roney each filed separate opinions, with Judge Clark
writing a per curiam preliminary statement and a separate dissenting opinion. A
footnote to Judge Clark's dissenting opinion reveals that the dissent was originally
written as a "proposed majority opinion to reverse the judgment of the district
court." 511 F.2d at 750 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting).
12. Ashe & DeWolfe, Procedural Due Process and Labor Relations in Public
Education: A Union Perspective, 3 J.LAW & EDUC. 561, 561-63 (1974). Forced to
chose between remaining employed and freely exercising constitutional rights, teachers
often were induced to surrender their legitimate rights without remedy in the courts.
Commentators have suggested that teachers may in fact have been forerunners in
ameliorating the plight of the public servant and in paving the way for union members
and others to challenge this narrowing of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id.

at 612.
13. Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions upon Public Employment: New Departures in the Protection of First Amendment Rights, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 129, 130
(1969). For applications of the right-privilege doctrine, see cases cited in note 15
infra.
14. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (upholding a municipal police department
rule prohibiting policemen from certain political involvement).
15. The 80-year span extended from 1882 to 1967, when the Supreme Court
decided Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See note 21 infra.
The key early decision which limited the freedoms of public servants by application
of the right-privilege distinction was Ex parte Curtis, 106 US. 371 (1882). Justice
Bradley's vigorous dissent in Curtis, id. at 376-77 (Bradley, J.,dissenting), marked
virtually the only time the right-privilege doctrine was disputed until 1947, when
Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge dissented from the Supreme Court decision in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See note 17 infra. For a
case in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, applying a privilege
doctrine rationale, readily upheld the dismissal of a federal employee on grounds of
her association with certain "subversive" organizations, see Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
See also Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 4

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

policeman."' 16 Later United States Supreme Court decisions such as
United Public Workers v. Mitchel 1 7 and Adler v. Board of Education 8
qualified the right-privilege theory by requiring only that any condition
attached to employment be reasonable. 19 However, the years following the
Adler decision saw the logic of these earlier privilege doctrine cases being
rejected increasingly by the Supreme Court.20
16. 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
17. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). In a 4-3 decision, the Mitchell Court upheld the Hatch
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324 et seq. (1970), which prohibits active political work by civil
service employees, on the grounds that imposition of this prohibition was a reasonable
way in which to promote the efficiency and integrity of public service. 330 U.S. at 99.
The Court's emphasis upon the reasonableness of the regulation indicated that the
restrictions were tested under the due process rationality standard rather than under
the stricter balancing scrutiny reserved for infringements of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. See id. at 102-03. The Hatch Act was again upheld recently in United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). However, in the latter case, the statute survived a more stringent review by the Court, i.e.,
the balancing test. Id. at 564; see Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 603 (1973).
In Broaderick, the companion case to Letter Carriers,the Supreme Court also upheld
Oklahoma's statutory equivalent of the Hatch Act against a challenge by state employees. Id. at 556.
18. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). In Adler, the Supreme Court again couched in due
process terms its holding that a New York statute barring employment to those who
advocated violent overthrow of the government was a reasonable restriction. Id. at
492. But see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
There is no agreement within the Supreme Court as to the precise status of
Adler. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra at 605, wherein Justice Brennan
noted that the "constitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected
its major premise." But see id. at 625 (Clark, J., dissenting). See generally Grossman,
Public Employment and Free Speech: Can They be Reconciled?, 24 AD. L. REV. 109
(1972) ; Palmer, Due Process Termination of Untenured Teachers, 1 J. LAw & EDUC.
469 (1972).
19. For an argument that the Mitchell rationality approach should be considered
proper, see Grossman, supra note 18.
20. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In that case,
the Supreme Court stated:
To the extent that the [opinion below] may be read to suggest that teachers
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens . . . it proceeds on a premise that has been
unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.
Id. For prior decisions in which teachers challenged restrictions upon their constitutional rights and wherein the Court summarily rejected the privilege argument, see,
e.g., Baggett v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
368 U.S. 278 (1961) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Speiser v. Randal,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; Weiman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). For examples of similar cases outside the context
of education, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961).
Federal employees are indebted to Justice Douglas, who carried on their battle
against second-class citizenship for 30 years. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights
of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy,
16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 751 (1969); see Barksy v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442
(1953) where Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion stated:
By the same reasoning a man has no constitutional right to teach, to work in
a filling station, to be a grocery clerk, to mine coal, to tend a furnace, or to be
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Today, full constitutional rights have been restored to public school
teachers who no longer lose their constitutional rights solely by virtue of
their employment in the public sector. 21 Likewise, it is axiomatic that even
non-tenured teachers may not be deprived of a public position for constitutionally impermissible reasons.2 2 Despite the demise of the absolute power

on the assembly line. By that reasoning a man has no constitutional right to
work.
• . . Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to
own property....
The dictum of Holmes [in McAuliffe, 155 Mass. at 220, 29 IN.E. at 517]
gives a distortion to the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 472 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The right-privilege distinction has been circumvented in several ways, notably
by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions which has been articulated thus:
[Wihatever an express constitutional provision forbids government to do directly
it equally forbids government to do indirectly. As a consequence, it seems to
follow that the first amendment forbids the government to condition its largess
upon the willingness of the petitioner to surrender a right which he would
otherwise be entitled to exercise as a private citizen.
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968). This doctrine appeared frequently in law
review material. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1595 (1960) ; Comment, Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: Progress Toward
Protection, 49 N. CAR. L. REv. 302 (1971) ; Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Another Look].
For specific discussions of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as applied in
situations other than the school system, see O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Willcox,
Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL
L. REv. 12 (1955).
Another way in which the courts have avoided the harsh results generated
by the right-privilege doctrine has been to recognize that teachers or governmental
employees may have constitutionally protected interests in "liberty" and "property"
by virtue of their employment. Due process of law must be accorded to the teacher if
such a protected interest exists. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ; Ashe & DeWolfe, supra note 12, at
579-613.
21. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian, the
teachers were not rehired due to their failure to sign an affidavit, which was required by
statute, stating that they were not Communists. Id. at 592. The Supreme Court found
that the New York statute which barred from employment in public schools any
persons wilfully advocating or teaching the forcible overthrow of the government was
unconstitutional. Id. at 604. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, based his conclusion partly upon vagueness principles, but he carefully noted that teachers' employment could not be conditioned upon surrender of constitutional rights. Id. at 605;
see cases cited in note 20 supra.
For a thorough review of the constitutional rights of teachers in light of their
performance of a governmental function, see Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Developments in the Law Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1065-1128 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Academic Freedom].
22. For examples of situations in which teachers were allegedly dismissed for
unconstitutional reasons, see McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968)
(teacher dismissed for exercising his right to join a union) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364
F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967) (teacher dismissed for
exercising her right to engage in civil rights activity). See also Griffis & Wilson,
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granted to school boards by the right-privilege doctrine,23 education officials,
nevertheless, may qualify the first amendment freedoms of their employees
in certain circumstances, since teachers still enjoy no constitutional right
24
to work.
Presented with the worrisome problem of defining the limits of teachers'
first amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court responded in Pickering v.
Board of Education25 with a call for a balancing of interests. 26 In Pickering,
generally regarded as the modern manifesto of first amendment rights of
public school teachers, 27 Justice Marshall noted that the state's interests
in governing its citizens differed in kind from its interests in regulating its
own employees. 28 He sketched the proper parameters of teachers' rights
in oft-cited dicta:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen ...

and the interest of the State, as an em-

ployer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs
29
through its employees.
ConstitutionalRights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal of a Public School Teacher's
Employment Contract, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 549 (1973); Jacobsen, Sperry & Jensen,
The Dismissal and Non-Reemployment of Teachers, 1 J. LAW & EDuc. 435 (1972).
23. See note 20 supra. For a discussion of the major misconceptions regarding
the discretion of school boards, see Note, An Illinois Teacher's Right to Retention,
48 C.-KENT L. REv. 80, 82-85 (1971).
24. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
955 (1973); Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971);
Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Slochower
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). In Slochower, the Supreme Court described the
"no constitutional right to work" concept as follows: "To state that a person does not
have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say that he must
comply with reasonable, lawful and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by the proper
authorities." Id. at 555. Thus, the "no constitutional right to work" tenet of public
employment has not been interpreted literally by the Supreme Court to allow public
employers to impose unreasonable and unconstitutional terms.
25. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
26. The courts have frequently resorted to balancing the divergent interests of
private citizens and governmental authorities in the context of first amendment
freedoms. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 516 (1960); Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 US. 516 (1960) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). In
Barenblatt, the Court employed a balancing test to determine the superior interest
between the congressional power of inquiry into alleged Communist infiltration into
the education field and the individual's first amendment rights protecting him from
compelled disclosure. Id. at 126-34.
It should be noted that the Court has unanimously held that one's constitutional right to use desegregated facilities cannot be balanced away. An attempt to do
so in Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 27 (E.D. Ark.) rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.
1958) was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that "law and order are not
here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights."
Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
27. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
972 (1973).
28. 391 U.S. at 568.
29. Id.
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Justice Marshall deftly avoided articulating an absolute standard,3 0 thereby
requiring the lower courts to engage in a balancing analysis on a case-by-case
basis. 31
The significance of the Cook case lies in the novel interests pitted
against one another before the Fifth Circuit, which was prepared with only
the vague guidepost of Pickering. Despite a firm national commitment to
the eradication of racial discrimination from all public schools, 2 the teachers
in Cook sought to exercise their first amendment rights to associate freely ss
with groups who practiced racial discrimination.8 4 Framed in the balancing
language suggested by Pickering, the Cook case posed this question:
Should the balancing between the parents' interest in freedom of association
30. Id. at 569.
Justice Marshall commented: "Because of the enormous variety of fact situations . .. we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a
general standard against which all such statements may be judged." Id.
31. Justice Marshall did, however, identify certain factors to be considered, the
most important of which was the extent to which the protected activity interferes with
proper performance of the employee's duty. Id. at 572-73. Other legitimate interests
mentioned by the Court were: 1) the need to maintain discipline or harmony; 2) the
need for confidentiality in the speech context; and 3) the need to encourage a close
and personal relationship between the employee and his superior. Id. at 569-72.
It is important to note that the Pickering balancing test has been used both
to determine the legitimacy of the challenged restrictions and to evaluate the validity
of a teacher's dismissal based upon protected activity. Compare Russo v. Central
School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973),
with Phillips v. Adult Prob. Dep't, 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974). For other express
applications of the Pickering dicta, see Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) ; Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist.,
491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974) ; Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970).
32. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Evidence of this federal public policy is plentiful.
See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Board of Educ. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) ; Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate
School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970) ; United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). All of these
cases reveal a modern trend toward the expanded use of the courts' plenary power to
eliminate discrimination from the schools, where the sharp struggle to secure equal
rights for all people first began. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
33. The right of freedom of association was fully recognized as a separate and

complete right, inherently necessary to the other first amendment rights, by Justice
Harlan in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). This general right of
association is protected no matter how unpopular the groups' purposes or characteristics may be. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963). For a comprehensive
review of the case law in this area, see Annot., 33 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1972).
There has been an abundance of literature addressed to this newly recognized right. See Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1361 (1963) ;
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J.. 1
(1964) ; Rice, The ConstitutionalRight of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491 (1965) ;
Note, Freedom of Association: ConstitutionalRight or Judicial Technique, 46 VA. L.
REv. 730 (1960). Likewise, the liberty of parents to choose schools for their children
is a first amendment construct of this freedom of association. See cases cited in
note 54 infra.
34. The courts have commented upon the right of segregated schools to exist in
both Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1166 (D.D.C. 1971) and Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973). The conclusion reached by most courts is that
the state may not prohibit the maintenance of such schools.
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for their children and the public interest in providing an effective and
nondiscriminatory school system be resolved in favor of the latter? Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit's holding provided no simple answer to this
question.
Judge Coleman prefaced his own analysis with a statement that the
court should have "dismissed the case for failure to raise a substantial
constitutional question. '3 5 In support of this conclusion, he developed an
analogy between the board regulation at issue and the proscription of
partisan political activity of federal employees upheld in Mitchell36 and its
modern counterpart, United Civil Service Commission v. National Associa37
tion of Letter Carriers.
While Judge Coleman recognized the applicability of the Pickering model,3 8 he implied that both Mitchell and Letter
Carriers obviated the need to actually balance the interests presented in
the instant case, since all necessary balancing could be regarded as having
39
been settled by the Supreme Court in Letter Carriers.
The crux of his

35. 511 F.2d at 748. Federal courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over
cases which arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and
involve an amount in excess of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). If the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are solidly based upon federal constitutional rights,
a jurisdictional basis exists unless the claim is deemed frivolous by the court.
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, at 62 (2d ed. 1970).
The following passage explains the meaning ascribed to the phrase "no constitutional
question" by Judge Coleman:
[T]he doctrine thus declared is, that although, in considering a motion to dismiss, it be found that a question adequate abstractly considered to confer jurisdiction was raised, if it likewise appear that such question is wholly formal, is so
absolutely devoid of merit as to be frivolous, or has been so explicitly foreclosed
by a decision or decisions of this court as to leave no room for real controversy,
the motion to dismiss will prevail.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 311 (1902) (emphasis added),
citing New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U.S. 336, 345 (1901).
36. 330 U.S. at 103; see note 17 supra.
37. 413 U.S. 548 (1973), noted in The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 55, 141 (1973) and 1973 UTAH L. REV. 479. In a 6-3 decision, the Letter Carriers
Court reaffirmed the Mitchell decision upholding the Hatch Act's restrictions on
employees' political activity. Interestingly, this holding must have surprised many
commentators who had uniformly believed that the present-day vitality of Mitchell
was in doubt. See Bruff, supra note 13, at 154-58; Another Look, supra note 20, at
150-51. Indeed, in one review of the decision, Letter Carriers was called a "defeat
for free expression." Dorsen, The Courts of Some Resort, 1 Civ. LIB. REv. 82, 93
(1974).
38. 511 F.2d at 748. Utilizing a quote from Letter Carriers which cited to
Pickering, Judge Coleman noted that the rights of teachers are subject to greater
restrictions than those of private citizens. Id., quoting United States Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973), citing
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
39. Id. This portion of Judge Coleman's opinion does not provide any description
of the exact rationale upon which he relied. Another possible interpretation of his
allusion to Mitchell and Letter Carriers is that he merely accepted the school board's
determination that the restriction contained in the board's policy was necessary or

reasonable. Judge Coleman may have been hinting that the courts should pay deference
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reasoning appears to be that both the Hatch Act, 40 whose validity was up41
held against a first amendment attack in Mitchell and Letter Carriers,
and the board policy in the instant case were designed to promote the same
governmental aims: preservation of public confidence in the system and
assurance of the dedication of government employees to the unbiased
operation of all services.42 Therefore, he seemed to view the board policy
as presumptively valid, not needing a fresh determination.
In addition to making the foregoing analogy, Judge Coleman also considered the teachers' initial assertion that the board policy impinged upon
their rights to select the educational atmosphere for their children,43 but
he chose to reformulate the issue. 44 In almost a paraphrase of earlier
cases, 45 he declared that simply because teachers enjoy the freedom to send
to a school board's judgment and refrain from substituting its own ideas, lest school
boards be stripped of their proper power. He quoted the following from Mitchell:
"Congress and the President are responsible for an efficient public service.
If, in their judgment efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as party officers or workers, we [the
Supreme Court] see no constitutional objection."
511 F.2d at 748, quoting 330 U.S. at 99. Paralleling the Mitchell view, this approach
would involve only a minimal review by the court rather than a full-scale balancing
of interests. However, since Letter Carriers was an overt balancing case, it seems
probable that the interpretation in the text accompanying this note is the proper one.
In this regard, the following language from Letter Carriersshould be noted:
Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so
chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously
important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political
activities now contained in the Hatch Act.
413 U.S. at 564.
40. See note 17 supra.
41. See notes 17 & 34 supra.
42. 511 F.2d at 748-49. Among the considerations faced by the Court in Letter
Carriers was a concern that the execution of federal laws by politically active employees might be biased and that any favortism exhibited by the employees might tend
to deteriorate public confidence. 413 U.S. at 565. Presumably, the Letter Carriers
Court found that preservation of a non-partisan work force, free from the pernicious
influences of bias, sufficiently overbalanced the employees' first amendment freedoms.
Judge Coleman found this rationale equally persuasive in Cook, stating:
[Dloes the United States Constitution deny a public school board the authority
to adopt and uniformly enforce a policy clearly designed . . . to insure the undivided dedication of its teachers (and the appearance of that dedication) to the
public school function? .

.

. I respond that it does not.

511 F.2d at 749.
43. 511 F.2d at 749.
44. Id. at 749; see note 39 supra. It is interesting to note that Judge Coleman
seemed unconvinced of the genuineness of the "parental" right as a full-fledged constitutional right: "The right of the teacher-appellants to send their children to private
school, whether grounded in the Constitution or not, is not at stake in this appeal."
Id. at 748 (emphasis added). Perhaps these words provide a hint to the lack of
importance of this right in Judge Coleman's mind and to his willingness to override
the parental interest in this opinion.
45. Judge Coleman's language is reminiscent of the privilege doctrine cases, most
notably Adler. See note 18 supra.
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their children to segregated schools does not mean that they have a constitutional right to continued public employment while engaging in this
46
activity.
In a separate opinion affirming the district court's decision, Judge
Roney also declined to apply the Pickering balancing test but for a different
reason. Viewing the board policy as a particular means of implementing
court-ordered desegregation, 47 he specifically avoided analyzing the issue of
the policy's constitutionality and voted to affirm the district court's dismissal
"on the particular facts of this case on a very narrow ground. '4 Judge
Roney reviewed the findings of the lower court to determine whether the
school board acted arbitrarily or irrationally in failing to renew the contracts
of these teachers. 49 Concluding that the school officials had acted within
their discretionary authority,5 0 he based his decision upon his belief that
the teachers' dismissals were mandated by the prior command of the district
52
court51l to eliminate segregation.
The affirming judges' evasion of the task of carefully identifying and
weighing the competing interests of the school board and the teachers
constituted a deviation5" from the traditional balancing methodology established by Pickering. Contrary to the view expressed by Judge Coleman,
46. 511 F.2d at 749. Judge Coleman said:
[P]ersons employed or seeking employment in public schools have no right to do
so on their own terms . . . . [T]o maintain the integrity of public schools as part
of an ordered society school authorities have the right and the duty to screen
teachers in a relevant manner ...
Id., citing Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (emphasis supplied by
the court).
47. 511 F.2d at 749-50.
48. Id. Judge Roney commented that "[tihis case, to me, does not have broad
implications." Id. at 750.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See note 4 supra.
52. 511 F.2d at 750. Confining his concern to the particular decision of the board
not to rehire the teachers, Judge Roney reiterated the district court's findings that
the only purpose in not rehiring was "to strengthen local support for the public
schools and to effectively implement the court-ordered requirement to change from a
dual segregated school system to a unitary nondiscriminatory system." Id. Judge
Roney did express, without elaboration certain reservations about the validity of the
board's action "under less compelling circumstances." Id.
53. The Fifth Circuit has not been loath to engage in a balancing of state interests
against private first amendment freedoms on prior occasions. See Battle v. Mulholland,
439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971) (black policeman alleging discharge due to his association with two white women; court balanced policeman's freedom of expression
against state's interest in keeping police force from becoming a focus of racial
tensions) ; Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969) (teacher's
participation in a teachers' association balanced against school's interests) ; Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (high school regulation prohibiting students
from wearing certain freedom buttons declared unreasonable; court balanced students'
freedom of speech against state's interest in keeping school system free from disruption).
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neither Mitchell nor Letter Carriers should have been controlling in the
instant case for several reasons. First, as between the diverse interests
of the public employees in each situation, the parental right claimed by
the teachers has traditionally received greater judicial protection than the
right of public employees to engage in partisan political affairs. 54 Secondly,
Judge Coleman underscored the importance of public confidence in the
public school system to an extent unwarranted by previous case law or
logic. 55 At the same time, he oversimplified the court's task by failing to
consider the patent racial purpose56 - "the elimination of racial discrimination and its 'pervasive influence' from the public schools" 57 - which
defendants claimed to be served by their action. 58 Clearly, Cook posed a
segregation-related question 9 which Judge Coleman did not address and
Judge Roney discussed incompletely.60
54. The Supreme Court initially recognized the parental right in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Since that time, the Court has expressly endorsed
the superiority of the parental right relative to certain other state interests. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) noted in 18 VILL. L. Rav. 955 (1973). In
Yoder, a case involving a challenge on behalf of the Amish people to a compulsory
education statute, the Court stated:
[E]ven this paramount responsibility [providing public schools] was, in Pierce,
made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a
privately operated system .... [T]he values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years
have a high place in our society.
406 U.S. at 213-14. For the Supreme Court's classification of the parental right as
fundamental, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
On the other hand, the rights involved in Letter Carriers do not occupy such
a high place in public or judicial opinion. In Letter Carriers,Justice White explained
how the federal employee's right to engage in political activity has sustained the
consistent disapproval of "Congress, the Executive and the country" since the time
of Thomas Jefferson. 413 U.S. at 564. For Justice White's review of the history,
see id. at 557-64.
55. 511 F.2d at 749. Even if it is conceded that both the Hatch Act and the board
policy shared a similar aim, the asserted decrease in public support which may occur
because of associational activities has carried no impact in Supreme Court decisions
and has been rejected as a justification in one state court decision. See Buckley v.
Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 476, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 934 (Sup. Ct. 1962). It has been noted
that, particularly in the school system context, the community reaction to teachers'
associational activities is largely immaterial. See Academic Freedom, supra note 21, at
1066 (suggesting that permitting restriction of teachers' rights upon the basis of
public opinion is open to drastic abuse).
56. 511 F.2d at 749.
57. Id. at 751 (Clark, J., dissenting), quoting Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855,
860 (N.D. Miss. 1973).
58. 511 F.2d at 751.
59. The Supreme Court has held a Mississippi textbook program unconstitutional
where it significantly aided the continuation of a separate private school system.
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. '455 (1973). Speaking of discrimination in private
schools, the Court said: "[A]Ithough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias,
it places no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent on the Free
Exercise Clause." Id. at 469-70. This dictum suggests that the right to associate
in a racially discriminatory manner may be easily outweighed by the state's interest
in nondiscriminatory schools. See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.),
aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
60. See notes 47 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
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It is suggested that a balancing analysis by its very nature requires
a precise assessment of the particular interests presented by the facts of
each case, and that the device of analogy chosen by Judge Coleman did
not enable the Cook court to identify these interests. Even the Supreme
Court has recognized the futility of articulating a generally applicable
standard for those cases within the purview of the first amendment.6 '
Letter Carriers,a decision with real precedential value only in very close
factual situations, reflected the Court's judgment of the constitutional
relationship between two definite interests. Only by identifying and
comparatively balancing the specific interests at stake in Cook could the
Fifth Circuit have ensured that constitutional freedoms of the plaintiff12
teachers were not unnecessarily diluted.
In addition to the Fifth Circuit's undue reliance upon the Mitchell
and Letter Carrierscases, the affirming judges' reasoning was inconsistent
with several established trends in the case law. By repeating the Adler
shibboleth that employees have no constitutional right to work, 3 Judge
Coleman inherited nearly 20 years of adverse criticism. 6 4 While his apparent attempt to avoid undermining the authority of the school officials
to set educational policy was not without some persuasive logic,65 the
courts, confronted with first amendment challenges against legislative and

61. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) ; see note 30 supra.

As the Second Circuit said in dictum about first amendment analysis:
The best one can hope for is to discern lines of analysis and advance formulations

sufficient to bridge past decisions with new facts. One must be satisfied with such
present solutions and cannot expect a clear view of the terrain beyond the periphery
of the immediate case.
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971). For more
abstract discussions of the balancing test, see generally Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) ; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment; Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
62. Judge Coleman's opinion may have been misleading in that he couched his
analysis in balancing language, but failed to actually identify and weigh the factors.
63. 342 U.S. at 492; see note 18 supra.
64. See notes 18, 20 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
65. One article took the following view toward the desirability of school board
autonomy:
Particularly where the teacher places himself in a position antagonistic to the
school administration, the competing interests of the teacher as a private individual
and the school administration as an employer become difficult to balance.
The school administration must be afforded wide discretion and latitude in
controlling the routine operations and daily affairs of the school in order to meet
the innumerable local problems which may occur. A school administration therefore has inherent powers to formulate rules and regulations consistent with its
education interests.
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administrative judgments,"6 have increasingly shown less deference to the
overall capabilities of these expert officials."'
In contrast to the reasoning in Judges Coleman's and Roney's opinions,
Judge Clark, in his dissenting opinion,68 respected the Pickering Court's
mandate by comprehensively identifying and reconciling the interests at
stake in Cook. His two-part dissent analyzed the action taken by the
board in both its rulemaking 9 and adjudicative capacities. 70 Differing with
the district court's view, 7 1 Judge Clark indicated that the parental right,
as a fundamental right, can be lawfully restricted only if the state can make
a showing of a compelling state interest. 72 He found the requisite interest
66. Another Look, supra note 20, at 149-51.
When the exercise of a first amendment right impairs a teacher's effectiveness
or conflicts with the performance of his or her job, the school board may lawfully
refuse to rehire. An extension of constitutional protection merely to prevent an unfit
teacher from being discharged would be unwarranted. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1970). For one commentator's warning against transforming government employment into "a constitutionalized sinecure in the name of the first amendment," see Note, The First Amendment & Public Employees - An Emerging Constitutional Right To Be A Policeman?, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 409, 424 (1968). The
key determination to be made in the classroom context is how much interference with
a teacher's daily duties or with the operation of the school will be tolerated by education officials before a constitutional guarantee can be justifiably curtailed. See notes
82-87 and accompanying text infra. Griffis & Wilson, supra note 22, at 550 (footnotes
omitted). See also Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 316 F. Supp. 1174, 1176
(E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971).
67. As the Second Circuit said in James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972):
The federal courts . . . cannot allow unfettered discretion to violate fundamental
constitutional rights.
The dangers of unrestrained discretion are readily apparent. Under the guise
of beneficient concern for the welfare of school children, school authorities,
albeit unwittingly, might permit prejudices of the community to prevail.
Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
68. 511 F.2d at 750 (Clark, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 751-53.
70. Id. at 753. After dealing with the constitutionality of the policy, Judge
Clark explained that the court should also scrutinize the underlying reasons for the
dismissal to determine whether the teachers had been dismissed for constitutionally
valid reasons. Id.
71. 365 F. Supp. at 860; see note 8 supra.
72. 511 F.2d at 751-52. While Judge Clark refrained from so labeling his test,
he patched together equal protection principles to measure the acceptability of the
limitations which the board policy imposed upon the fundamental right of the teacherparents to direct the education of their children. Id. at 750-53.
In his opinion, the validity of the board's policy could be sustained only if
the board proved the following elements: 1) a relation between the restriction and
the public purpose; 2) the compelling nature of the public purpose; 3) the necessity
of the restriction to achieve that purpose; and 4) a drafting of the restriction in
the narrowest manner possible. Id. at 751-53. In Judge Clark's view, the first element was not sufficiently demonstrated since the only showing of a relationship
between the board's policy and the elimination of discrimination was the testimony of
the psychologists. See note 79 infra. The third element was not adequately shown
since other less intrusive policies could easily have been adopted by the school board.
For example, the board could have made separate evaluations of the teachers to
determine those that did not provide positive reinforcement to the black students.
Id. at 752-53. Finally, the board's policy was overbroad. Id. at 753. Since the policy
failed to evidence the necessary elements, Judge Clark ultimately found it unconstitutional. Id.
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in the state's duty to eliminate discriminatory influences from the school
system. 78 However, he demonstrated that the policy failed to narrowly
fit the state interest,7 4 concluding that the regulation should not be upheld.75
Proceeding to an examination of the underlying causes for the dismissal of each teacher, 76 Judge Clark conceded that the same school board's
interest in fostering a nondiscriminatory school system outweighed the
teachers' interests under the Pickering balancing test. 77 Nevertheless, he

observed that no balancing of these interests is required unless the interests
are shown to conflict unavoidably. 78 Since the testimony of the psychologists provided no more than a speculative inference of possible conflict,7 9
Judge Clark hinged his dissent upon the lack of a substantial nexus between
80
the protected activity and the efforts to eliminate racial discrimination.
He adopted the "substantial and material interference" standard as the
requisite threshold qualification. 8 ' Under this test, once an employee
proves that his or her employment has been terminated due to an exercise
of rights protected by the first amendment, such termination will be upheld8 2
only if the state can show that the employee's exercise of that protected
73. Id. at 751-52.
74. Id. at 752-53.
75. Id. It should be noted that traditional equal protection analysis is not the
standard of scrutiny usually applied in evaluating alleged infringements of rights
such as first amendment freedoms of expression and association, although these rights
are equally susceptible to such an analysis. Equal protection treatment has more commonly been reserved for cases dealing with the following fundamental rights: the
right to vote, the right to procreate, and rights related to criminal procedure. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Electors, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting) ; Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal appeals); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (procreation). As Justice Harlan has said, it is unnecessary to use the
stringent equal protection test when the right affected is one assured by the Constitution or at least claiming clear support in constitutional history. See Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Equal
Protection, supra note 8, at 1127-30.
76. 511 F.2d at 753-57. This second step was a vital part of Judge Clark's
analysis. Notwithstanding the board policy, the teachers' dismissals might still have
been sustainable if an adjudicative inquiry revealed that each of the plaintiff-teachers
had performed the duties inadequately.
77. 511 F.2d at 754-55. Judge Clark set forth the following test -by which the
school board must evaluate a particular teacher: "To sustain a determination of unfitness on the basis of protected activity, the governmental interest to be served must
outweigh the infringement of personal liberty, viewed in the special environment of the
schoolroom." Id. at 753-54 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 755.
79. Id. at 756. Clark placed little weight upon the opinions of the psychologists,
evidencing a reluctance to abdicate to the psychologist or the psychiatrist the function
and duties of the court. Id.
80. 511 F.2d at 757.
81. Id. at 756. Judge Clark prefaced his review of the cases with this summary:
While no prior similar cases have dealt with precisely the kind of subtle psychological effect asserted here, they have uniformly required a showing of more than
a speculative inference that constitutionally protected activity could interfere with
a state interest.
Id.
82. Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974), citing Battle v.
Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
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activity interfered with the "discharge of duties and responsibilities inherent in such employment.18 3 It is contended that this standard most
effectively safeguards both the rights of public school teachers and the
integrity of the school system. To require the state to show only a
reasonable relation between teacher conduct and the state's interest unfairly dilutes the teachers' constitutional protection which they have
enjoyed since the erosion of the right-privilege doctrine. At the other
extreme, to require the state to show a compelling state interest before
restricting teachers' rights overly restricts the board's ability to regulate
its employees effectively. Teachers are subject to greater state-imposed
restrictions than ordinary citizens: due consideration must be given to
the effects which the exercise of their rights has upon others - particularly school children. Judge Clark properly recognized the "substantial and
material interference standard" to be an important middle-level solution.
When a teacher's activity materially interferes with classroom duties, the
first amendment balance should be tipped in favor of restricting the teacher's
protected activity.
This interference criterion, articulated in several cases by both the
Fifth Circuit 84 and the Supreme Court8 5 as the balancing becomes "case

hardened,"8' 6 is the closest the courts have come to articulating a per se
rule in this fluid area and it has injected some desirable certainty into this
difficult process of conflict resolution. Furthermore, the demonstration of
a definite interference relationship should be a prerequisite to the curtailment of constitutional rights in this case since the greater restrictions of
teachers' rights can be justified only because of their positions in the school
83. 511 F.2d at 756.
84. See Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974)

(federal em-

ployee's wearing of a peace pin while on duty at a veterans hospital found to result in
a material and substantial interference with his duties as a psychologist) ; Battle v.
Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971) (substantial and material interference
standard posited as the test to measure plaintiff's usefulness as a policeman) ; Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (students' rights of freedom of expression
could not be abridged where the exercise of such rights did not materially and
substantially interfere with the requirement of appropriate discipline within the school) ;
note 53 supra. But cf. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Doherty
v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Ga. 1973) ("serious impairment of effectiveness as
an instructor" stated as appropriate measure rather than "substantial and material
interference").
85. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Consol. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
In this controversial decision, Justice Fortas held that absent a showing of possible
substantial disruption or material interference with school activities, a school board's
regulation prohibiting students from wearing black armbands was unconstitutional.
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972).
86. It is common in constitutional adjudication for the Court to begin with an
ad hoc method of decisionmaking and, as more cases are decided, to move progressively toward a decisional method based upon the application of rules. When the
transition is complete, the Court singles out a small number of critical factors and
formulates them into a rule. The balancing test constructed by the Court in Pickering
is illustrative of the ad hoc method. See Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 843-44 (1969).
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system. s 7 It is unfortunate, indeed, that the Fifth Circuit, one of the first
courts to utilize the interference test, s8 ignored the opportunity presented
in Cook to apply it.
Thus, it is suggested that Judge Clark's resolution of the case accorded
concrete meaning to the seminal but incomplete Pickering formula. However, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cook largely defeats the intention of
the Supreme Court as delineated in Pickering despite Justice Marshall's
caution against lightly overriding the newly restored freedoms of one
class of public servants.8 9
Since the court did not require a demonstration that the teachers'
exercise of their first amendment rights substantially interfered with the
interests of the school board, the Cook holding conflicts with recent trends
toward expanding first amendment protection within the school system90
and toward checking the broad discretion of school authorities.,' This
expansion of protection has resulted from the use of the balancing test.
The balancing process necessarily requires a functional approach to the
considerations involved in any particular set of facts, an approach which
guarantees vitality and accuracy in the application of the test. The Cook
court, however, adopted a definitional approach, requiring only the categorization of the state's interests as employee loyalty and preservation of
public confidence to settle the question. Through this approach, the judges
omitted the very factors which distinguish Cook from other cases.
In conclusion, the Cook court should not have countenanced this setback in teachers' civil liberties without a showing that the protected conduct
substantially and materially interfered with the performance of their
services. It is hoped that the Supreme Court's decision in Cook later this
term 92 will not similarly encourage other courts to seek shortcuts in the
application of the critical balancing test; for without careful identification
and evaluation of the opposing interests involved, the value of the test
will be diminished.
Linda Lipscomb

87. For examples of the importance of the relationship between the protected
activity and the state's interests, see Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) ; Cole v. Choctaw, 471 F2d 777 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973).
The school room has always been viewed as a sensitive area, especially in
light of the strong policy of ensuring that the nation's youth receive a proper education
from qualified teachers. See generally Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
88. See note 84 supra.
89. 391 U.S. at 568.
90. See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text supra.
92. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Cook. 44 U.S.L.W. 4246
(U.S. March 2, 1976) (No. 75-503).
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CORPORATIONS

FIDUCIARY DUTY SHAREHOLDERS IN A CLOSE
CORPORATION OWE TO ONE ANOTHER SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED BY PARTNERS TO ONE ANOTHER.

Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England
(Mass. 1975)
Plaintiff, Euphemia Donahue, was a minority shareholder in Rodd
Electrotype Company of New England, Inc. (the corporation), a closely
held Massachusetts corporation.1 The majority shareholders, members of
the Rodd family (the Rodds),2 held most of the managerial and directorial
positions in the corporation. 3 The corporation, as authorized by the board
of directors, purchased a portion of the shareholdings from one of the
Rodds, 4 and after learning of the purchase, plaintiff offered her shares
to the corporation on the same terms. Upon rejection of her offer, Mrs.
Donahue brought suit5 against the corporation, Charles Rodd, Frederick
Rodd, and Harold Magnuson as directors, and Harry Rodd as a former
director, officer, and controlling shareholder, to rescind the corporation's
purchase. 6 The complaint alleged that the Rodds, by their failure to
accord her an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of her shares,
had violated the fiduciary duty they owed to her as a minority shareholder.7 The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the purchase
did not prejudice the plaintiff, and impliedly finding that the transaction
had been made in good faith. 8 In affirming the findings of the trial court,
the Appeals Court held that neither the corporation nor its directors
1. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, __ Mass. .... 328 N.E.2d
505 (1975). Plaintiff and her husband had been joint owners of 50 shares. They
subsequently transferred five shares to their son. Upon her husband's death, plaintiff
became the sole owner of the 45-share block. Id. at .-. n.8, 328 N.E.2d at 510 n.8.
2. Prior to complete divestiture of his holdings, Harry Rodd held 81 shares, his
sons, Charles and Frederick, each held 39 shares, and his daughter, Phyllis Mason,
held 39 shares. Id. at ..... 328 N.E.2d at 510.
3. Upon his father's resignation as a director of the corporation, Frederick Rodd
joined his brother, Charles, and Harold Magnuson, clerk of the corporation, as a
director of the corporation. Id. Prior to his retirement, Harry Rodd served as president of the corporation, and his son Charles served as vice-president. Charles later
succeeded his father as president. Id. at .__ 328 N.E.2d at 509-10.
4. The corporation purchased 45 shares at $800.00 per share from Harry Rodd,
leaving his total holdings in the corporation at 36 shares. Harry then distributed these
remaining shares equally among his three children. The resulting share distribution
in the corporation was as follows: Charles Rodd, Frederick Rodd, and Phyllis Mason
each held 51 shares; Mrs. Donahue held 45 shares; Robert Donahue, plaintiff's son,
held five shares. Id. at .... 328 N.E.2d at 510.
5. Though in form the suit partially presented a derivative action brought on
behalf of the corporation, the court noted that the plaintiff was actually alleging the
breach of a personal right, a fiduciary duty owed to her, and decided the instant case
on that basis. Id. at __ n.4, 328 N.E.2d at 508 n.4; see note 62 infra.
6. Id. at ...... 328 N.E.2d at 508.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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were obligated to buy shares ratably from all shareholders. 9 On review,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, 10 holding that
shareholders in a close corporation owe each other essentially the same
fiduciary duty in the conduct of corporate affairs that partners owe to
each other, and remanded to the Superior Court, with directions to award
one of two alternative forms of relief: 1) rescission of the purchase transaction, or 2) purchase by the corporation of all the plaintiff's shareholdings
in Rodd Electrotype. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England,
Mass .. 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
A fiduciary relationship has been said to arise when "one holds a
position of superiority and influence over the interests of another such
that the latter is forced to rely upon the good faith and fair dealing of the
former . . . ."" In all jurisdictions, 12 corporate directors and officers
are said to occupy a fiduciary position.' 3 Moreover, partners are held to
owe each other the highest degree of good faith in the exercise of all
partnership operations. 14 However, it is generally held that a shareholder
is under no fiduciary duty to either the corporation or to other shareholders
by virtue of the mere ownership of stock. 15
9. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 307 N.E.2d 8 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1974).
10. The court restricted the applicability of its holding to those corporations
falling within the ambit of its definition of the close corporation, ____Mass. at _
328 N.E.2d at 511. For a discussion of the court's definition of a close corporation,
see text accompanying note 37 infra.
11. 3 H. OLECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW § 1569, at 624 (1959) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as OLECK].
12. See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838

(perm. ed. rev. 1965) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
13. The fiduciary obligation of a director was described by one Massachusetts
court as requiring those who occupy such positions to
act with absolute fidelity and . . .place their duties to the corporation above
every other financial or business obligation. They must act, also, with reasonable
intelligence, although they cannot be held responsible for mere errors of judgment
or want of prudence. They cannot be permitted to serve two masters whose
interests are antagonistic. They are liable if, through their bad faith, financial
loss to the corporation results. They are responsible if they unlawfully divert the
assets of the corporation.
Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 410-11, 8 N.E.2d 895, 904 (1937).
For a thorough examination of the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors in
Massachusetts, see Tilden, The Fiduciary Duty of Corporation Directors in Massachusetts, 28 B.U.L. REV. 265 (1948).

In the pioneer case of Smith v. Hurd, 12 Mass. 371, 46 Am. Dec. 690 (1847),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that this fiduciary duty was owed
only to the corporation, and not to the individual shareholders. Id. at 384, 46 Am.
Dec. at 691.
14. See, e.g., Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 105 N.E.2d 843 (1952); Shelley
v. Smith, 271 Mass. 106, 170 N.E. 826 (1930).
15. 13 FLETCHER, supra note 12, § 5811, at 108; see Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J.
Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910), as an early example of the view that partners who subsequently adopt the corporate form are no longer burdened with a partnership fiduciary
duty, but "have only the rights, duties and obligations of stockholders. They cannot be
partners inter sese and a corporation to the rest of the world." Id. at 599, 75 A. at 571.
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Some courts have held that a controlling shareholder who chooses to
determine corporate policy, thereby possibly jeopardizing the interest of
the noncontrolling shareholders, is under a fiduciary duty to those shareholders,'16 but it is not clear that Massachusetts has adopted this exception
to the general rule.' 7 In the early case of Von Arnin v. American Tubeworks,'8 a minority shareholder of a close corporation brought an action
against the corporate officers for misappropriation of corporate funds. In
affirming a decree overruling a demurrer to the shareholder's complaint,',
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did not acknowledge the
existence of any particular duty owed by the controlling shareholderofficers to the noncontrolling shareholder, other than that generally owed
by them as a result of their managerial capacity. 20 Several years later, in
Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp.,21 the court made express the implication of Von Arnin, and held that, as the relationship between corporate
shareholders was not ordinarily that of partners, a shareholder of a twoman corporation did not stand in any fiduciary relationship with the other
22
shareholder.
However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has imposed
fiduciary relationships upon shareholders in some cases, apparently depending upon the existence of an extracorporate relationship between the
parties. In Mendelsohn v. Leather Manufacturing Co. 23 and Silversmith
16.

OLECK,

supra note 11, § 1569, at 625. The nature of this duty was aptly de-

scribed by the United States Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) :
A director is a fiduciary ....
So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or
group of stockholders ....
Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to
rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the
corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from
the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.
Id. at 306 (citations omitted). See also Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Controlling
Shareholders, 7 W. RES. L. REv. 467 (1956).
17. Other jurisdictions have generally held that this fiduciary duty is owed by
controlling shareholders directly to the noncontrolling shareholders. See, e.g., Zahn
v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (construing Kentucky law) ; Jones
v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. App. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969);
Kirtz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541 (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1971).
18. 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905).
19. Id. at 521, 74 N.E. at 682.
20. Id. at 519, 74 N.E. at 681.
21. 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1944).
22. Id. at 198-99, 55 N.E.2d at 23. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
examined a contract entered into by the two corporate shareholders to which the
corporation was also a party. The contract provided guidelines for the operation of
the corporation, transfer of stock, and liquidation. Id. at 197-98, 55 N.E.2d at 22.
The court determined that the contract between the shareholders and the corporation
did not create a partnership-like relationship between the parties. Id. at 199, 55
N.E.2d at 24.
23. 326 Mass. 226, 93 N.E.2d 537 (1950). Mendelsohn involved a sale by one
shareholder to another shareholder of all the former's corporate stock. The court
held that the sale was untainted by fraud or misrepresentation. Id. at 235-37, 93
N.E.2d at 542-43.
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v. Sydenan,24 Massachusetts' highest court found a fiduciary relationship 25
to exist between shareholders who had acted as joint venturers prior to
incorporation, or were acting as joint venturers after incorporation. 26 In
Sher v. Sandler,2 the court determined that a fiduciary relationship, which
required full disclosure of information concerning corporate transactions,
existed between the two shareholders 28 who had entered into a preincorporation agreement requiring such disclosure. 2 9 A few years later,
in Samia v. Central Oil Co. of Worcester,"° the court recognized that the
familial relationship between the shareholders, 3 1 as well as the administration of a family estate by one shareholder-brother, gave rise to a fiduciary
s2
relationship between the shareholders

In its most recent decision prior to Donahue, Wilson v. Jennings,8
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the relationship between the three corporate shareholders was one of trust and confidence.3 4 The court justified the imposition of this fiduciary relationship
on the basis of the shareholders' arrangement for a three-way permanent,
equal division of the corporate stock, the shareholders' "mutual under-

standing" that full disclosure would be made, and the joint venture
structure employed by the shareholders to market their invention.

5

24. 305 Mass. 65, 25 N.E.2d 215 (1940). In Silversmith, the court held that a
shareholder-officer of a two-man corporation had wrongfully withheld interest payments on money loaned by him to the corporation. Id. at 70, 25 N.E.2d at 218.
25. 326 Mass. at 233, 93 N.E.2d at 541; 305 Mass. at 68, 25 N.E.2d at 217. While
the nature of this fiduciary duty was not expressly described by the court in Silversmith, the duty was described in Mendelsohn as one which required full disclosure
between shareholders of all corporate matters. 326 Mass. at 233, 93 N.E.2d at 541.
26. 326 Mass. at 233, 93 N.E.2d at 541; 305 Mass. at 68, 25 N.E.2d at 217. The
term "joint venture" is generally used to describe a business relationship comparable
to that of a partnership which is formed by two or more persons to carry out a
particular undertaking of limited scope, in which each participant usually has a
pecuniary interest. Jaeger, Joint Adventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9
Am. U.L. REV. 1, 5-14 (1960). See generally Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures,
15 MiNN. L. REV. 644 (1931).
27. 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950).
28. Id. at 353, 90 N.E.2d at 539. This relationship was characterized as
a duty of disclosure similar to that owed by a fiduciary in his dealings with his
beneficiary. In such dealings the fiduciary owes the beneficiary the duty to make
the fullest disclosure and unless he does so the transaction can be set aside.
Id.
29. Id.
30. 339 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959).
31. Id. at 105, 158 N.E.2d at 472. Suit was brought by three sisters as minority
shareholders, against their brothers, the majority shareholders in a close family corporation. The minority shareholders alleged a breach of trust by the majority shareholders because of the failure of the majority shareholders to issue to a deceased
brother 20 shares of stock to which he had subscribed prior to his death and to which
the sisters had become entitled upon his death. Id. at 106, 112-13, 158 N.E.2d at
472, 476-77.
32. Id. at 112-13, 158 N.E.2d at 476-77. The court stated that as fiduciaries, the
brothers were required to "keep and render accounts" and show proper disposition of
funds received by them. Id. at 126, 158 N.E.2d at 484-85.
33. 344 Mass. 608, 184 N.E.2d 642 (1962).
34. Id. at 615, 184 N.E.2d at 646.
35. Id. at 614-15, 184 N.E.2d at 646.
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It was against this historical framework that Donahue departed from
a case-by-case determination of shareholder fiduciary duties by defining a
duty applicable to all shareholders in close corporations, regardless of the
existence of other external factors. Crucial to the court's analysis was its
distinction between the close corporation and the publicly held corporation,3 6 which gave rise to the court's adoption of a definition describing
the close corporation as one which has "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial
majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and
operations of the corporation. '3 7 The court stressed the similarities between the close corporation and a partnership, placing particular emphasis
upon the integration of ownership and management, restrictions on share
transfers to others than the original owners, and the dependence of
co-owners upon one another to ensure the success of the venture.38
The Donahue court focused on the disadvantage of the corporate
form to the minority shareholder which occurs in the form of "freeze-outs," 3 9
and reasoned that, unlike his counterpart in the publicly held corporation,
the minority shareholder in the close corporation has no remedy against
oppressive majority tactics. 40 Thus, to afford greater protection to the
minority shareholder in the close corporation, and because of the significant
resemblance of that corporate form to a partnership, 41 the court imposed
the stringent fiduciary duty owed by partners to each other 42 upon con36----Mass, at __, 328 N.E.2d at 514.

37. Id. at _, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
38. Id. at ...... 328 N.E.2d at 512. For a discussion of the similarities between

close corporations and partnerships, see Hancock, Minority Interests in Small Business
Entities, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 130 (1968); Israels, The Close Corporation and the
Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
39.
Mass. at .__ 328 N.E.2d at 513. A freeze-out has been described as a
manipulative use of corporate control or inside information to eliminate minority
shareholders from the enterprise, or to reduce to relative insignificance their
voting power or claims on corporate earnings and assets or otherwise to deprive
them of corporate income or advantages to which they are entitled.
2 F. O'N.EAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 8.07, at 43 (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
Freeze-outs can occur in various ways: 1) issuance of new shares subsequently bought by majority shareholders at an inadequate price; 2) merger of the
corporation to the detriment of the minority; 3) exorbitant compensation to officers;
4) refusal to declare dividends. Id.; see Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders,
74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
40. ___ Mass. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15. The court noted that the unavailability of a market, coalesced with the difficulty of achieving dissolution as provided
by MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §§ 99(a), (b), 100(a)(2) (1970), to leave
the minority shareholder in the close corporation with an illiquid investment, often
compelling him to sell his shares to the controlling shareholders at unreasonably low
prices ___.
Mass. at __ 328 N.E.2d at 515.
41. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
42. ____
Mass. at .. 328 N.E.2d at 515. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
This fiduciary duty was described by one commentator as a "stringent standard" which
arises from the fundamental nature of a partnership. In a partnership each partner
is the confidential agent of his copartners and vice versa. Therefore, every partner
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trolling shareholders in a close corporation. 43 To justify its imposition
of such a strict fiduciary obligation within a corporate form, the Donahue
court looked to past cases in which a fiduciary relationship was found due
44
to certain extracorporate factors.
The court concluded that this strict fiduciary duty required that a
close corporation which has repurchased shares from a controlling shareholder must offer to each other shareholder an opportunity to sell a ratable
number of his shares at an identical price, 45 in order that the controlling
shareholder not create "an exclusive market in previously unmarketable
shares from which the minority shareholders are excluded." 46 Thus, the
failure of the Rodds, as controlling shareholders, 47 to cause the corporation
to offer to Mrs. Donahue an opportunity to sell a ratable number of her
shares on the same terms as those given to Harry Rodd 4s constituted a
breach of the stringent fiduciary duty owed to her as a noncontrolling
49
shareholder.
While the Donahue court relied upon prior cases imposing fiduciary

duties upon shareholders as support for its instant decision, it is submitted
that this reliance was not justified since these cases can all be distinguished
on their facts. Donahue does not fall within the reach of cases such as
has a right to information the others possess, and no one may act at the expense
of his copartners. Furthermore, a secret profit may not be made to the exclusion
of copartners.
Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners,48 IOWA L. REv. 902, 907-08 (1963) (footnotes
omitted). The Donahue court noted that this fiduciary duty involves "[n]ot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.'" --- Mass. at ___ 328 N.E.2d
at 516, quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
43.
Mass. at ----328 N.E.2d at 515. The holding was not limited in application to majority shareholders in a close corporation, but rather applied to the controlling shareholders in a close corporation, whether majority or minority shareholders.
Id. at ----n.17, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17.
44. The court relied upon Silversmith v. Sydeman (see notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra); Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Co. (see notes 23 & 25-26 and
accompanying text supra) ; Sher v. Sandler (see notes 27-29 and accompanying text
supra); Samia v. Central Oil Co. (see notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra);
and Wilson v. Jennings (see notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra).
45 -...... Mass. at -----328 N.E.2d at 518. The court observed that the offer of
an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of shares would not be required in all
situations, such as when all shareholders had given advance consent to the purchase
in the articles of organization, bylaws, or in a shareholders' agreement, or the purchase had been ratified by all shareholders. Id. at ____n.24, 328 N.E.2d at 518 n.24.
46. Id. at328 N.E.2d at 518. It is arguable that, by requiring a corporation
to offer to purchase a ratable number of shares from all shareholders, the court's
holding may make it impossible for a corporation to repurchase shares from a controlling shareholder since the corporation could possibly be confronted with purchase
demands which, if complied with, would lead to insolvency.
47. The court determined that "[tihe Rodds have retained the paramount management positions. Through their control of these management positions and of the
majority of the Rodd Electrotype stock, the Rodds effectively controlled the corporation." Id. at ___ 328 N.E.2d at 519.
48. See note 4 supra.
49. __ Mass. at .
328 N.E.2d at 520.
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Mendelsohn, as the shareholders in Donahue did not act as joint venturers
prior to their incorporation. Further, Donahue cannot look to the existence
of a familial relationship among all shareholders, such as that present in
Samia, to justify the imposition of a fiduciary duty, for the shareholders
of Rodd Electrotype were not all members of the same family. Moreover,
no preincorporation agreement expressly requiring full disclosure was
entered into by the Rodds and Mrs. Donahue, which could have given rise
to a fiduciary relationship similar to that found in Sher, and no permanent
equal division of stock was agreed upon in the instant case as in Wilson,
which contributed, in that case, to the imposition of the fiduciary relationship.
The Donahue court's reliance upon these cases as support for its
instant decision manifests its desire to isolate the close corporation as a
unique corporate entity and to define the scope of the application of the
strict fiduciary duty. However, it is submitted that the adequacy of the
court's definition of the close corporation" ° can be questioned. Generally,
50. The fact that the Donahue court attempted to define the close corporation is,
in itself, noteworthy, since this task has been all but ignored by the courts, who seem to
have placed the burden on the legislatures.
In 1963, Florida enacted the first and, to date, the only separate close corporation statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1975). The Florida statute
defines the close corporation as "a corporation for profit whose shares of stock are
not generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers."
Id. § 608.70(2).
In 1967, Delaware enacted a separate subchapter to its general corporation
law which deals exclusively with close corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56
(1975). Delaware defines the close corporation as one whose certificate of incorporation provides:
(1) All of the corporation's issued stock of all classes . . . shall be held of record
by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30; (2) All of the
issued stock of all classes shall be subject to 1 or more of the restrictions on
transfer permitted by § 202 of this title; and (3) The corporation shall make no
public offering of any of its stock of any class which would constitute a
public offering ....
Id. § 342(a). In 1968, Pennsylvania adopted close corporation provisions similar to
the Delaware subchapter. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-86 (Supp. 1975). The
Maryland close corporation provisions, enacted in 1967, merely define the close corporation as a corporation whose charter contains "a statement that the corporation is
a close corporation" and, unlike Delaware, do not require the corporation to restrict
the number of shareholders. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1973).
Massachusetts has enacted no statutory definition of the close corporation,
either in the form of a separate statute, or as a subchapter to its general corporation statute.
Many states have provided statutory modifications for the purpose of accommodating the close corporation. 1 O'NEAL, supra note 39, § 1.14; see, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 819 (West Supp. 1975) (authorizing court appointment of a provisional director
in case of director deadlock) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1975) (permitting the
corporation to be formed by a single incorporator) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.34
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (authorizing the corporation to have less than the traditional minimum of three directors).
For commentaries on the need for legislation covering close corporations, see
Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More and
Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1966); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341 (1958); Weiner, Legislative

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 21

all close corporations appear to have at least two features in common :51
1) restricted alienability of shares ;52 and 2) integration of ownership and
management. 53 However, there are varying shades within the close corporation spectrum which give rise to characteristically different corporate
entities, all defined as close corporations: the one-man corporation, the
incorporated partnership, the family corporation, and the large, complex,
but still closely held corporation. 54 By adopting a sweeping definition
of the close corporation, it appears that the Donahue court has overlooked
these various nuances existing within the close corporation setting.
The court described the close corporation as having a "small number
of stockholders. ' 55 This description is unfortunately susceptible to an
infinite variety of interpretations, and provides Massachusetts corporations
with no particular guidelines to determine whether they fall within the
purview of the court's definition of a close corporation. 56 For example, a
Recognition of the Close Corporation,27 MIcH. L. REV. 273 (1929) ; Note, Statutory
Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1958); Note, A
Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV.
700 (1958).
51. See 1 O'NEAL, supra note 39, § 1.07, at 21 (enumerating as other characteristics of most close corporations a small number of shareholders, and a familiarity
among shareholders with the business capabilities of one another).
52. Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59
YALE L.J. 1040, 1047-48 (1950). Restrictions imposed upon the transferability of
shares in close corporations serve as an example of the judicial tolerance of the
departure by the close corporation from the traditional corporate norm of free alienability of shares. Absolute restrictions on transferability of shares will be declared
void as against public policy. Id. at 1048. Judicially acceptable transfer restrictions
have included the prohibition of sale to an outsider unless the shares are first offered
to the corporation or its shareholders. This restriction, known as a "first option"
provision, grants a preemptive right to the corporation or its shareholders to the
shares offered for sale. Id. For comprehensive treatment of the subject of transfer
restrictions, see Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37
VA. L. REV. 229 (1951).
53. 1 O'NEAL, supra note 39, § 1.07, at 21-22.
54. At one end of the close corporation spectrum may be found the one-man corporation, in which all the stock is controlled by a single shareholder. 1 O'NEAL, Supra
note 39, § 1.05. See generally Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the
One-Man Company, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1373 (1938). Another species of the close
corporation has often been called the "joint venture corporation" or the "incorporated
partnership." This species is an outgrowth of a relationship between several persons
who are partners or joint venturers in a business and subsequently decide to incorporate to obtain the benefits of incorporation. 1 'NEAL, supra note 39, §§ 1.06-.06b.
A family corporation is one in which the stock is controlled by the members of one
family. Id. § 1.05. At the opposite end of the close corporation spectrum lie the corporate giants similar to Ford Motor Company, which was a close corporation until
1955, when it made its first public offering of shares. Id. § 1.03.
55. ____Mass. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 511.

56. Though it is arguable that the court has also failed to provide guidelines as
to what constitutes "substantial majority stockholder participation in the management,
direction and operations of the corporation," this issue is academic in light of the
reasoning that any number of majority shareholders who have imposed their will in
such a way that the direction of the corporation is controlled must by necessity constitute "substantial" participation. Id.
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corporation composed of 50 persons, who have agreed not to sell their
shares to others, 57 and whose majority shareholders are active participants
in the management of the corporation, may be justifiably concerned as to
the impact of Donahue upon its controlling shareholders. While 50 shareholders may be a small number compared to the number of General Motors
shareholders, it may not be small when compared to the number of share58
holders in the average American corporation.
The confusion thus generated by Donahue is potentially dangerous
in light of the extreme fiduciary obligation it imposes upon close corporation shareholders. What is perhaps most hazardous is dicta in Donahue
that this stringent fiduciary duty should be imposed upon shareholders
in their actions relative to all corporate operations which affect the "rights
and investments of other stockholders." 59 Justice Wilkins, in his concurring opinion, stressed that he was not in agreement with such a broad
imposition of this strict fiduciary standard, and suggested that the imposition of this duty should be restricted to the corporate share repurchase
situation.60

The implication thus raised by Donahue leaves other areas

of corporate activity such as declaration of dividends,6 ' sale of treasury
57. For a discussion of shareholder stock transfer agreements, see 2

O'NEAL,

supra note 39, §§ 7.08-.10. Shareholder agreements are also used to delineate methods
of resolving disputes, procedures for declaring dividends, and other corporate control
devices. 1 id. § 5.02. The minority shareholder in the close corporation will frequently
try, through the vehicle of a shareholder agreement, to secure representation in management positions. Id. See generally Hancock, supra note 38, at 137-40; Hornstein,
supra note 52.
58. See 1 O'NEAL, supra note 39, § 1.02.
59 ----Mass. at .___n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18. The court stressed that the
stockholder's strict fiduciary duty arose "relative to the operations of the enterprise." Id.
60. Id. at ___ 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Justice Wilkins felt
that the court had proceeded beyond the facts of this case in its sweeping imposition
of a stringent fiduciary duty in all corporate operations. He cautioned that on other
facts, the "analogy to partnerships may not be a complete one." Id.
61. The courts generally accord directors a wide range of discretion in making
the determination of whether or not to declare a dividend. In Fernald v. Frank Ridlon
Co., 246 Mass. 64, 140 N.E. 421 (1923), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
stated that this "discretion will not be interfered with by the courts unless the directors
act fraudulently or unreasonably." Id. at 71, 140 N.E. at 425. Several years later, in
Daniels v. Briggs, 279 Mass. 87, 180 N.E. 717 (1932), where a minority shareholder
in a close corporation brought suit against the corporation's majority shareholderdirectors, the court, in refusing to compel declaration of a dividend, noted that judicial
interference would not be undertaken except in "extraordinary circumstances." Id. at
95, 180 N.E. at 719 (citations omitted).
It is possible that the imposition of Donahue's stringent fiduciary duty upon
majority shareholders in a dividend declaration situation such as that presented by
Daniels would withdraw from the court's determination, in a suit brought to compel
declaration of a dividend, subjective factors such as fraud or bad faith, and require
only a determination based upon objective criteria such as the availability of a legal
source for dividends and the existence of a valid business justification for accumulating profits.
However, Donahue's rationale of maintaining the proportionate interests
among shareholders would seem to militate against the imposition of the stringent
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stock, 62 determination of salaries, hiring of employees, and other areas
traditionally reserved to the discretion of directors, open to investigation
by other courts.
By imposing a strict fiduciary duty upon controlling shareholders of
a close corporation, the Donahue court has provided judicial protection to
the often helpless noncontrolling shareholders. However, the uncertainties
existing in the court's definition of the close corporation present the
shareholders of many Massachusetts corporations with the very real problem of determining whether they could conceivably fall within the grasp
of the Donahue decision. Until such uncertainties are resolved by future
decisions, controlling shareholders should seriously consider whether incorporation in Massachusetts is a prudent choice.
Jane A. Gross

standard in the dividend declaration situation, as the refusal to declare dividends does
not alter proportionate shareholdings. Moreover, Donahue's principle of equality

of opportunity among shareholders would be inapposite in the dividend declaration
situation, as the refusal by the corporation to declare a dividend would affect all shareholders in the same manner.
However, the imposition of Donahue's strict fiduciary duty in the dividend
situation is arguably necessary to protect minority shareholders from the unwarranted
accumulation of profits by the majority shareholders seeking to maintain a certain
income level at the expense of minority shareholders who are seeking a return on their
investment. See generally 2 O'NEAL, supra note 39, § 8.08.
62. Donahue's requirement of equal opportunity for all shareholders in the close
corporation share repurchase situation is strikingly similar to a requirement recently
imposed by the New York Court of Appeals in a situation involving the sale of
treasury stock. In Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334 (1975), a
minority shareholder in a close corporation brought an action against the three
directors, alleging that, by authorizing the sale of treasury stock to only themselves
and two corporate employees and by refusing the plaintiff an equal opportunity to
purchase a ratable number of shares, the directors had violated the fiduciary duty
owed to the plaintiff. The court held that this preferential treatment accorded the
directors and the resulting destruction of the equality of ownership which had previously existed among the shareholders required the directors to justify that the sale of
the stock had a bona fide business purpose which could not have been accomplished
by other means. Id. at 492, 335 N.E.2d at 338. Thus, Schwartz required uniform
treatment among shareholders as Donahue had done. It should also be noted that, as
in Donahue, Schwartz recognized the existence of a personal right of action in the
plaintiff-shareholder in an otherwise classical derivative action situation. The recognition of this personal right of action by courts in jurisdictions having security for
costs provisions may significantly aid a minority shareholder in bringing suit.
Since in Schwartz the New York court acted without the benefit of the
stringent standard adopted by the Donahue court, yet awarded strikingly similar relief,
it is uncertain whether the Donahue duty will lead to a different result in a situation
involving the sale of treasury stock. Notwithstanding this result, it is clear that the
Donahue rationale of equality of treatment is compelling in this context, as similar
dangers are inherent in both the Donahue and Schwartz situations.
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ABSTENTION -

317

DISMISSAL OF FEDERAL ACTION

MANDATED IF PLAINTIFF Is ABLE TO HAVE CLAIM ADJUDICATED IN
A PARALLEL STATE PROCEEDING OR IF STATE PROCEEDING IS INSTITUTED AGAINST HIM WHILE FEDERAL CASE Is STILL IN AN EARLY

STAGE.

Hicks v. Miranda (U.S. 1975)
Police seized copies of an allegedly obscene film 1 shown in a California
theater, and, based upon that evidence, 2 filed a misdemeanor charge against
two theater employees for violation of the state's obscenity statute.3 In
a separate proceeding involving both the owners and employees of the
theater, the Superior Court of Orange County declared the film obscene
under California law and authorized the seizure of any other copies still
4
held by the theater.
In response to these events, the theater owners instituted an action
in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of the obscenity statute,
1. On the theory that each copy materially differed from the other, four separate
seizures were made under warrant. Money in the theater's ticket booth was also seized.
Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 353-54 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
2. Each copy of the film formed the basis of a separate count in the criminal
complaint filed against each employee. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 335 (1975).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311 et seq. (West 1970).
4. 422 U.S. at 334-36. In the proceedings before the superior court, the owners
and employees objected to the court's jurisdiction, purported to "reserve" all federal
questions pursuant to the procedure authorized in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Med. Exams., 375 U.S. 411 (1964), and refused to participate further in the proceedings. The court made the obscenity determination despite those actions. 422 U.S. at
335 & n.2; see id. at 336 n.3.
The superior court's decision was not appealed. Id. at 336. In a colloquy with
one of the federal district judges, counsel for the theater owners indicated that they
had decided not to appeal because plaintiffs believed that any appeal would be useless,
since the legal questions presented had already been decided adversely by the California
courts. Id. at 336-37 n.3. During argument before the United States Supreme Court,
however, counsel provided a different explanation, asserting that the order was not
appealable. Id. at 351 n.20.
5. The defendants were the district attorney of Orange County, California, a
deputy district attorney, and four members of the local police department. 388 F.
Supp. at 354.
6. Jurisdiction was based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), and its jurisdictional
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1970). 388 F. Supp. at 354.
Because of federal justiciability requirements, a plaintiff usually cannot challenge a state penal statute in federal court unless a prosecution against him under that
statute is pending or threatened. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60
(1974); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) ; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42
(1971) ; Comment, Protecting Civil Liberties Through Federal Court Intervention
in State Criminal Matters, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1549, 1561-62 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Protecting Civil Liberties]; Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief from Unconstitutional State Statutes: the Implications of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARv. Civ. RIGHTSCirv. LiB. L. REV. 520, 526-33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Implications of Steffel] ;
Note, Declaratory Relief in the CriminalLaw, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1490, 1507-09 (1967) ;
cf. Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable
Relief When No State Prosecutiots Is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 893-94 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Implications of the Younger Cases]. No such prosecution was
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to have sections of the statute 7 declared unconstitutional,8 and to reacquire
the seized films. 9 A three-judge court was convened to consider the federal
complaint. 10 Meanwhile, one day after service of that complaint was completed, the state criminal complaint against the theater employees was
amended to include the federal plaintiffs (plaintiffs) and to add counts
alleging conspiracy. 1
Reaching the merits of the controversy, 12 the three-judge court 3
declared that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional 4 and
ordered that the seized property be returned. 15 That ruling was directly
17
6
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which reversed,
present when the theater owners commenced their action. See note 63 infra. Nevertheless, the action was justiciable because theater property had been seized and held
by the state officials for the sole reason that the theater owners had allegedly violated
the attacked statute. 388 F. Supp. at 355.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311, 311.2, 311.5 (West 1970).
8. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
9. 422 U.S. at 337-38.
10. Id. The Judicial Code requires that federal challenges to the enforcement of

a state statute by a state official be heard and determined by a three-judge district court.

28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
Before the three-judge court was convened, a federal district court, having
found insufficient proof of irreparable injury and an insufficient likelihood that plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, denied a request by plaintiffs for a temporary restraining order. 422 U.S. at 338. Subsequently, a motion by plaintiffs for a temporary
iniunction to restrain the enforcement of both the obscenity statute, CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 311 et sea. (West 1970), and the California search warrant statute, CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1523-42 (West 1970), was also denied. 422 U.S. at 338-39 & n.6.
11. 422 U.S. at 338-39.
12. The three-ludge court rejected a contention that the doctrines of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), required
it to abstain from deciding the case on its merits and awarding appropriate relief.
Instead, relying on Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the court held that
Younqer and Samruels were not applicable when no prosecution was pending against the
plaintiffs personally at the time that the federal complaint was filed and that it was
therefore not required to abstain from examining the merits of the plaintiffs' declaratory
judgment action. 388 F. Supp. at 356, 361-62. Additionally, the court fonnd that a
grant of injunctive relief was appropriate because plaintiffs' injury would probably
not be remedied by a defense in the state criminal prosecution since the California
courts had previously declared the state obscenity statute constitutional. Id. at 360:
see People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973), hearing denied,
33 Cal. App. 3d 916 (Cal., Oct. 24, 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 937 (1974). Alternatively, the court asserted that the repeated seizures of the film and cash receipts and
the naming of the plaintiffs as criminal defendants after the federal suit had been
filed demonstrated bad faith and harassment which justified federal intervention under
an exception to the Younger rule. 388 F. Supp. at 360, 361-62. For a discussion of
the bad-fqith exception to the Younger rule, see note 17 infra.
13. Two opinions were issued by the three-judge court, the second in response
to various post-judgment motions filed by the defendants. See 388 F. Supp. at 352, 360.
The opinions were reported together.
14. Id. at 356-59.
15. Id. at 360, 364-65. The order required the federal defendants to petition the
state court for the return to the plaintiffs of three copies of the film; it was agreed
that the state officials could retain the other seized copy. See id. at 364-65. The seized
money was returned by mutual agreement. Id.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) ; note 40 infra.
17. In addition to holding that policy considerations compelled the application of
the abstention rule announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court
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holding that the three-judge court had erred in reaching the merits of the
case and should have dismissed the action because 1) the plaintiffs had a
substantial interest in the state proceedings which were already underway
and which could provide an adequate forum for the presentation of their
claims and 2) state criminal proceedings had been instituted against the
plaintiffs "before any proceedings of substance on the merits"'18 had occurred in the federal court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
explicitly disapproved the district court's alternative holding that the state officials'

actions constituted bad faith and harassment which would have brought the case
within an exception to the Younger doctrine's application. Characterizing the district
court's findings on that issue as "vague and conclusory," the majority concluded that
the district court had derived its holding from its decision that the state obscenity
statute was unconstitutional. 422 U.S. at 350-52. The reasoning of the three-judge
court - that the officials were guilty of bad faith and harassment because they had
used an unconstitutional statute to frustrate the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected
activity - was incorrect, since the statute had not been declared invalid at the time
the officials acted, and since each of the officials' actions had been authorized by
judicial warrant or order. Id. at 351-52. Although evidence obtained in some of the
early seizures had been suppressed in the municipal court, that suppression order had
been reversed. Id. at 339-41 & n.9. Therefore, absent a showing that the state officials
were not entitled to rely on those judicial authorizations, no bad faith could be found.
The Court concluded that an ex post facto determination of bad faith based upon a
finding of unconstitutionality would allow Younger to "be swallowed up by its exception." Id. at 350-52.
The scope of the exceptions to the Younger rule has not yet been fully defined.
See generally Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-25 & n.4 (1975). The presence
of bad faith and harassment by state officials constitutes one of those exceptions
because the officials' indifference to the outcome of the state proceedings renders the
availability of the state forum to the plaintiff virtually useless. See Note, I Used to
Love You but It's All Over Now: Abstention and the Federal Courts' Retreat from
Their Role as Primary Guardians of First Amendment Freedoms, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
847, 879-80 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Federal Courts' Retreat]. See generally
Allee v. Medrano, 420 U.S. 802, 833-46 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In this context, the factual test of bad faith requires that the
state prosecution have actually been instituted without a reasonable expectation of a
valid conviction. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 126 n.6 (1975) (decided subsequent to three-judge court's decision in Hicks) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85
(1971) ; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1968). An analysis of the facts
presented in Hicks discloses that the Court was correct in concluding that that test
had not been met. The three-judge court had inferred bad faith from the various
seizures and criminal prosecutions. See 388 F. Supp. at 360, 361-62. Ironically, however, that course of action had demonstrated the exact opposite: the officials, zealous
in their efforts to successfully enforce the obscenity law, had no reason to believe that
they could not do so. The officials' actions had been authorized under the law as they
knew it; the subsequent declaration by the district court that the statute was unconstitutional and, hence, unenforceable, could not logically have been imputed to the
knowledge of those officials to discredit their reasonable expectations. In retrospect,
this error of the district court can best be explained as the result of a misplacing of
the burden of proof. The district court's inference of bad faith had been based
primarily upon the state prosecutors' failure to explain their timing of the institution
of state criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs. See id. at 361-62. Hence, it
presumed bad faith until the state could prove otherwise. But the burden should have
been placed on the plaintiffs, not on the state. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 54 (1971). An analysis based upon a proper transposition of that burden of proof
reveals that the party correctly charged therewith had failed to demonstrate the presence of bad faith.
18. 422 U.S. at 349.
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The dismissal in Hicks was an exercise of the federal doctrine of
abstention. Generally, this doctrine states that the federal courts should,
in their equitable discretion, refuse to decide certain cases, requiring the
cases instead to be initially decided in state tribunals. 19 In one application
of this doctrine, referred to in this note as "Younger abstention," 20 the
federal judiciary has refused to exercise its injunctive powers to enjoin state
22
2
criminal proceedings which are threatened ' or have already commenced.
In the principal case articulating this policy, Younger v. Harris,23 the
United States Supreme Court explained that this application of federal
abstention was based upon the general notion of comity24 and equity's
19. The Federal Courts' Retreat, supra note 17, at 847, 849. See generally C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970); Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: the Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
The abstention doctrine did not begin to evolve in the federal courts until
early in the 20th century. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court
Proceedings: the Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535, 537-38 (1970).
However, manifestations of a similar philosophy had existed from the time of the
Nation's inception. The eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
for example, had been interpreted to prohibit the federal courts from adjudicating any
suit by a citizen of a state against any state or against officials of any state who were
acting in their official capacity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Governor of
Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S.(1 Pet.) 110 (1828). The Supreme Court, however,
subsequently declared that a state official's performance of an unconstitutional act is
per se ultra vires and thus not within his constitutionally protected capacity. See
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). That decision placed the Hicks type of action
outside the constitutional prohibition. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra § 48.
Similarly, a statutory prohibition against the enjoining of state court proceedings had existed since 1793. See Federal Anti-Injunction Act, Act of March 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334, 335 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)). However, because
the Hicks case was a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), it fell within an
exception to that Act's application. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
20. The abstention doctrine takes a variety of forms according to the factual
situation to which it is applied, the rationale used to justify its application, and the
procedural consequences which result from its use. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 19,
§ 52; Field, supra note 19, at 1147-87. This casenote deals with just one category
of the doctrine, referred to herein as "Younger abstention," after the name of the
principal case in the area, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
21. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). Douglas held that, in
their equitable discretion, federal courts should allow state courts to try state criminal
cases without federal interference unless the federal plaintiff was able to show "irreparable injury 'both great and immediate.'" Id. at 164, quoting Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935). The Court explained that "[n]o person is
immune from prosecution in good faith for his alleged criminal acts" and that the
constitutionality of a criminal statute could just as readily be determined in a state
criminal case as in a federal suit for injunctive relief. 319 U.S. at 163.
22. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122-23 (1951). In Stefanelli, the considerations discussed in Douglas were held even more cogent where state criminal
proceedings were already pending, rather than merely threatened. Id.
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger was the primary case in a group of abstention
cases decided by the Court in 1971. The others were Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971) ; Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) ;
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) (per curiam); and Byrne v. Karelexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971) (per curiam).
24. 401 U.S. at 44. As an inherent aspect of the federal system, that notion
required that legitimate state functions be properly respected by the federal government
and its courts. Id.
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recognition of the plaintiff's adequate remedy at law in the state court
proceedings. 25 In this situation, therefore, unless the plaintiff could demonstrate a bad faith prosecution by state officials or other extraordinary circumstances rendering adequate vindication of his constitutional claim impossible
in the state criminal proceedings, federal relief had to be denied. 26 In the
companion case of Samuels v. Mackell,27 those same considerations were
also held applicable to a grant of declaratory relief when a state prosecution
28
is pending.
The analysis to be applied when no state court prosecution is pending
was subsequently articulated 29 by the Supreme Court in Steffel v. Thompson."0 The plaintiff in Steffel sought federal declaratory relief from a
threatened state criminal prosecution, but, since no prosecution had actually
been initiated against him, Samuels was held inapposite. Proclaiming that
"the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force
in the absence of a pending state proceeding,' "31 the Court explained that
the lack of such a proceeding could leave the plaintiff with no forum other
than a federal court in which to test his constitutional claim unless he
chose to actually instigate prosecution by violating the state law.3 2 Given
this lack of an available forum, the interest of the federal courts in serving
as primary guardians of federal constitutional rights33 became a prime
factor for consideration, 34 and, as a result, federal declaratory relief was
appropriate. 5 The propriety of granting injunctive relief in such a situation was left undecided. 6 The Court thus developed a dichotomous ap25. Id. at 43-44.
26. Id. at 48-49, 53-54; see Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-25 (1975).
Although in some cases a court may retain jurisdiction after it has invoked the abstention doctrine, the court will dismiss the action if the interests of comity are so strong
as to override the need for providing a federal forum. Younger abstention is one of
the situations in which dismissal is proper. See Field, supra note 19, at 1163-87;
The Federal Courts' Retreat, supra note 17, at 849-53.
27. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
28. In Samuels, the Court reasoned that a declaratory judgment would be as
equally disruptive of pending state proceedings as would be an injunction because a
court could compel a subsequent injunction to secure the judgment's enforcement
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970), and also
because the judgment carried a res judicata effect which would render continuation
of the state prosecution impossible. 401 U.S. at 72-73.
29. Younger and Samuels had expressly left the issue open. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1971).
30. 415 U.S. 452 (1974), noted in 20 VILL. L. REv. 241 (1974).
31. Id. at 462, quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMillan, 406 U.S. 498, 509
(1972).
32. 415 U.S. at 462. The Court also noted that in such a situation legal proceedings would not be duplicated, state criminal proceedings would not be disrupted, and
"federal intervention [could not] be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles." Id.
33. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text infra.
34. 415 U.S. at 463.
35. Id. at 472-73, 475.
36. Id. at 463, 475. The Court did emphasize, however, that, when a proceeding
was not already pending, a grant of injunctive relief was not to be treated identically
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proach to the abstention issue, recognizing an overriding state interest
requiring abstention when a state criminal proceeding8 7 was pending,
but also recognizing the absence of such an interest when no state action
was pending.
Against this background, the Supreme Court,38 with four of its members dissenting,3 9 held that the Younger abstention doctrine compelled
dismissal in Hicks v. Miranda.40 It first considered the application of the
doctrine to the facts existing at the time that the federal complaint had
been filed. Noting that at that time state proceedings had not yet been
instituted against the plaintiffs themselves, the majority emphasized that
the plaintiffs nevertheless had possessed a substantial interest in those
state proceedings which were then extant: state criminal charges had been
brought against plaintiffs' employees; moreover, plaintiffs' property had
been seized, and their film had been declared obscene and subject to
further seizure. 41 The federal relief which the plaintiffs had sought would
necessarily have interfered with the pending prosecution of their employees. 42 The interests of the plaintiffs and their employees had been
closely intertwined, even to the point that both were represented by the
same counsel. 43 Given that situation, the Court would not allow the
Younger doctrine to be circumvented merely because no criminal prosecuto a grant of declaratory relief, the requirements for a grant of injunctive relief
remaining much more stringent than those for a declaratory judgment. Id. at 462-73.
Six days after its decision in Hicks, the Court decided that preliminary injunctive relief could be granted if no state proceedings were already pending. Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
37. The Court recently extended the Younger rule to certain noncriminal proceedings. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In that case the Court also
added an exhaustion aspect to the rule, requiring that all available state appellate
procedures be utilized before recourse to the federal courts could be had. Id. at 607-11.
38. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice White. 422 U.S. at 334.
Chief Justice Burger joined in that opinion and also wrote a brief concurrence in
which he discussed the composition of the three-judge court. See id. at 352-53
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. The dissent was written by Justice Stewart, and was joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Id. at 353.
40. Before reaching the abstention issue, the Court dealt at length with two
challenges to its appellate jurisdiction under section 1253 of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which grants jurisdiction only for actions required to be heard
by three-judge courts. It first held that the plaintiffs' challenge to the search warrant
statute (see note 10 supra) preserved the Court's jurisdiction to decide the abstention
issue although, as a result of the decision in Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915 (1974),
the issue of the obscenity statute's constitutionality no longer presented a substantial
federal question and thus did not require adjudication by a three-judge court. 422
U.S. at 343-46. See generally Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
Secondly, the Court rejected the appellee's contention that the three-judge court's injunction was of a type not directly appealable under section 1253. 422 U.S. at 347-48.
41. 422 U.S. at 348.
42. The three-judge court had permitted the state officials to retain only one copy
of the film. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. By thus prohibiting use of the
other copies as evidence, that order severely hampered prosecution of several counts
in the criminal complaint against the employees. 422 U.S. at 347; see note 2 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 1 supra.
43. 422 U.S. at 348-49.
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tion was personally pending against the plaintiffs on the date that their
federal complaint had been filed. Since the plaintiffs were unable to
clearly demonstrate that their constitutional claims and property interests
could not be adequately advanced during the state prosecution of their
employees, 44 the considerations of comity emphasized in Younger required
45
abstention by the federal courts.
Secondly, the Court discussed the impact of the institution of the
state proceedings against the plaintiffs themselves. Noting that that event
occurred only a day after service of the federal complaint had been completed, the Court stressed that, despite the formulation in Steffel of a
rule focusing upon the pendency of a state prosecution, the exact stage
of the federal proceeding at which pendency of the state action would be
dispositive of the abstention question had yet to be identified. 46 The Court
held that the critical determination of whether a state proceeding was
already pending would not be made as of the date that the federal complaint had been filed; instead, the Younger abstention doctrine would
continue to apply until "proceedings of substance on the merits" took
place in the federal court 47 Since the plaintiffs had been criminally
charged before answers had been filed in the federal case and before any
proceedings had occurred before the three-judge court, no proceedings of
substance on the merits had yet occurred, and dismissal was therefore
mandated. A contrary ruling would have only served to "trivialize" the
48

principles of Younger.

It was with this second portion of the Court's opinion that the dissenters disagreed. In their view, resolution of the abstention issue required
an evaluation of the state and federal interests as they had existed when
the state proceeding against the plaintiffs had been commenced. Citing
Steffel, they pointed out that no substantial state interests requiring
abstention had existed at the time that the federal proceeding had been
instituted since no state prosecution was pending against the plaintiffs
at that time. They added that, when the state prosecution of plaintiffs was
subsequently begun, the federal interest in adjudicating and vindicating
44. The federal plaintiffs had successfully argued in the district court that a
presentation of their constitutional claim in the California courts would have been
fruitless, since those courts had already settled the issue against them. See note 12
supra. The Supreme Court disagreed. Noting that the state ruling had been made
by an intermediate appellate court, the Court emphasized that the California Supreme

Court could have been asked to reconsider the issue, that "[sltate courts, like other
courts, sometimes change their minds," and that, even if the state courts adhered to

their position, United States Supreme Court review would always be available. Thus,
Younger was "not so easily avoided." 422 U.S. at 350 n.18.
45. 422 U.S. at 349.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 349-50. Disposing of the case in this manner allowed the Court to sidestep the additional issue of whether the plaintiffs' failure to appeal the state superior
court's ruling that their films were obscene required dismissal of the federal case
under Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See 422 U.S. at 351 n.20. That
decision would have depended on whether the state ruling was in fact appealable. See
note 37 supra. See also note 4 supra.
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federal constitutional rights had already been invoked. Therefore, the
dissent concluded that, since the federalism emphasized in Younger required a "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments," 49 the federal role as primary guarantor of federal constitutional rights should not have been ousted in favor of the state once it had
been properly initiated.5" This analysis compelled the further conclusion
that the critical determination of whether a state action was pending
should be made as of the time that the federal complaint, with its concomitant invocation of the substantial federal interest in adjudicating the
proceedings, was filed.51 The majority's new rule was interpreted to hold
that Stefel was "inoperative" if a state charge were filed up to some
unclear 5 2 later point in time, and this, it was said, actually "trivialized"
53
Steff el.
Conscious of the decision's impact, the dissenters predicted a more
unseemly "race to the courthouse" to determine controlling jurisdiction"
than the mere pendency dichotomy could itself ever ensure, since the states
could now "leave the mark later, run a shorter course, and arrive first
at the finish line." 55 The majority's decision invited state prosecutors to
institute state proceedings in order to remove a case from federal jurisdiction to a more sympathetic state forum; it "virtually [instructed] state
officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments."5 6 Thus, the
majority opinion was considered a major distortion of the federal balance
reflected in past decisions, being untrue not only to Steffel, but to the
57
principles of Younger as well.
The dissenters thus pointed out the major difficulty in reconciling
the second portion of the majority's opinion with the abstention doctrine
analysis established by previous cases. Both Younger and Samuels had
emphasized that federal abstention was mandated when a state proceeding
had been commenced prior to the initiation of a federal suit. 58 Moreover,
the Court had justified its holding in Steifel by noting that no state proceedings were pending at the time that the federal complaint had been
filed.591 Though dicta, those statements were consistent with the dichotomy
49. 422 U.S. at 356-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (emphasis supplied by dissent in Hicks).

50. 422 U.S. at 353-57.
51. See id.
52. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text infra.
53. 422 U.S. at 353.
54. Under the form of the doctrine favored by the dissenters, the determination
of whether state or federal jurisdiction was appropriate would necessarily be made
according to which action was filed first. Thus, the party who won the "race to the
courthouse" would be rewarded with his choice of a judicial forum. See Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

55. 422 U.S. at 354.
56. Id. at 357.
57. Id.

58. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.

66, 72-74 (1971).
59. 415 U.S. at 462. The three-judge court relied heavily upon this language. See
388 F. Supp. at 361.
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which had been developed, and they were interpreted as a clear expression
of the Court's approach to the abstention problem. 60 Thus, though not
actually in conflict with earlier holdings, 61 the declaration in Hicks that
Younger abstention would apply even though state proceedings had not
been instituted until after the filing of the federal complaint 2 was inconsistent with previous statements of the Court and blurred what theretofore
03
had seemed to be a clear rule.
More important than the Court's rejection of its own dicta, however,
was the question of whether the majority opinion was consistent with the
analysis suggested in Steifel. In Steffel, the Court had declared that
substantial weight should be accorded the fact that Congress had made the
federal courts "the primary guardians of constitutional rights" and that
4
that factor would control in the absence of a pending state proceeding.
That declaration formed the basis for the dissenters' argument 65 that an
assertion of such a major federal interest, once invoked by the filing of a
federal claim, could not be ousted by the subsequent presence of a pending
state proceeding because such an ouster would violate the deference to
which that legitimate federal interest was entitled. Arguably, since
"[f] ederalism is not a one-way street," 66 the converse of Younger's comity
60. See Implications of Steffel, supra note 6, at 535-36.
61. The Court had once summarily affirmed the issuance of a temporary injunction although a state prosecution against the federal plaintiff had been instituted on
the day after the federal complaint had been filed. See Nichol v. Keenan, 404 U.S.
1055 (1972), aff'g mem. 326 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Wis. 1971). Yet, despite its factual
similarity to Hicks, Nichol is distinguishable. The only question presented on appellate review of the grant of a preliminary injunction is whether the district court
abused its discretion in issuing the order; the appellate court does not decide the
merits of the questions presented by the case. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
931-32, 934 (1975). Therefore, the Court in Nichol only decided that, given the
state of the law in 1972, the district court had not abused its discretion in issuing
the injunction. The Court did not consider the abstention issue itself. But cf. Implications of Steffel, supra note 6, at 537-38 (discussing trial court opinion).
62. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
63. It should be noted that Hicks only decided the stage of a federal action
during which a state proceeding had to be pending in order for Younger abstention
to apply; it did not define when a state proceeding should be considered "pending."
On the latter issue, decisions have run the gamut from the time application is made
for a search warrant to the time of the state trial. See Federal Injunctions Against
State Criminal Proceedings,4 STAN. L. REV. 381, 388-89 (1952) ; The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 308-09 (1971); 20 ViL.. L. REv. 241, 251 & n.82
(1974). No one in Hicks contended that the amendment of the state's criminal complaint to include the federal plaintiffs did not create a pending proceeding against
those plaintiffs.
It should also be emphasized that the situation in Hicks did not involve a
plaintiff who, after instituting his federal action, continued his unlawful conduct, thus
inviting a subsequent state prosecution. In such cases, at least so long as the fedoral
litigation is still "in an embryonic stage [with] no contested matter [having] been
decided," the Younger doctrine fully applies. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
929 (1975) (case decided subsequent to, but without citation to, Hicks).
64. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463 (1974), quoting Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432 (1975) ; cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra at 472-43.
65. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
66. Implicationsof Steffel, supra note 6, at 537.
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principles should have applied.67 However, the Steffel decision had also
recognized that state courts possess an equal responsibility to guard federal
constitutional rights.68 In fact, the underlying basis of that decision had
been the absence of an available state forum in which federal constitutional
rights could be protected.6 9 Therefore, since the initiation of state criminal
proceedings made such a forum available in Hicks, the Court's mandate
of federal abstention was consistent with at least a narrow interpretation of
Steffel's rationale.
Of course, although the decision in Hicks conformed to the rationale
of Younger and Steffel, its result was not necessarily mandated. The
analysis provided by the dissent also would have fit comfortably into the
framework of the previous cases. In essence, the difference between the
dissent and the majority opinion concerned the proper balance which
should be struck between the various interests involved. Although the
majority never openly admitted that it was balancing interests, 70 the cases
indicate that interests have indeed been balanced against the factors compelling Younger abstention. 71 As the dissent pointed out,72 one interest
67. See 422 U.S. at 356-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. See 415 U.S. at 460-61.
69. Id. at 462; see notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra; cf. Kugler v.
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 103-04, 120-21
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). So long as no state
action was pending, the considerations of comity and equitable discretion mandating
abstention in Younger were absent. Meanwhile, a judicial forum was needed to
provide the plaintiff an opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights. At this
point, the interest of the federal courts in serving as primary guardians of constitutional rights took on prime significance and federal judicial relief became appropriate.
415 U.S. at 462-63. Conversely, when a state action was pending, a state judicial
forum was already available and a federal forum therefore was not needed. In this
context, the considerations of comity and equitable discretion underlying Younger
outweighed any need for federal intervention. See notes 73-76 and accompanying
text infra.
70. The majority merely asserted that dismissal was mandated in order that the
principles of Younger not be trivialized. See 422 U.S. at 350; notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. It explained those principles in terms of a need to permit state
courts to try their cases without federal court interference. See 422 U.S. at 349. No
countervailing factors were ever mentioned. See id. at 349-50.
This approach was consistent with that taken by the cases decided prior to
Hicks. In Younger, for example, the need for a denial of federal relief was explained
in terms of the "longstanding public policy against federal court interference with
state court proceedings," which was required for reasons of comity and equitable
restraint. 401 U.S. at 43-45; see notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra. Countervailing considerations were not mentioned by the Court. See 401 U.S. at 43-54. The
Steffel opinion was only slightly more cognizant of the balance being struck, basing
its holding upon the absence of the considerations of comity and equity which had
compelled abstention in Younger and then on the countervailing need to provide the
plaintiff with a federal forum in which to assert his constitutional claim. 415 U.S. at
462-63; see notes 31-34 & 69 and accompanying text supra. But cf. Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 103-21 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the balancing of interests). On the need for balancing in general, see
Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger,
and Beyond, 50 TEXAs L. REV. 1324, 1338-40 (1972).
71. One interest which can be said to have been balanced is the need to provide
the plaintiff with some judicial forum in which to vindicate his constitutional claim.
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which is appropriate for such balancing is that of the federal courts in
serving as the primary guarantors of federal constitutional rights, 73 an
interest which is so strong that it cannot be overbalanced by the mere
availability of a state forum which can also protect those rights. 74 Steffel
serves as one illustration of the primacy of this interest in the absence of
overriding considerations of comity and equity present in a Younger
situation. 75 Conversely, however, Younger implies that when a state prosecution is pending at the time a federal action is commenced, this major
federal interest is itself overbalanced by the additional considerations of
comity and equity which then become present.7 6 The difficult question
presented in Hicks was whether this overbalancing also occurred when
the institution of the federal action antedated the institution of the criminal
prosecution by the state. To the dissenters, it did not; since the interest
of the federal courts in serving as the guarantor of constitutional rights is
77
"fully implicated from the moment [federal] jurisdiction is invoked,"
the interest could not be allowed to be eliminated by the subsequent institution of a state criminal action without allowing it to be totally nullified at
the whim of a state prosecutor. 78 To the majority, however, the federal
interest apparently was overcome at the time that the subsequent state
prosecution was initiated. Only when "proceedings of substance on the
merits" took place in the federal action did the federal interest become so
strong as to outweigh the factors compelling abstention.7 9 This conclusion
This interest controls when no state action is pending and a state forum is therefore
unavailable. In such a situation, provision of a federal forum may be a necessity and
the interests in favor of abstention do not override that need. Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974) (by implication); see Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 120 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because of the institution
of the state prosecution in Hicks, this interest was not a factor in the case; the state
prosecution provided the plaintiffs with a forum for the assertion of their constitutional claim.
72. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.

73. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-48 (1967). This interest arose
subsequent to the Civil War when Congress ceased relying upon the state courts to
vindicate constitutional rights and invested the federal courts with broad powers to
redress civil rights deprivations. Id.; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463-65
(1974). As a result of this congressional conferral of judicial power, a "duty" was
imposed upon the federal judiciary to respect a plaintiff's choice of a federal forum
for adjudication of his federal constitutional claims. Zwickler v. Koota, supra at 248.
74. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
75. See 415 U.S. at 463, 472-73; note 69 supra.
76. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (by implication). This overbalancing is the major
difference between Younger abstention and the other forms of the abstention doctrine.
Because of the interest of the federal courts in protecting constitutional rights, other

forms of abstention presume the federal courts to be a proper forum for resolution of
a case unless equitable considerations compel a contrary conclusion. On the other
hand, where Younger abstention is applicable, the overbalancing considerations com-

pelling abstention and dismissal shift the presumption so that the federal forum is
presumed not to be proper unless extraordinary circumstances are present. See Field,
supra note 19, at 1163-70.
77. 422 U.S. at 356 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 355-57.
79. Id. at 349-50 (by implication).
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was never explained by the Court, but it could well be argued that this
result occurred because at that point an additional countervailing interest
entered the balance - that of judicial economy, with its interest in preventing the waste of precious judicial resources. 80 Thus, it appears that a
majority of the Court decided that the interest of the federal courts in
serving as primary guarantors of constitutional rights did not in itself
overbalance the considerations in favor of Younger abstention. Only when
other interests were added would the balance tip against a federal court
dismissal.
The majority's extension of the time period during which a pending
state action could be used to invoke the Younger doctrine thus has broad
implications. Indeed, it takes on even greater significance in light of the
fact that the Court could have based its decision entirely on the narrower
rationale of the first portion of its opinion, which discussed what has been
called the "parallel plaintiff" 8' problem. Although the dissenters never
addressed themselves to this earlier portion of the majority opinion, significant difficulties existed with regard to its line of reasoning. The Court
had previously confronted parallel plaintiffs in a Younger context in at
least two cases. In Roe v. Wade,8 2 without any specific discussion of the
issue, the Court upheld a grant of declaratory relief to a plaintiff challenging
a state abortion statute even though a doctor who had entered the case
as a plaintiff-intervenor had already been charged with violations of the
same statute.83 Similarly, in Steffel, the Court, relying upon Roe, held
that the plaintiff's federal action was not affected by the fact that a companion of the plaintiff had been prosecuted for the same activity which
had been the subject of the plaintiff's federal suit.8 4 Nevertheless, in
Hicks, the Court asserted that the presence of a pending state action against
the theater employees served to justify a denial of federal relief to their
employers. 8 5

An explanation of this apparent inconsistency is suggested by a
separate opinion of three members of the Hicks majority in Allee v.
Medrano.80 In that opinion, Chief Justice Burger discussed the applicability
of Younger principles where a union derivatively sought federal relief
80. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
81. See Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened State Prosecutions: the Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 965, 980-83 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Relief]. Although not fully descriptive, the term was
used in that article to describe the situation wherein a party would seek federal relief
to restrain the enforcement of a state statute while state proceedings under that
statute were already pending against a different party in the state courts.
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Id. at 125-27, 166-67. Relying upon Younger and Samuels, the Court dismissed the doctor's complaint, but this did not affect the grant of relief to another
plaintiff, against whom no charges were pending. See id.
84. 415 U.S. at 471 n.19.
85. See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
86. 416 U.S. 802, 821 (1974) (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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from a state statute under which state prosecutions were pending against
87
union members for constitutionally protected organizational activities.
He argued that, since the union's cause of action rested solely upon its
members' prosecutions, an "identity of interest"8 8 existed between the two
parties which would justify federal abstention; a denial of federal relief
to the union would not deny its prosecuted members a full opportunity to
vindicate those same constitutional claims during their own state court
proceedings.8 9 This factual situation was distinguished from that of Steffel
in that no such "identity of interest" between that plaintiff and his prosecuted companion which would have allowed the plaintiff's rights to be vindicated in his companion's state prosecution was shown to have existed.9 0
The opinion did not articulate guidelines for ascertaining when such an
identity of interest would exist, but it noted that "facts of joint activity
and common interest" between the two parties would be the determinative
factors. 91 By inference, such "joint activity and common interest" must
have existed in Hicks. The employees of the plaintiffs were prosecuted
for the same activities with regard to which federal relief was sought, and
the property which the plaintiffs sought to reclaim was the primary evidence in the state prosecution. Moreover, the two parties had retained the
same counsel, and their employment relationship assured protection of
the plaintiffs' interests in the state action. Therefore, "the same comity
considerations" 92 of Younger applied.
As a matter of policy, however, the identity-of-interest rule may still
be subject to criticism, since it forces a federal plaintiff to arrest conduct
which may be constitutionally permissible while awaiting a state determination which might leave the constitutional claim unanswered. 93 Yet,
critics must recognize that a similar danger also exists in the classic
Younger situation itself, in which the state defendant is also the party
87. See id. at 829-30 & n.6.
88. Id. at 830.
89. See id. at 830-31.
90. See id. at 831-32. The same analysis apparently distinguishes Roe. Cf. Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1975).
91. See 416 U.S. at 832 n.8 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
92. Id. at 831, quoted in 422 U.S. at 349.
93. The federal defendant cannot, of course, intervene in the pending criminal
action to present his own arguments as to the constitutional issues involved. Meanwhile, even if the state defendant himself decides to present the constitutional claim
as a defense, he might, for example, be acquitted on the facts of the case or on some
other nonconstitutional ground. See Federal Relief, supra note 81, at 982. Indeed, in
Hicks itself, subsection 311.2(b) of the obscenity statute bestowed a limited criminal
immunity on certain theater employees. See CAL. PEaL CODE § 311.2(b) (West
1970). The court opinions do not provide sufficient information to indicate whether
that immunity was available to the theater employees in Hicks, but if it were, it would
have enabled them to be acquitted of charges under section 311.2 without a consideration
of that section's constitutionality. It also would have posed serious ethical problems for
their attorneys, who would still have been charged with vindicating the rights of their
other clients, the erstwhile federal plaintiffs, in the state court proceedings.
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seeking federal relief.9 4 The identity-of-interest rule at least assures that
the federal plaintiff and the state defendant have a relationship which is close
enough to create a substantial probability that the federal party will have
his claims litigated in a state tribunal.9 5 Such an opportunity is a "necessary predicate" to Younger's application,90 but, once it exists, nothing
more can be demanded. The Younger decision has clearly established that
the certainty of resolution of federal claims in a federal court must often
be sacrificed to the higher interests of the federal system itself.
The Hicks decision has broken new ground in the federal abstention
doctrine, and, due to the equivocal language employed by the Court, it
may take some time for its holding to assume a definite shape. Its prime
impact, of course, will be a broadening of the application of the Younger
abstention doctrine with a concomitant narrowing of federal judicial
authority. Federal district judges can now be expected to scrutinize more
closely the principles underlying the Younger rule before declaring it
inapplicable. As they do so, a clearer formulation of the identity-of-interest
rule now applicable to parallel plaintiff situations9 7 should begin to evolve.
The simple fact that the Court has embraced that rule may have a profound effect on the federal courts' ability to decide a variety of cases
involving such potential parallel parties as employers and their employees,
corporations and their officers or directors, and labor unions or other unincorporated associations and their members. But the presence of such broad
categorical groups should merely alert a court to the rule's possible applicability; it should not be the sole criterion for the rule's application. Instead, the
paramount determinants must be the specific facts at hand, for only if they
disclose a situation affording the federal plaintiff an opportunity to vindicate his rights in existing parallel state proceedings may the identity-ofinterest rule be properly invoked. Similarly, the greater care with which
abstention policy will probably now be viewed should produce an effort
to determine the exact time period in which the Younger rule will control.
The Court's new measure of this period - "before any proceedings of
substance on the merits have taken place in federal court"98 - needs
94. For example, the case might be voluntarily dismissed by the state before
trial, or, if it does go to trial, the defendant might be acquitted for some reason other
than his constitutional defense. Federal Relief, supra note 81, at 984.
95. Indeed, the assurance of this interest should serve as the test of whether the
rule will apply. If the factual situation will not reasonably assure the federal plaintiff
that his interests will be protected in the state proceeding, an identity of interest
should, by definition, be found not to exist. See text following note 97 infra.
96. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975); see Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
97. See notes 41-45 & 81-92 and accompanying text supra.
98. 422 U.S. at 349. See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975)
(implying a time limitation similar to that in Hicks for cases wherein a subsequent
state prosecution had been instigated by continued unlawful conduct) ; note 63 supra.
The Hicks test is apparently two-pronged, requiring the proceedings to be
both "of substance" and "on the merits." 422 U.S. at 353 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Prior to the filing of the state criminal complaint against the theater owners in
Hicks, the district court, in considering the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary in-
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extensive clarification 0 and can be expected to provoke considerable litigation before its meaning is finally settled. It is clear that the rules to be
derived from Hicks are far from completely formulated.
Of greater concern than the direct impact of Hicks on the federal
courts, however, is its potential effect on local prosecutors and the dangers
which that effect portends for the exercise of federal judicial power. The
decision implies that the role of the federal courts as protectors of federal
constitutional rights is outweighed, and therefore subject to divestment,
by the presence of a state prosecution of the federal plaintiff. 100 As a
result, this federal judicial role is in a precarious position. The dissenters'
warning that the decision will invite state officials to reply to federal actions
by securing state criminal indictments 0 1 was farfetched. Indeed, "[olne
need not impugn the motives of state officials to suppose that they would
rather prosecute a criminal suit in state court than defend a civil case in a
federal forum.' u0 2 Since an indictment is not always required for minor
offenses,103 state officials may not be reluctant to bring state charges to
remove a defendant's federal case to the state courts. But the philosophy
underlying Younger and its progeny does not sanction such conduct. It
is imperative that the Court recognize that the filing of state proceedings
will not always be prompted by legitimate law enforcement considerations;
state officials may seek to frustrate federal jurisdiction, to penalize a
plaintiff for having brought a federal action, or to deter others from
bringing similar suits.-04 Such motives are certainly not meritorious; yet,
no exception to the Younger rule would prevent their effectuation so long
as state officials might reasonably expect to obtain a valid conviction. 0 5
junction, had made certain preliminary rulings on the merits. See id.; note 10 supra.
Since those proceedings were insufficient to meet the Court's test, they presumably
did not satisfy the "of substance" requirement.
99. The Court did not attempt to more clearly define its test in terms of procedural events. In applying the test to the factual situation presented, it merely stated
that the plaintiffs "were charged . . . prior to answering the federal case and prior
to any proceedings whatsoever before the three-judge court." 422 U.S. at 349-50. That
statement may indicate that the issues must be formally joined by both parties through
the filing of appropriate documents in order for the test to be met; it may also mean
that, if a three-judge court is required to adjudicate the case, any proceedings occurring prior to that court's designation are insufficient. One general consideration
which might aid in accurately defining the time period may be the concern for judicial
economy. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (White, J., concurring); note 80
and accompanying text supra; cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra at 462.
100. See notes 70-80 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
102. 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
103. In Hicks, the filing of a criminal complaint was sufficient to institute the
state criminal action. A delineation of what other actions may also be sufficient is
tied to the difficult problem of defining a "pending" state proceeding. See note 63
supra. Additionally, as a result of the Court's decision in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), the mere filing of a state civil complaint may adequately institute a pending state action so as to allow the Younger abstention doctrine to be
asserted. See 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See generally note 37 supra.
104. Implications of Steffel, supra note 6, at 534.
105. The major exception, bad faith, is extremely narrow, since it is applicable
only in situations wherein the state prosecution is instituted without any supporting
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Therefore, the Court should closely study the implications of Hicks and
decide how and to what extent such unfavorable effects can be limited.
Resolution of that particular problem will probably be the next major
abstention issue faced by the federal courts.
Hicks v. Miranda presents some serious problems for federal plaintiffs.
Through this decision, the Court has extended Younger's restrictions on
the powers of the federal courts and thereby further strengthened the
powers of the states. In so doing, the Court has struck a balance which can
well be criticized and has established a rule which is in need of tempering
to prevent future abuse. Yet, the delicate task of constitutional balancing
which the federal system requires is not an easy one, for through it the
Court must strive to preserve values which are fundamental to the American
form of government. In that context, Hicks presents one additional illustration of the Court's concern with one such fundamental concept: once
again the Court has demonstrated its continuing concern for the preservation of American federalism.
Carl A. Solano

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF LIKE KIND EXCHANGES

-

SECTION 1031 NONRECOGNITION
SALE OF PROPERTY AT ITS FAIR MARKET

VALUE CONDITIONED UPON LONG-TERM LEASEBACK FOR FAIR
MARKET RENTALS CONSTITUTES A SALE SOLELY FOR CASH CONSIDERATION AND NOT A LIKE KIND EXCHANGE.

Leslie Co. (Tax Ct. 1975)
In 1966, Leslie Company (taxpayer), an industrial manufacturing
concern, decided to relocate its business operations and acquired land for
that purpose.' Financing was necessary in order to construct a new plant,
and having explored various methods of financing without success, the
taxpayer entered into a sale and leaseback agreement with Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential).2 The agreement provided
that following the taxpayer's construction of an industrial plant on the
evidence which could cause the state officials to expect a valid conviction. See
Maraist, supra note 19, at 586-87; Shevin, Federal Intervention in State Court
Proceedings, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 3, 6; note 17 supra. See also Carey, Federal Court

Interference in State CriminalProsecutions, 56 MAss. L.Q. 11, 20-21 (1971); Protecting Civil Liberties, supra note 6, at 1558. A recognition that there is a greater
possibility that state officials are improperly motivated when a state action is instituted
subsequent to the filing of a federal complaint may prompt the Court to broaden the
bad faith exception in such fact situations and consequently subject the officials' actions
to greater scrutiny.

1. Leslie Co., 64 T.C. 247, 249 (1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-2305, 3d Cir.,
Nov. 17, 1975.
2. 64 T.C. at 249.
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property according to specifications approved by Prudential, Prudential
would purchase the improved property3 and lease it to the taxpayer for a
term of 30 years. 4 The lease was to contain two renewal options of 10
years each and an "option to offer" which gave the taxpayer an option to
repurchase the property at specified time intervals in accordance with a
declining price schedule. 5
The taxpayer completed the building, and following approval by Prudential, sold it to Prudential for $2.4 million. 6 The lease agreement was
executed contemporaneously with the transfer of title, the rental terms
7
being comparable to the fair rental value of similar properties in the area.
The taxpayer reported on its 1968 corporate income tax return a total cost
in purchasing the land and erecting the plant of $3.187 million and a resulting loss, after the sale, of $787,414.8 The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (Commissioner) disallowed the claimed deduction for the loss,
contending that the sale and leaseback fell within the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code). 9
On petition by the taxpayer, the United States Tax Court rejected the
Commissioner's view, holding that the transaction was a bona fide sale
of the property and not a like kind exchange under section 1031, and,
therefore, the general rule of recognition found in section 1002 of the
Code 10 was applicable. Leslie Co., 64 T.C. 247 (1975), aPpeal docketed,
No. 75-2305, 3d Cir., Nov. 17, 1975.
3. The agreement provided that the purchase price was to be the actual cost
of the land, building, and other improvements, but not to exceed $2.4 million. Id.
4. Id.
5. If Prudential rejected an offer to purchase, the lease was to terminate. Id.
at 257 n.2 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 250.
7. Id. The annual rental of $190,560 included all taxes, maintenance, and other
charges which the taxpayer was obliged to pay. Id.
8. Id. at 250-51. The claimed loss resulted in a net operating loss of $366,907
which was carried back to the 1965 tax year. Investment credits of $436.41 and $50,700,
which could not be utilized in the 1968 return on account of the net operating loss,
were carried back to the 1965 and 1966 tax years respectively. Id.
9. Id. at 251. Section 1031 of the Code provides in pertinent part:

(a)

NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR

Loss

FROM ExCHANGES SOLELY IN KIND. -

No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade
or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property
held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of
trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or
interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for
productive use in trade or business or for investment.

(c) Loss FROM EXCHANGES NOT SOLELY IN KIND. - If an exchange would be
within the provisions of subsection (a) . . . if it were not for the fact that the
property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such
provisions to be received without the recognition of gain or loss, but also of other
property or money, then no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(a), (c).
10. Section 1002 of the Code provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on the sale or exchange of
property the entire amount of the gain or loss . . . shall be recognized.
Id. § 1002.
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Section 1002 of the Code requires that, subject to statutory exceptions,
the entire amount of gain or loss on a sale or exchange of property shall
be recognized." This gain or loss is generally the difference between the
amount realized on the disposition of the property, and the property's
adjusted basis. 12 Section 1031 is one of the statutory exceptions contemplated by section 1002. Section 1031 (a) provides that no loss or gain shall
be recognized in transactions involving the exchange of property, held for
productive use in a trade or business or for certain investment purposes,
for property of a like kind. 1 3 If such an exchange also involves the transfer
of money or other non-like kind property, section 1031 (c) requires recognition of any losses, to the extent of the value of the non-like kind consideration.' 4
The questions involving the application of section 1031 to sale and
leaseback transactions did not arise until the mid-1940's when this form
of transaction gained popularity.' 5 In Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner 6 a court first investigated the possibility that a sale conditioned
on a long-term leaseback was a nonrecognizable exchange of like kind
property within the meaning of section 1031. In Century Electric, the
taxpayer was denied a loss deduction on a sale and leaseback of its foundry
and business property since the transaction, involving a potential 95-year
leaseback, was found to be a nonrecognizable exchange of like kind busi11. Id.
12. Id.§ 1001(a).
13. The term "like kind" refers to the nature or character of the property, and
not to its grade or quality. Therefore, it is of no import that real estate is improved
or unimproved since this condition relates solely to the quality of the property rather
than its character. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1956).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031 (c).
15. See generally, Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back
of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1948).
The sale and leaseback transaction consists of a property owner selling the property
with the buyer contemporaneously executing a lease of the property back to the
original owner. The leaseback is often found in the sale agreement itself, and is a
condition of the sale. If a bona fide lease is found, the taxpayer-lessee is permitted to
deduct all of the rental payments under section 163 of the Code. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 163. This would more than offset the loss of depreciation deductions, which
the taxpayer is entitled to as owner of the property, because the lessee could deduct
the total investment contained in the rental payments, including the land which may
not be amortized. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956).
In addition to these tax motives, the sale and leaseback also has other
sound business purposes. By selling the property and then leasing it back, a taxpayer
may receive cash immediately, while spreading its costs over a period of time as
rent. Restrictions found in bond indentures and loan agreements can be avoided, and
the cash obtained by the taxpayer is often the full market value of the property,
rather than the fraction which is usually realized through the use of a mortgage.
For a discussion of the business purposes behind the utilization of the sale and leaseback,
see Cary, Current Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-Back Transactions,29 TAXES
662 (1951) ; Cary, Tax Aspects of the Sale and Lease-Back of Corporate Property,
N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX 599 (1949); Mandell, Tax Aspects of Sales and
Leasebacks as PracticalDevices for Transfer and Operation of Real Property, N.Y.U.
18TH INST. ON FED. TAX 17 (1960).
16. 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
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7
ness property and, therefore, not a sale.' As the Century Electric court
noted, the legislative purpose behind the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031 reflects Congress' concern with the administrative problems of
computing a gain or loss when neither is readily measurable due to the
nature of an exchange not involving money but rather like kind business
property.' 8 While in theory a taxpayer may have realized a loss or a gain,
in fact the nature and extent of his or her interest would remain basically
unchanged.
Eight years later, in Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner,19 while the
Tax Court followed Century Electric and disallowed a loss deduction in
a similar transaction, 20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that there had not been an exchange of business
property, but rather a sale at the fair market value of the property followed
by a separate leaseback. 2' Accordingly, the Jordan Marsh court allowed
the deduction. Unlike Century Electric, the taxpayer in Jordan Marsh
was found to have altered its economic situation in that it had "'closed
22
Therefore, the
out a losing venture'" by selling its business property.
court reasoned, as the primary legislative purpose behind section 1031 was
to avoid the recognition by a taxpayer of a loss or gain in a transaction
where there had been a mere change in the form of ownership, 28 section
1031 should not apply in this situation as the taxpayer had suffered a
quantitative change as well.2
Missouri Pacific Railroadv. United States25 is the most recent decision
dealing with the tax consequences of the sale and leaseback arrangement. 2G
In Missouri Pacific, the United States Court of Claims recognized that although the long-term leaseback had been the quid pro quo for the sale of
the property, this factor was not controlling as to the applicability of

17. 192 F.2d at 159-60.

18. Id. at 159.
19. 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).
20. 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1094 (1957), not acquiesced in, REv. RUL. 60-43,
1960-1 Cum. BULL. 687. The lease was for a term of 30 years and 3 days, with an
option to renew for 30 more years if the lessee should erect new buildings. 269 F.2d
at 454. Significantly, there was no option for the seller-lessee to repurchase the
property.
21. 269 F.2d at 456.
22. Id. at 456, quoting Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488
(1st Cir. 1940).
23. 269 F.2d at 456.
24. Id.
25. 497 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
26. One of the four issues facing the Missouri Pacific court was the tax consequences of the sale of the taxpayer's St. Louis headquarters and office buildings with a
simultaneous leaseback for a term of 29 years and 11 months, accompanied by a
right to renew for four additional periods of 5 years each. Id. at 1387-88. The taxpayer also received an absolute option to reacquire the property after a period of
5 years. Id. at 1390. A claimed loss deduction on the sale was disallowed by the
Commissioner, who viewed the disposition as an exchange of real estate for property
of like kind within the meaning of section 1031(c). Id. at 1388.
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section 1031.27 Rather, where such reciprocity is present, in order to avoid

the application of the nonrecognition provisions it must be shown:
(1) that the seller has relinquished effective control of the property;
(2) that the lease is for a total term of no more than thirty years,
inclusive of optional renewal periods; (3) that the consideration,
apart from the lease, for the transfer is fairly equivalent to the market
value of the property transferred; and (4) that the rental payments
under the lease are reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy
28
of the desired premises.
The court found that, on the facts, the first and second 29 requirements of the
test had not been met, and therefore section 1031 applied. 30 Jordan Marsh
was distinguished on the basis that the sale of the property in that case had
been unconditional while in Missouri Pacific the contract of sale provided
for certain repurchase options for the taxpayer.3 1 The Missouri Pacific
court reasoned that had the taxpayer in Jordan Marsh retained the right to
repurchase the property in the near future at a reasonable price, then
there would not have been a "closing of a losing venture"3 2 but merely a
33
suspension thereof, and thus no sale for tax purposes.
As an alternative approach to the sale and leaseback issue, several
courts have been willing to look through the mere form of the deed and
treat the transaction as a mortgage if it is determined that the sale and
leaseback arrangement was actually executed as security for a loan,"" In
such instances the original owner would then be deemed not to have relinquished ownership of the property, and therefore, the questions of
whether a "sale" or "exchange" had occurred and whether section 1031
applies would never arise. In Commissioner v. H.F. Neighbors Realty
Co.,3 5 the Sixth Circuit expressed the general tenor of this approach in
finding that a mortgage had resulted and stated:
The more common criteria which indicate a borrowing and
lending rather than a purchase and a sale, are inadequacy of consideration, provisions for redemption or reconveyance, continued possession
27. Id. at 1390-91.

28. Id. at 1391, citing 5

MERTENS,

THE LAW OF

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§ 28.28a (1969 rev.). It is significant that the Missouri Pacific court, confronted with a
situation where a sale of property was conditioned upon its immediate leaseback,
chose to ignore the general presumption in favor of the applicability of section 1002,
and instead presumed the applicability of section 1031. The court offered no explanation for this presumption in favor of section 1031, but it is important to the extent
that it makes a finding of the applicability of section 1031 easier.
29. See note 60 infra.
30. 497 F.2d at 1391.
31. Id. at 1393.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) ; Commissioner v. H.F. Neighbors Realty Co., 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936).
35. 81 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1936). This case involved a transaction whereby land
was given to a trustee in return for a 99-year leaseback and land trust certificates.
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and management of the property by the transferer, payment by him
of the taxes and assessments,
and his receipt and use of the rents and
36
profits of the property.
Confronted with these conflicting decisions as to agreements fundamentally similar in nature, the Leslie court began its analysis by emphasizing
that the "exchange" prerequisite to the operation of section 1031 necessitated
a transfer of property for property, in whole or in part, as distinguished
from a transfer of property solely for cash.37 In considering whether the
seller of property in a sale and leaseback transaction had received in return
any property in addition to cash - in which case the transaction might
be considered an exchange with cash as boot - the Leslie court inquired
as to whether the leaseback had a capital value of its own.38 The court's
determination that the leasehold did not have any capital value which could
be considered a part of the consideration paid or exchanged 9 was premised
upon evidence in the record 40 indicating that the fair market value of the
property with improvements at the time of the sale was roughly equivalent
to the sale price. 41 The court felt this determination was further buttressed by the fact that the annual net rental42 was comparable to that of
similar properties in the area. 43 The court noted that the fair value of both
the sales price and rentals coupled with the lease provision that all condemnation proceeds would be paid to Prudential without deduction for the
leasehold, all supported the finding that the leasehold had no capital value. 4 4
Since the leasehold was deemed to have no value, and the sole consideration
paid for the property therefore could only be the $2.4 million,45 the court
concluded that there was a sale of the property and not an exchange within
the meaning of section 1031.46

The Leslie court's particular mode of analysis of the exchange issue,
in emphasizing the fact that the fair market value of the property equaled
36. Id. at 175. The United States Supreme Court upheld the reasoning of

Neighbors when a similar fact situation arose 3 years later in Helvering v. F. & R.
Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939). The Lazarus case involved the transfer of
land coupled with a long-term leaseback and the issuance of trust certificates. The
Court, in that case, found the transaction to be a loan and the transferor was permitted
to continue to depreciate the property. Id. at 255.
37. 64 T.C. at 252. The Treasury regulations provide: "[T]o constitute an
exchange, the transaction must be a reciprocal transfer of property, as distinguished
from a transfer of property for a money consideration only." Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1 (d)
(1957).
38. 64 T.C. at 252; cf. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456-57
(2d Cir. 1959).

39. 64 T.C. at 252.

40. This evidence was introduced by the Commissioner. Id. at 253.
41. Id. If the sale price of $2.4 million had been less than the fair market value
of the improved property, an inference might have arisen that the difference represented the capital value of the leasehold. See note 50 infra.
42. See note 7 supra.
43. 64 T.C. at 253.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 255.
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the purchase price, may have predetermined the result. An alternative
approach the court might have taken would have been to assess the nature
of the taxpayer's interest in the property prior and subsequent to the sale
and leaseback instead of concentrating on fair market values. If it had
appeared that the taxpayer's overall interest had not been significantly
altered by the transaction, this would have indicated that an exchange of
47
like kind property had occurred.
Even accepting the Leslie court's fair market value approach, its
determination that the leasehold had no capital value such as would constitute non-cash consideration appears problematical. It is difficult to
reconcile the majority's statements that "it was only because of the leasehold that petitioner was willing to spend $3.187 million," 48 and that "the
leaseback arrangement was a necessary condition to the sale,"'49 with the
ultimate finding that the leasehold had no instrinsic value of its own. The
court seems to have disregarded the economic realities of the situation,
despite the frequently invoked principle that the economic substance of
a transaction should govern for tax purposes, rather than the form or
appellation which the parties give it.5"
Moreover, even accepting the Leslie court's view that the taxpayer
had sustained a recognizable loss, the court's failure to discuss factors
which previously had been considered important in ascertaining the existence
of the requisite "exchange" seems to add further confusion to an already
unsettled area of the law. The court failed to note the fact that the taxpayer's investment after the transaction was of a substantially similar
nature, a factor important to the Second Circuit in Jordan Marsh.51 Nor
47. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
48. 64 T.C. at 252.
49. Id.
50. See Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) ; George A.
Roesel, 56 T.C. 14, 25-26 (1971). In the instant case the Commissioner contended
that since the cost to the taxpayer exceeded the contract price, the difference would
equal the capital value of the lease. 64 T.C. at 253. While the majority recognized
that economic realities would seem to indicate that the excess of cost over contract
price would not be a loss to the petitioner since it would be able to utilize the improvements as lessee, and therefore, willing to spend more than $2.4 million, the court
nevertheless concluded that the leasehold had no capital value. Id. at 254. Rather,
the difference between the $2.4 million received and the $3.187 million expended was
found to be attributable to the cost of acquiring the land and making the improvements,
not to the value of the leasehold. The court reasoned that in order for the difference

of $787,414 to be the value of the lease, the fair market value of the property would
have to be equal to $3.187 million, a fact which the evidence failed to support. Id.
Judge Wilbur, in his dissenting opinion, noted that since the contract between
Prudential and the taxpayer provided that the sale price was to be the lesser of the
actual costs of the land and improvements or $2.4 million, the taxpayer could not
possibly make a profit. Accordingly, he concluded with regard to the capital value
that "[t]he expenditure at issue here was clearly incurred for the leasehold interest
of 50 years." Id. at 258 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Moreover, all of the dissenting
judges expressed the view that the taxpayer had not actually sustained a loss; the
excess of the cost over the sales price in fact represented the value of the leasehold.
See id. at 256 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting) ; id. at 257 (Quealy, J., dissenting) ; id.
at 259 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
51. See note 23 supra.
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did the Leslie court discuss the fact that the lease was for a term of more
than 30 years and that the taxpayer retained effective control of the prop52
erty, factors which the Missouri Pacific court had deemed significant.
As suggested earlier, the Leslie court could have approached the issue
analytically by inquiring whether the nature of the taxpayer's financial
interests were affected by the transaction, and finding an exchange if no
significant change had occurred. This appears especially significant in
Leslie, for it is not sufficiently apparent that the taxpayer's reported
$787,414 loss from the transaction resulted in any significant alteration
of its business operations. 53 Although the basic fact situations were distinguishable the Leslie court relied upon Jordan Marsh in holding that
the present transaction was a sale rather than an exchange, since the selling
price of the property was equivalent to its fair market value. 54 While the
Second Circuit did emphasize in Jordan Marsh the fact that the leasehold
had no independent value, that case may be distinguished since the taxpayer was selling property which it had held for a considerable period of
time, 55 undertaking costs in excess of the fair market value, independently
of the sale and leaseback transaction. 56 However, in the instant case, the
taxpayer had not incurred the costs of acquiring the land and constructing
the plant over a period of years in its business operation ;57 rather, the
costs were assumed with a view to selling the property and leasing it back
from Prudential. Thus this was not a case of "closing out a losing venture"
as in Jordan Marsh.55 It is submitted that for this reason, and the fact
that the sale in the instant case was expressly conditioned upon an immediate long-term leaseback, 59 the Court of Claims would not have found the
transaction involved in Leslie to be a sale. As the lease in the instant
case was for a period of up to 50 years, 60 and the taxpayer had retained
52. See notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text infra.
53. The taxpayer owned the property and newly constructed plant which was to
have been used in its manufacturing process prior to the sale to Prudential. Following
the completed transaction, the taxpayer retained the complete use and occupancy of
the property for a term potentially as long as 50 years. It is true that the taxpayer
now had to pay an annual rental of over $190,000; however, it had also received the
benefit of $2.4 million in cash which it needed due to the cost of constructing the
plant, and which it had been unable to satisfactorily obtain by alternate means. 64
T.C. at 249-50.

54. Id. at 256, citing Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1959).
55. The taxpayer had acquired the property in question in 1925, while the sale
and leaseback occurred in 1944. 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1094, 1095 (1957).
56. See 64 T.C. at 255 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 249-50.
58. See id. at 256 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
59. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
60. The Missouri Pacific requirement of the lease being for a term of 30 years
or less was inferred from regulation section 1.1031(a)-l(c)(2) which provides for
nonrecognition if "a taxpayer who is not a dealer in real estate . . . exchanges a
leasehold of a fee with 30 years or more to run for real estate .... " Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1031(a)-1 (c) (2) (1956). This regulation does not, however, answer the primary
question as to whether the transaction was an "exchange" or not. Since the concept
of a sale implies the transfer of complete ownership of an object, it would seem
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effective control of the property, 1' the sale and leaseback arrangement
involved therein fails the test as to recognition set forth in Missouri
62
Pacific.
Neither the parties, nor the majority in Leslie addressed themselves
to the issue of whether the transaction was actually a financing arrangement
rather than a sale. 63 However, previous cases have shown that if a
repurchase option is contained in a sale and leaseback transaction, a court
might properly find that the seller has retained an "equity" in the property
and hold that the transaction creates a mortgage instead of a lease. 64 In
light of its provisions for a repurchase offer by the taxpayer, as well as
the taxpayer's possession, management, and obligation to pay all taxes,
maintenance, and other charges on the property, 65 the agreement in the
instant case appears to meet most of the criteria enumerated in Neighbors
as indicating the creation of a mortgage.6 6 The use of the sale and leasethat the relinquishment of effective control is a valid factor in determining whether
a sale has actually occurred.
61. See note 41 supra. Repurchase options were considered by the Missouri
Pacific court to amount to the retention of effective control over business property.
497 F.2d at 1393. In ascertaining whether the taxpayer in Leslie gave up control of
the property in question, thus meeting the requirement in Missouri Pacific, it must
be acknowledged that the taxpayer's repurchase option did not give it as much control
as did the taxpayer's absolute right to repurchase after 5 years in Missouri Pacific.
Id. The question then arises as to how much control can be retained by the seller
of property before the transaction will not be deemed to be a sale. It is submitted
that in resolving this problem as to retention of control there exists a line of sale
and leaseback decisions, not concerning the application of section 1031, which proves
helpful. In each of these cases, the courts, in determining whether a bona fide sale
had occurred or only a sham to avoid taxes, noted that the absence of an option to
repurchase indicated that the seller had given up effective control and a sale had
actually taken place. See City Inv. Co. & Subsidiaries, 38 T.C. 1 (1962), not
acquiesced in, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 5; May Dep't Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951);
Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41 (1950).
Although the taxpayer had only a rejectable offer to repurchase, this did
not mean that Prudential could refuse such an offer without any adverse consequences.
The lease provided that if Prudential rejected a purchase offer, the lease would terminate. 64 T.C. at 257 n2 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). Since there is some indication that
Prudential considered itself more as a lender than as a landlord, the company may
have been hesitant to reject any offer the taxpayer may have made. Id. at 258 n.4
(Wilbur, J., dissenting). It is not clear from the opinion whether the plant could have
been easily rented to another company, or whether it was specifically suited to only the
taxpayer's needs. However, if it would have been difficult for Prudential to sell or
lease the premises to someone else, the option to purchase may have been absolute in
effect, and thus the taxpayer would have retained effective control.
62. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
63. See 64 T.C. at 257 n.4 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
64. See Chicago Stoker, 14 T.C. 441 (1950) ; see generally Cohen & Meisel,
A Later Look at the Sale and Leaseback, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 169, 186-90 (1958).
65. 64 T.C. at 250 n.3.
66. Although both the Neighbors and Lazarus cases involved the use of land
trust certificates, this should not be controlling if the facts otherwise indicate a mortgage agreement. These land trust arrangements, like the "sale" by Leslie in the
present case, transferred the legal title of the property. However, in the land trust
transaction, the legal title vests in a trustee who manages the property, and the
holder of the trust certificates may receive a share of the profits realized by the
business operations of the property. See G.G. BOGERT
OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 32, 47, 88 (5th ed. 1973).
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back is recognized to be a modern alternative to the traditional bond and
mortgage loan, 67 and if the Neighbors criteria are met, the economic
realities should be acknowledged and the arrangement considered a loan for
tax purposes. This analysis is especially applicable to the transaction in
Leslie, not only because it meets the criteria in Neighbors, but also because
the evidence indicates that the parties entered into the agreement solely
to provide funds for the construction of the taxpayer's new facilities.68
In light of the fact that the agreement with Prudential was entered into
only after other financing possibilities had been unsuccessfully explored,69
and that Prudential, in all probability, viewed itself as a lender rather
than a landlord, 70 it appears that the Commissioner could have presented
a convincing argument that the transaction at issue was in actuality a loan.
Although the Leslie court might have concluded that section 1031 was
inapplicable since the taxpayer had never really held the building for
"productive use in trade or business"'-1 before the sale to Prudential, 72 its
refusal to find a section 1031 transaction based upon the view that there
was no reciprocal transfer of non-cash property, may provide an incentive
for companies in the future to sell a portion of their business property with
the intent of leasing it back and taking a loss deduction, when ordinarily
a mortgage loan would have been utilized. If the Leslie court is holding
that in order for the nonrecognition provisibns to be deemed inapplicable
a taxpayer need only show that property was transferred and a subsequent
lease entered into at respective fair market values, 78 then the taxpayer
would realize the benefit of a loss deduction evei though it would not have
been available had a traditional mortgage been' erployed. 74 If the adjusted
basis of such property is less than the fair market value, the taxpayer
could use a standard mortgage to avoid any possible gain, and thus the
taxpayer would win in either case.
The Leslie decision may also produce a type- of forum-shopping since
taxpayers who realize a loss in the sale and long-term leaseback situation
may take the deduction and litigate the deficiency asserted by the Commissioner in the Tax Court rather than pay the tax, or where a gain is
realized, pay the tax on the gain and then sue for a refund in the Court of
67.
L. REv.
68.
'69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

See Rohrlich, Initial Capitalizationand Financing of Corporations, 13 VAND.
197, 199 (1959).
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
64 T.C. at 249.
See note 61 supra.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(a); see note.9 supra.
64 T.C. at 253.
See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
While the taxpayer can take a deduction under section 163 for the interest
a mortgage, see INT. RRv. CODE OF 1954, § 163, this mnight not necessarily be as

paid on
great as the loss deduction. The taxpayer would also have the advantage of taking the
full loss deduction immediately, rather ,than having to wait until each interest payment
is actually made..
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Claims or a federal district court. 75 The possibility exists as long as the
Court of Claims, following its recent decision in Missouri Pacific, applies
the nonrecognition provisions of section 1031 in situations involving leases
for over 30 years, while the Tax Court, following Leslie, continues to
characterize a similar arrangement as a sale and allow the deduction.
At the time that Jordan Marsh was being appealed to the Second
Circuit, it was suggested that if that case should be decided contrary to the
position taken by the Eighth Circuit in Century Electric the Supreme Court
78
would probably undertake review of the sale and leaseback problem.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide this conflict, but its definitive
opinion, or action by another governmental branch, is needed to bring
order to this confused and unsettled area of the law.
Robert Long

LABOR LAW

-

ANTITRUST REMEDIES HELD APPLICABLE FOR VIOLA-

TIONS OF SECTION *8(e) OF
CARGO"

8(e)

THE NLRA WHICH PROHIBITS "HOT

AGREEMENTS WHERE THE AGREEMENT VIOLATING SECTION

ALSO RESTRAINS OR MONOPOLIZES TRADE -

ABSENT

A COL-

LECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP, THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

PROVISO TO SECTION.8(e) HELD INAPPLICABLE.

Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100 (U.S. 1975)
Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry (Union), the bargaining representative for plumbing and mechanical tradesmen in the Dallas area, had
a collective bargaining agreement with an association of mechanical contractors.' In late 1970, the Union approached Connell Construction Company (Company), a general contractor whose employees the Union neither
represented nor wished to represent, and requested that the Company
sign an agreement promising not to subcontract any work falling within
the normal trade jurisdiction of the Union to a firm which did not have a
75. A taxpayer may contest a notice of deficiency by petitioning the Tax Court
for a redetermination of the deficiency. During this time, no tax is to be collected.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6213(a). Alternatively, a taxpayer may pay the tax, then
sue for a refund in a federal district court or in the Court of Claims as a "claim
against the United States founded

. . .

upon . . . any Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491 (1970).
76. Cohen & Meisel, supra note 64, at 191.
1. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 619 (1975). The
agreement contained a "most favored nation" clause, in which the Union agreed that
if it granted a more favorable contract to any firm which was not a member of the
association, it would extend the same terms to all association members. Id.
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current contract with the Union.2 Upon the Company's refusal to sign
the agreement, the Union commenced picketing at one of the Company's
major construction sites, causing approximately 150 men to walk off the job.3
The Company brought suit in state court seeking injunctive relief under
Texas antitrust laws. 4 After the Union removed the case to federal court, 5
the Company signed the agreement under protest." The Company amended
its complaint to include allegations that the agreement violated sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act,7 and was therefore invalid.8
The district court held the agreement exempt from the federal antitrust
laws because the construction industry proviso of section 8(e) of the
2. Id. at 619-20.

3. Id. at 620.
4. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE §§ 15.01-.04 (1968).

5. The case was removed from state court to United States district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
6. 421 U.S. at 620.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Id. § 1. Although the term
restraint of trade was not expressly defined by Congress in the Act, the Supreme
Court, interpreting the section in light of the background of the common law, has
determined that only unreasonable restraints of trade were prohibited. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). Reasonableness was to be determined
from the facts of each case. Id. Relying upon this statutory interpretation, the Court
has stated that restraints of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act
only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated
to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or
unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which either because of their inherent
nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously
restrained trade ....
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
Section 2 of the Act outlaws monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
combinations and conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). The offense of
monopolization is made out by proving two elements: 1) monopoly power; and 2) a
general intent to monopolize. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563
(1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
See generally Note, Monopolization Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 22 S. CAR.
L. REV. 345, 349-60 (1970). Monopoly power has been defined as "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). The intent element of a monopolization violation is
fulfilled by a showing of "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., supra at 571.
The offense of attempting to monopolize requires proof of two major elements: 1) the specific intent to monopolize, and 2) a dangerous probability that monopolization will result from the defendant's actions. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905). The problems with this definition are twofold. First, specific
intent to monopolize may be inferred from the absence of a normal business purpose or
predominant business motivation. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S.
495, 533 (1948). Second, more than half of the opinions on this subject in the lower
federal courts ignore the dangerous probability requirement, and the Ninth Circuit
has gone as far as to expressly reject it. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459,
474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize - Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1121,
1135 & n.73 (1973); see generally AMERICAN. BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1-60 (H. Appelbaum ed. 1975).
8. 421 U.S. at 620-21.
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 9 specifically permitted the agreement. 10 The Fifth Circuit affirmed upon the ground that the Union's goal
of organizing all the employees of mechanical subcontractors was legitimate
and, therefore, exempt 'from the antitrust laws." The Supreme Court
reversed in part,' 2 holding that the construction industry proviso to section
8(e) did not specifically permit the agreement since no collective bargaining
relationship existed between the Union and the Company and that the
agreement between the Union and the Company was not immune from
federal antitrust sanctions. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Organized labor's immunity from the Sherman Act's prohibitions
against specific anticompetitive practices was derived from sections 613
and 20' of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 15 In United
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).

Section 8(e) provides in pertinent part:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement
shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this
subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting
of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair
of a building, structure, or other work ....
Id.
10. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D.
Tex. 1971).
11. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Fifth Circuit did not pass upon the district court's finding that the agreement
was specifically permitted by the proviso to section 8(e). See note 10 and accompanying text supra. The circuit court concluded that the National Labor Relations
Board was the appropriate forum for the initial determination of whether the Union
had violated section 8(e). 483 F.2d at 1171-75.
12. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit that Texas
antitrust law was preempted by federal labor law. 421 U.S. at 621, 635-37. The Court
relied upon a number of cases which have held that federal labor law preempts state
remedies which interfere with specific provisions of the NLRA. See id. at 635, citing
Association of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) ; Teamsters Local 20
v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), and Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court in order to determine whether the agreement'did, in fact, violate the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 637.
On remand, the district court will initially determine whether the Union was acting
primarily to benefit its members' wages and working conditions in securing the agreement. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text infra. If not, the court will determine
whether the agreement violates sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. For discussion
of what conduct violates the Sherman Act, see note 7 supra.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
15. Id. §§ 101-15. The a&ivities of a labor organization which were exempted
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act from injunctions for alleged antitrust violations were
listed in section 4 of that Act. Id. § 104.
Prior to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, union activities were subject to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
The Clayton Act failed to free unions from the sanctions of the Sherman Act because
of the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the Act. See Coronado Coal Co. v.
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States v. Hutcheson,'6 the Supreme Court construed the Clayton Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as exempting organized labor from classification as a combination in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act provided
the union acted in its own self-interest and did not combine with non-labor
groups. For two decades following Hutcheson, the Supreme Court's view
7
of antitrust immunity for union activities remained unchanged.1
During the 1960's, the Court, recognizing that in collective bargaining
a union combined with non-labor groups to further the union's self-interest,
placed emphasis upon the union's purpose in entering into the combination.' The Court fashioned a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).

In Duplex Printing, the Court ruled that the Clayton Act did not exempt unions
from the Sherman Act when secondary union activities were involved because the
definition of a labor dispute in section 20 of the Clayton Act was limited to disputes
between an employer and his employees. 254 U.S. at 470-71. In Coronado Coal, the
Supreme Court held that a primary dispute between an employer and his employees
would be subject to the antitrust laws if it were shown that the union had the unlawful purpose of obstructing the flow of the employer's goods or services in commerce, and not merely that any such obstruction was an indirect by-product of a
dispute involving legitimate union objectives. 268 U.S. at 310.
Section 13(c) of the Norxis-LaGuardia Act superseded Duplex Printing by
broadly defining a labor dispute to include situations where the parties were not
situated in an employer-employee relationship. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970).
16. 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). The Court reasoned that the Clayton and NorrisLaGuardia Acts had not merely given organized labor immunity from injunctions,
rather Congress had also intended to grant a broad exemption from any liability under
the Sherman Act when the union acted in its own interest without combining with
non-labor groups. Id. at 235. The Court further asserted that the exemption would
not be lost even if the union's purpose was to restrain trade, provided the other
requirements were met. Id. at 232.
17. In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), the Court
affirmed the Hutcheson rationale. Through collective bargaining agreements with electrical contractors and manufacturers in New York City, the union had succeeded in
having the contractors agree to purchase electrical equipment only from manufacturers
having closed shop agreements with the union, and the manufacturers agreed to sell
electrical equipment only to contractors having similar agreements with the unidn.
Id. at 799. These agreements had the effect of preventing outside contractors and
manufacturers from participating in the electrical contruction trade in New York
City because the union's jurisdiction was limited to that city. Id. at 800. Due to the
combination with non-labor groups, the Court was free to inquire into the purpose of
the union's actions. The Court determined that the purpose was to aid the non-labor
groups in creating a business monopoly and in controlling the marketing of goods
and services. Id. at 809. Therefore, the union was held to have lost its exemption
from the antitrust laws. Id.
18. American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Meat Cutters
Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965). The antitrust exemption was lost by the union in Pennington because the
Court believed that the dominant objective of the union's agreement to demand the
same wage scale of all coal operators, not merely those in the multi-employer bargaining unit with which the agreement was signed, was to force small operators out
of business and not to obtain higher wages for the union's members. Id. at 664-65.
In Jewel Tea, the Court said that the restrictions in the collective bargaining agreement, concerning the hours during which fresh meat could be sold, did not violate
the Sherman Act because the union's primary purpose was to limit the number of
hours that the union's members would be required to work. 381 U.S. at 691. In
Carroll, the Court held that union regulations which fixed prices for certain musical
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laws whereby the combination would be deemed exempt if the union's
primary purpose was to directly benefit its members' wages or working
conditions. 1 If some other purpose was found to be primary, and the
combination had the effect of restraining trade in a significant way, the
20
union would lose the antitrust exemption.
The Connell Court appears to have implicitly recognized a third
antitrust exemption for labor in situations where union conduct directly
restrained trade, but was expressly allowed by the NLRA. 21 Consequently,
the Court had to consider whether the construction industry proviso of
section 8(e) 22 specifically permitted the agreement between the Company
and the Union. As originally enacted, 23 the NLRA did not restrict secondary activity 24 by labor unions. 25 The initial attempt to regulate secondary

activity was contained in section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA26 which classified
certain enumerated secondary activities as unfair labor practices. Specifically, section 8(b) (4) was aimed at union conduct intended to induce
strikes or concerted work stoppages by employees in the course of their
employment in order to force one employer or other person to cease doing
business with another employer. 27 In an attempt to avoid the section
8(b) (4) prohibitions upon concerted activities, unions sought "hot cargo"
contracts - direct agreements with employers having the same secondary
effect. 28 In Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door),29 the Supreme
engagements did not violate the antitrust laws since, in the entertainment industry,
such limitations were the only means available to determine a union wage scale. 391
U.S. at 109.
19. Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965).
20. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-66 (1965).
21. Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent gleans this recognition from the Court's treatment of the section 8(e) issue. See 421 U.S. 616, 648 n.8 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). For the pertinent text of section 8(e) of the
NLRA, see note 9 supra.
23. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
24. Secondary activity is union activity which is used to bring pressure upon one
essentially neutral employer to exact some concession from another employer with
whom the union has a dispute. See W. OBERER & K. HANSLOWE, LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 377 (1972).
25. The Congressional decision in 1935 not to include sanctions against labor
organizations for secondary activities might possibly be attributed to a general desire
at the time to strengthen the economic power of unions in order to hasten recovery
from the Great Depression. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 25-26 (C. Morris ed. 1971).

26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
27. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 25, at 608.
28. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 79
(1959) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON L-MRDA]. In a hot cargo agreement, an
employer agrees that his employees will not handle the products or materials of
another employer, and that he himself will not deal with the other employer whom
the union considers unfair to organized labor. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1960).
29. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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Court upheld the validity of hot cargo agreements so long as they were
voluntarily observed. 0
Congress, apparently wishing to close what it perceived to be a major
loophole in the section 8(b) (4) ban against secondary activity, 31 enacted
82
section 8(e), prohibiting hot cargo agreements in all but a few instances.
Excepted from the section 8(e) proscriptions were hot cargo agreements
in the construction industry 3 which related solely to the contracting or
subcontracting of work at the construction site.3 4 The most difficult problem
which the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the federal courts
have had to resolve concerning the construction industry proviso has been
defining the scope of the jobsite limitation.35 The Board has required that,
in order for an agreement to be permitted under the proviso, it must only
affect work to be done at a construction site and, additionally, that the work
covered by the agreement must be of a kind which was normally done only
at a construction site.86 However, neither the Board nor the federal
courts have required that the agreement list a specific jobsite, even absent
30. Id. at 105-08. The Sand Door Court held that a strike or other concerted
pressure, as defined in section 8(b) (4), to enforce a hot cargo agreement violated
section 8(b)(4)(A) (presently section 8(b)(4)(B)). However, the Court noted
that no such violation occurred if the agreement was voluntarily observed. Id.
31. See REPORT ON L-MRDA, supra note 28, at 80.
32. For the relevant text of section 8(e), see note 9 supra.

33. See COMM. OF CONFERENCE, REPORT ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON 1959 ACT]. There is virtually no evidence in the legislative
history as to the reason for including the construction industry proviso in section 8(e).
The Senate conferees succeeded in including the proviso in the House bill which had
banned all hot cargo agreements. Id. The only reason given by the Senate conferees
for the proviso's inclusion was "to avoid serious damage to the pattern of collective
bargaining" in the construction industry. 105 CONG. REc. 17327 (1959) (remarks of
Senator John F. Kennedy); id. at 18134 (remarks of Representative Thomson).
34. REPORT ON 1959 ACT, supra note 33, at 39. The committee report makes clear
that the construction industry proviso did not overrule the Sand Door case; strikes to
enforce a hot cargo clause valid under the proviso remained an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b) (4) (B). Id. The report also states that the proviso did not overrule the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951). REPORT ON 1959 ACT, supra note 33, at 39. In Denver Building Trades,
the Court held that a strike to force a nonunion subcontractor off a construction site
was secondary activity and violated section 8(b) (4). 341 U.S. at 689. However, the
Court indicated that in the situation where no contract had been signed between the
general and subcontractor, a strike against the general contractor to make the project
all union would be primary and hence, not violative of section 8(b) (4). Id. at 688.

35. See

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

supra note 25, at 671-7.4; Comment, "Hot

Cargo" Clauses in Construction Industry Labor Contracts, 37
102 (1968).

FORDHAM

L. REv. 99,

36. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 204 N.L.R.B. 742 (1973), modified, 511 F.2d 848
(9th Cir. 1975); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 977 (1962).
For example, the mixing of concrete is work which is not limited to a construction
site, and therefore, a subcontracting agreement relating to concrete mixing violates
section 8(e). Teamsters Local 294 (Island Dock Lumber, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 484
(1963), enforced, 342 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1965).
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the work
a collective bargaining relationship between the parties, as long as
7
subject to the agreement met the construction site requirement.
Confronted with the preceding historical development of both labor
and antitrust law, the Supreme Court began its analysis in Connell by
scrutinizing the Union's assertion that the agreement was exempt from the
operation of federal antitrust laws. The Court, finding the statutory exemption unavailable, s8 inquired whether the agreement fell within the nonstatutory exemption allowing agreements whose anticompetitive effect among employers is due to contractual provisions concerning employees' wages and
working conditions.8 9 The Court concluded that the Union could not avail
itself of the nonstatutory exemption because the potential restraint upon
competition caused by the agreement did not result from an attempt by
the Union to benefit its members in wages and working conditions, but
rather from the Union's goal of organizing all the subcontractors in the
40
area.
The second issue faced by the Connell Court was the Union's contention that the subcontracting agreement 4 ' was exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws because it was explicitly allowed by the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e) of the NLRA.4 2 The Court stated that
although the agreement fit within the literal language of the proviso, the
43
Finding no
substance of the transaction was the paramount concern.
37. See Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966); Construction Laborers Local 383 v.
NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963); Papazian v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council,
83 L.R.R.M. 2710 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council (FowlerKenworthy Elec. Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 770 (1965); Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council
(Couch Elec. Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 413 (1965). Not until the Fifth Circuit's consideration of Connell has the issue arisen of whether a collective bargaining relationship was
required. 483 F.2d at 1173-74.
38. 421 U.S. at 622-23. The statutory exemption was derived from the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts and the Hutcheson case. Id. It was unavailable to the
Union in Connell because the combination was with the Company, which was a non,
labor group. Id.; see notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra.
39. 421 U.S. at 622-23. The nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws is
available if the union acts with the primary purpose of improving the wages or
working conditions of its members. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
40. 421 U.S. at 623-26. The Court conceded the legality of this goal, but refused
to allow direct restraints of trade as a means of attaining the goal. Id. at 625. In so
holding, the Court rejected the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Connell, that the
Union's goal must have been to restrain trade in order to find an antitrust violation.
483 F.2d 1154, 1169-71. The Court found that the subcontracting agreement, combined with the "most favored nation" agreement with the association of mechanical
subcontractors (see notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra), could exclude nonunion subcontractors from competition in the Dallas area, even if their competitive
advantages resulted from efficient operations and not substandard wages and working
conditions. 421 U.S. at 623-24.
41. See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text supra.
42. 421 U.S. at 626. The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding that
the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the Union had violated section
8(e). Id.; see note 11 supra. The Supreme Court stated that the federal courts may
decide labor law questions which emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under
independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws. 421 U.S. at 626. See
generally Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684-88 (1965).
43. 421 U.S. at 628.
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express rationale for the inclusion of the proviso in section 8(e), the
Connell Court inferred that Congress had intended that the proviso allow
agreements relating solely to the jobsite in order to avoid the general
disruption which picketing causes in the completion of a construction
project.44 The Court determined further that the congressional objective
in enacting section 8(e) was to limit "top-down" organizational campaigns
by unions. 45 In order to effectuate this broad congressional objective, the
Court determined that the construction industry proviso must be read
in a limited context - to alleviate the problems which can occur when
union and nonunion personnel work together on one construction project.4"
The Court reasoned that this limited purpose could be served, while at the
same time effectuating the overall purpose of section 8(e), by limiting the
availability of subcontracting agreements to parties in a collective bargaining
relationship, since the union would then be acting for the employees of
the contractor and could be presumed to be protecting its members from
47
working alongside non-union men.
44. Id. at 628-30. The Court referred to the problems encountered in attempting
to picket only one subcontractor on a jobsite as one reason for the inclusion of the
proviso to section 8(e). Id. at 629-30. In attempting to picket only one subcontractor,
an entire construction site was often closed down as other workers refused to cross
the striking union's picket line. 421 U.S. at 630 n.9, citing 105 CONG. REc. 17881
(1959) (remarks of Senator Morse); id. at 15541 (memorandum by Representatives
Thomson and Udall); id. at 15551-52 (memorandum by Senator Elliott); id. at 15852
(remarks of Representative Goodell), and id. at 20004-05 (remarks of Representative Kearns).
45. 421 U.S. at 632. While the specific objective of Congress in enacting section
8(e) was to prohibit hot cargo agreements in most industries, the section can be
viewed as part of Congress' overall objective of limiting top-down organizational
campaigns which are situations where a union boycotts an employer until his employees join the union. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to join a
union, or to refrain from joining one. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The subcontracting
agreement in Connell might have forced the non-association subcontractors to violate
their employees' section 7 right to refrain from union membership because the employer would have been faced with the choice of either remaining nonunion and being
unable to compete, or coercing his employees into joining the Union. See id. §
158(a) (1). The Court determined that Congress could not have intended such a
result under the section 8(e) proviso. 421 U.S. at 632-33.
Further, Congress manifested its disapproval of top-down organizing in
1959 with the passage of section 8(b) (7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1970) (originally
enacted as Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(c), 73 Stat. 519. This
section allows a union to picket an employer whose employees are not represented
by a union, but the union must file a petition with the Board for a representative
election within a maximum of 30 days after the start of picketing. 29 U.S.C. §
158(b) (7)(C) (1970). One of the major purposes for the requirement of filing an
election petition is to prevent the union's picketing from forcing the employer to
coerce his employees to join the union without an election, which would clearly constitute an instance of top-down organizing. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 262-63 (1960).
46. 421 U.S. at 630, citing Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
47. 421 U.S. at 633. It should be noted that this was merely a presumption
since the union may still have an overall organizational purpose, even if there is a
collective bargaining relationship.
The Court also determined that the labor law remedies for violation of section
8(e) were not intended by Congress to be exclusive. The Court reasoned that the
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The Court's analysis of the Union's claim that the agreement was
beyond the reach of federal antitrust law was consistent with its past
treatment of the antitrust exemption for organized labor. 48 Because the
Court found the agreement not immune from the antitrust laws, its decision
that the agreement was not permitted by the construction industry proviso
was extremely significant since the agreement, though potentially violative
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, could have been expressly made
49
legal by a finding that it fell within the ambit of the section 8(e) proviso.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the proviso was a significant departure from the approach taken by the Board and the lower federal courts.
The Board's analysis had been primarily concerned with the statutory
language - whether the work which was the subject of an agreement
was normally done only at the construction site.50 The Connell Court
chose instead to place primary analytical emphasis upon whether the agreement would frustrate Congress' purpose for enacting section 8(e) - the
elimination of top-down organizational campaigns.51
Despite the Court's laudable approach of examining congressional
intent rather than merely the statutory language, analytical problems remain. First, if the congressional objective in enacting section 8(e) was
to eliminate top-down organizational campaigns, it is difficult to understand
why the Court placed reliance upon the collective bargaining relationship
5 2
as a requirement for a valid subcontracting agreement under the proviso.
If, as the Court indicated, Congress' major concern was the elimination of
top-down organizing, which transcends the limited exemption offered to
the construction industry in the proviso, a more appropriate method of
antitrust remedies would also be available because these remedies were consistent
with the remedial scheme of the NLRA. Id. at 633-35. For a further discussion of the
labor law remedies available for a violation of section 8(e), see note 56 infra.
48. 421 U.S. at 621-23. The Court followed its prior decisions in Meat Cutters
Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965). On the facts of the instant case, the Court attempted to determine whether
the Union's procurement of the subcontracting agreement was designed primarily to
enhance the wages and working conditions of its members. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. The Court found that the agreement was primarily an organizational device and hence did not meet the standard for the nonstatutory exemption as
delineated in previous cases. 421 U.S. at 623.
49. This is precisely what the district court held in Connell. 78 L.R.R.M. at
3014. It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not reverse the district court's
holding upon the ground that the section 8(e) proviso could not validate an agreement
which was invalid under the antitrust laws. 421 U.S. at 626-33. Rather, the Supreme
Court reversed because it determined that the conditions of the section 8(e) proviso
had not been met. Id.
50. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
51. See 421 U.S. at 632-33; note 45 supra.
52. 421 U.S. at 633. The presence of a collective bargaining relationship should
not be determinative of whether the union has an organizational motive. See note 47
supra. The presumption which the collective bargaining relationship raises that the
union was acting to protect its members from having to work alongside nonunion men
seems reasonable, since it attempts to add certainty to the question of when such an
agreement will be deemed valid under the proviso. However, it does not necessarily
follow that in all cases the union will have this legitimate objective. Id.
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implementing congressional intent would be to require a Board finding
that a hot cargo agreement was intended as an organizational weapon.
Should there be such a Board finding, the agreement would be held to
violate section 8(e), notwithstanding the fact that the agreement literally
53
complied with the construction industry proviso.
The second problem with the Court's analysis is that arguably, the
Court misread Congressional intent, not regarding the purpose of section
8(e), but as to the scope of the exemption provided by the proviso to construction unions from the prohibitions of section 8(e). As the Court admitted, there is scant direct evidence from which the congressional purpose
regarding the proviso may be ascertained. 54 However, it does not seem
implausable that Congress wished to exempt construction trade unions
from the limitations upon top-down organizing as well as from the general
ban upon hot cargo agreements contained in section 8(e). 55
The Connell Court's holding that the labor laws were not meant to be
the exclusive remedy for violations of section 8(e) has some merit.58 The
decision by Congress in 1947 that labor law be the exclusive remedy for
violations of section 8(b) (4) 57 does not mandate that violations of Section
8(e) be remedied only by federal labor laws. The type of activities regulated under sections 8(b) (4) and 8(e) are distinguishable upon the grounds
53. While this approach does not possess the advantage of providing certainty,
because it would necessitate a determination of union motive in every case, it is submitted that a finding of organizational motive would seem to better effectuate the
avoidance of top-down organizing.
54. 421 U.S. at 628-29; see note 33 supra.
55. It is arguable that an examination of prior Board decisions indicates its
belief that the proviso exempted the construction trade unions from the section 8(e)
policy against top-down organizational campaigns. This observation may be inferred
by the Board's failure to require a collective bargaining relationship, upon which the
Connell Court placed such great weight. See Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council
(Fowler-Kenworthy Elec. Co.), 151 N.L.R.B. 770 (1965). See also 483 F.2d at 1158,
where the Fifth Circuit referred to a case, involving the Union with facts similar to
those in Connell, in which the Regional Director and General Counsel of the Board
refused to issue a complaint against the Union for section 8(e) violations.
56.
section
639-55
opinion
federal

The issue of whether antitrust remedies were available for violations of
8(e) was the basis of Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in Connell. 421 U.S. at
(Stewart, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice Powell's majority
failed to enunciate a rationale for the non-exclusivity of the remedies of the
labor laws. See id. at 633-35.
An examination of the legislative histories of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,
and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 suggests that Congress rejected attempts to
impose antitrust sanctions for violations of specific provisions of the NLRA. See 421
U.S. at 640-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Instead, Congress chose to impose labor
law penalties upon unions for violations of the secondary activity provisions of the
Act. Id. at 645-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Federal labor law provides varied remedies for violations of section 8(e).
Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) allows any person
injured by a union's attempt to enter into a hot cargo clause prohibited by section
8(e) to sue in a federal district court and recover his actual damages. 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1970). Section 10(1) of the NLRA provides for speedy injunctive relief, at the
initiative of an officer of the Board, for violations of section 8(e). Id. § 160(1).
57. See 421 U.S. at 640-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that section 8(b) (4) deals with unilateral secondary activity by unions 58
while section 8(e) concerns combinations between labor and non-labor
groups. 50 The Court's distinction between sections 8(b)(4) and 8(e)
arguably was valid because of the greater potential for harm to commerce
when a union combines with a non-labor group.60
However, the Court's analysis is open to dispute since Congress'
rejection in 1947 of antitrust remedies for section 8(b) (4) infractions and
its failure to expressly repeal the antitrust exemption for labor unions can
be read as demonstrating its preference for labor as opposed to antitrust
law remedies where organized labor is concerned."' Further, the express
choice by Congress not to abrogate legislative and judicial antitrust exemptions in either 1947 or 1959, leads to the conclusion that it intended
the exemptions to continue, at least for those activities by organized labor
62
which Congress expressly regulated.
The major impact of Connell will probably be a significant decrease
in the use of the hot cargo contract in the construction industry. 63 The
accuracy of this prediction will be determined by future Board and federal
court interpretations of the Connell Court's rationale concerning section
8(e). On one hand, Connell may be read not to invalidate a subcontracting
agreement, irrespective of the union's motive for procuring the agreement,
provided there is a collective bargaining relationship between the parties.
Thus, the hot cargo agreement could retain some vitality because a union
could predict when its conduct would be protected by the proviso under such
an interpretation. Conversely, if the interpretation of Connell focuses upon
the organizational motive of the union, 64 an agreement which was used
58. The secondary activities prohibited by section 8(b) (4)

do not involve a

combination between labor and non-labor groups. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 28 supra.

60. The increased potential for harm where labor combines with non-labor concerns has-been recognized since the Hutcheson decision in which the ability of a union
to take advantage of the antitrust exemption depended upon its not combining with a

non-labor group. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
61. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 654-55
(Stewart, J., dissenting). It has further been suggested that this congressional prefer-

ence for labor law remedies would apply even where a union had the direct purpose
to restrict competition, as in Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 3, 325
U.S. 797 (1945). National Woodwork Mfgrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, supra at 654-55.
62. 421 U.S. at 640-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, the majority of the
Court doubted that congressional inaction in 1947 and 1959 could be used to infer
congressional intent in enacting section 8(e). Id. at 634-35 n. 16.
63. The treble damage provision of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970),
should provide an effective deterrent to violations of section 8(e). Violations of sections 1 and 2 are also potentially punishable as a violation of the criminal law. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. IV, 1975). Further, while a strike to procure a prohibited hot
cargo clause might not be enjoinable under section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1970), because it would constitute unilateral activity subject to the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbidding the issuance of antitrust injunctions in such
situations, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 (1970), injunctive relief could nevertheless be
obtained under section 10(1) of the NLRA, id. § 160(1).
64. This focus formed the foundation of the Court's holding that the nonstatutory
exemption was unavailable, 421 U.S. at 623, 625-26, and that the agreement was not
protected by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). Id. at 631.
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for organizational purposes would violate section 8(e) regardless of the
fact that the parties had a collective bargaining relationship. This interpretation would serve to discourage hot cargo agreements because the
union would probably not be willing to take the risk of predicting when
the Board or the courts would find that its motive was organizational, and,
more importantly, because in most, if not all, hot cargo agreements the
union has some organizational motive.6 5
Connell indicates that the Supreme Court is continuing on its previous course of using antitrust sanctions against organized labor where a
union combines with a non-labor group and does not act primarily to better
the wages and working conditions of its members. Connell further indicates that the Court will employ the remedies of the antitrust laws to
dissuade such union activity even where labor law remedies are available.
Kevin P. McKendry

SECURITIES LAW
STATE-SUBSIDIZED

-

COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS -

NONPROFIT COOPERATIVE HOUSING

SHARES

OF A

CORPORATION

DEEMED BEYOND THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS.

United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman (U.S. 1975)
Plaintiff-respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op City,' filed a class action
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
65. One could go further and say that all union actions are motivated by a desire
to organize all the employees in the union's trade or industry. This desire to monopolize the representational rights of all employees has been one of the conceptual
difficulties with applying the antitrust laws to organized labor. See Cox, Labor and
Antitrust - A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 252, 254-56 (1956).
If, as the preceding suggests, union activity such as engaging in hot cargo
agreements has some organizational motive in all cases, unions will be required to
predict the degree of organizational motive which the Board and federal courts will
allow. The difficulty which this drawing of somewhat arbitrary lines between a permissible and impermissible organizational motive will entail for organized labor will
probably signal the end of the hot cargo clause.
1. Co-Op City is a large, nonprofit, low and middle income cooperative housing
project in the Bronx, a Borough of New York City. United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840 (1975). The project was organized and constructed under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law (Mitchell-Lama
Act), N.Y. Priv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 11-37 (McKinney 1962), as amended (Supp.
1974-75), "enacted to ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent lowincome urban housing." 421 U.S. at 840. "Eligibility [in Co-Op City] is limited
to families whose monthly income does not exceed six times the monthly rental
charge (or for families with three or more dependents, seven times the rental
charge)." Id. at 841 n.1; see N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31(2) (a) (McKinney
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York 2 on behalf of themselves and all other resident-tenants, alleging
violations of their civil rights3 and the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 (Securities
Acts) by the State of New York, two of its agencies, 6 and the corporate
group that conceived, built, and controlled the project. 7 They contended
that these violations stemmed from alleged misrepresentations" and material
omissions 9 contained in an "Information Bulletin" circulated through the
as amended (Supp. 1974-75). Preference in admission must be given to
veterans, the handicapped, and the elderly. Id. §§ 31(7)-(9).
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible purchaser must buy 18
shares of stock in Riverbay (see note 6 infra) for each room desired at $25.00 per
share. The shares are tied to the apartment and cannot be pledged, encumbered,
bequeathed (except to a surviving spouse) or transferred to a nontenant. The residents
of each apartment have one vote, regardless of the number of shares owned. Upon
termination of occupancy, a tenant must offer his stock to Riverbay at the original cost;
in the event that Riverbay does not repurchase, the tenant cannot sell his shares for
more than their original price plus a fraction of the mortgage amortization that he
has paid during his tenancy - and then only to a prospective tenant satisfying the
income eligibility requirements. Under the Co-Op City lease arrangement, the resident is also committed to make monthly payments in accordance with the size, nature,
and location of his apartment. 421 U.S. at 843.
2. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
3. Plaintiff-respondents presented a claim against the New York State Private
Housing Finance Agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) (rule 10b-5
promulgated under 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970)).
6. Pursuant to the Mitchell-Lama Act, the New York State Housing Finance
Agency provided the bulk of the financing for the project through long-term, lowinterest mortgage loans. New York State Division of Housing and Community
Renewal, through its Commissioner, was responsible for the supervision of the
development, construction, promotion, and operation of the project. Id. at 840-42;
see N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 11-37 (McKinney 1962), as amended (Supp.
1974-75).
7. Corporate defendants included United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit, membership corporation composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and
civic groups, which initiated and sponsored the project; Riverbay, a nonprofit
cooperative housing corporation, organized by UHF to own and operate the land
and buildings and issue the stock that is the subject of the instant action; and
Community Services, Inc. (CSI), UHF's wholly owned subsidiary and the project's
general contractor and sales agent. 421 U.S. at 841-42.
8. The 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin informed prospective tenants that
the total estimated cost of the project was $283,695,550 and that a $250,900,000 mortgage loan would be required to finance this construction price. Ultimately, the construction loan was $125 million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin,
causing the "average" monthly cost per-room to increase from the $23.02 per-room
estimate given in the 1965 Bulletin to an actual figure of $39.68 per-room as of July,
1974. "The heart of respondents' claim was that the 1965 . . . Bulletin falsely
represented that CSI would bear all subsequent cost increases due to such factors as
inflation." 421 U.S. at 844. A copy of the 1965 Information Bulletin can be found
in 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE app. D-8
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RESKIN].
9. Respondents maintained that the following material facts were omitted:
(i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to in any of the previous
Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners
knew that the initial estimate would not be followed by the present project;
1962),
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mail by the cooperative's sales agent. The district court dismissed the suit,
holding that shares of Riverbay were not securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts, 10 but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, taking a
2
more flexible approach in defining a "security,"" reversed and remanded.1
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,1 3 holding that shares
of stock in a state-subsidized cooperative housing corporation, purchased
as an incident of tenancy, were not "securities" within the purview of the
federal securities laws. United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975).
Whether a cooperative offering is covered by the Securities Acts requires an analysis of the definitional sections of these statutes to ascertain
whether the shares in question are securities 14 or are beyond the scope of
(iii) CSI was a wholly owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was
so small that it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs; (v) the State Housing Commissioner had waived his
own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractor;
and (vi) there was an additional undisclosed contract between CSI and Riverbay.
421 U.S. at 844-45 n.8.
10. 366 F. Supp. at 1132. The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
the denomination of the shares of Riverbay as "stock" meant that they were, a
fortiori, securities. Id. at 1126-27. The court then held that they were not stocks
because they did not represent any right to apportionment of tangible profits. Id.
at 1127. Finally, the court asserted that the purchase in issue was not an "investment
contract" since it was neither induced by an offering of tangible or material profits,
nor could such profits realistically be expected. Id. at 1129. For a discussion of the
expectation of profits requirement, see note 20 and accompanying text infra.

11. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
12. The court reached its decision by employing two alternative tests. Based
upon a "literal" test, the offering was found to be within the ambit of the Securities
Acts since the shares purchased were called "stock." Id. at 1252-53. Alternatively,
the court concluded that the offering was an investment contract under the Securities
Acts since profit was expected from three sources: 1) reduced carrying charges
resulting from income generated from the leasing of commercial enterprises within
the cooperative community; 2) the existence of tax benefits from pro rata deductions
on mortgage interest payments; and 3) the monthly savings due to the fact that
Co-Op City apartments were a less expensive form of property interest than comparable nonsubsidized housing. Id. at 1254.
The court further ruled that the immunity claims by the state parties were
unavailing. It held that the state agency was independent and distinct from the state
itself and therefore was a "person" for purposes of section 1983 (see note 3 supra) ;
that both the agency and the state had waived immunity under section 32(5) of the
Private Housing Finance Law, N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 32(5) (McKinney
1962), as amended (Supp. 1974-75); and that the state also implicitly waived
its immunity by voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulation. 500 F.2d at 1255-56.
13. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. 421 U.S.
at 840. Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissent in which Justices Douglas and White joined.
Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Due to the manner in which the case was resolved, the Court did not have to
address the issue of the validity of the immunity claims presented by the state. Id.
at 841 n.11.
14. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides in pertinent part:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires - (1) the
term "security" means any note, stock . . . certificate of interest or participation
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securities legislation.' 5 Although this problem of statutory construction
has plagued the federal courts for quite some time, the Supreme Court,
prior to the instant case, has only considered the definition of the term
"security" upon a few oqcasions since 1933.16
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,'7 the Supreme Court, interpret-

ing the definitional language of the 1933 Act for the first time, articulated
a test for determining the existence of a security without attempting to
enumerate a security's constituent elements. The Court held that the character given to the instrument by the offering's terms, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements to the prospective purchaser should
determine whether it constitutes a security.' 8 Three years later, in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 19 Justice Murphy, speaking for the majority, isolated
the elements which were the distinctive features of an "investment contract": an investment in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits
20
derived solely from the efforts of third parties.
in any profit-sharing agreement,

..

investment contract,

.

.

.

or, in general, any

interest or instrument commonly known as a "security" ....
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a slightly different definition of
a security. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10)
(1970). However, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Supreme Court
ruled that the definitions were "virtually identical." Id. at 336.
15. Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities" when it provided the definitions of
"security" in the Securities Act of 1933. It sought instead to define "the term
'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition
the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). There is a
substantial question as to whether a promoter of a housing cooperative must register
the cooperative shares with the SEC. See Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real
Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U. L. REv. 465, 496-503 (1965). See also Hammon &
Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining FederalSecurities,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 219 (1974).
16. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares
in a savings and loan association ruled securities); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (flexible fund annuity contract ruled an investment contract) ; SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(variable annuity contract ruled an investment contract); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946) (sale of citrus groves with a contract for care and development
ruled an investment contract); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943) (sale of oil lease assignments along with exploration contracts ruled an
investment contract).
The Supreme Court has indicated that the definitional provisions of the
Securities Acts are to be construed broadly to effectuate the statutes' remedial purposes.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra at 336, 338; tee SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., supra at 298.
17. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
18. Id. at 352-53.
19. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). This is considered to be the landmark case defining
investment contracts. 1 L. Loss, SECUarIrEs REGULATrON 483 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
20. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Court noted that it was "immaterial whether the
shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates." Id. at 299. This test
has been broken down into four basic elements: (i) investment of money, (ii) in a
common enterprise, (iii) with the expectation of profits, (iv) arising solely from the
efforts of others. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a
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Fifteen years after Howey, the Supreme Court of California, in Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,21 made the first major departure from
Justice Murphy's well-established definition of an investment contract.
Writing for the court, Justice Traynor rejected a profit expectation analysis
and adopted instead a "risk capital" approach under which an investor is
entitled to the protection of the securities laws if he risks capital, whether
or not he expects any monetary return. 22 This opinion, described by one
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE W. REs. L. RPv. 367 (1967); Hannon &
Thomas, supra note 15, at 225 n.28; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. Rav. 135, 142 (1971).
The first two elements of the Howey test - an investment of money and a
common enterprise - are always present in a cooperative housing venture; the sharing
of control and expense by the tenant-shareholders constitutes a common scheme. See
Miller, supra note 15, at 467. However, the third requirement, that profits be expected,
is rarely found in transactions involving shares of cooperative housing stock. Id. at 474.
Most state courts faced with questions involving the applicability of state
security acts (blue sky laws) to cooperative corporations have held that cooperative
housing shares constitute an interest in realty and not a security and are thus exempt
from the registration requirements of state statutes. RoHAN & REsKIN, supra note 8,
§ 3.03(3); see, e.g., Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(sale of stock in a cooperative without a permit ruled not a violation of the state
securities statute) ; Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ill. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953)
(shares of cooperative were "merely mechanical incidents to the basic contract which
was for the sale of an interest in real estate," id. at 326, 115 N.E.2d at 118, and thus
not subject to blue sky law) ; State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342
(1946) (sale of cooperative stock constituted sale of real estate and transaction was
thus not subject to state securities law).
Some courts have applied the latter portion of Howey literally. See, e.g., Mr.
Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) (franchise scheme
not an investment contract though franchisee had no effective control, since plan envisioned that franchisee would have flexible role); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (pyramid scheme not an investment contract,
since investors' expected profit would not come solely from the efforts of a promoter).
However, an increasing number of courts, dissatisfied with this approach,
have interpreted these elements more expansively. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blue, 489
F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973) ("in name only" management role of investor satisfies
the third-party management test); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F2d
476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (element of third-party management
is present even though undeniably significant managerial efforts are made by investor) ;
Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909
(1959) (job security a sufficient "profit") ; SEC v. American Found'n for Advanced
Educ., 222 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. La. 1963) (assurance that investors' children will have
financial capability to attend college a sufficient "profit").
21. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The court held that
a membership which gave the purchaser the right to use country club facilities to be
built with the investor's money, but in which he was to have no legal interest, conferred
sufficient benefit to make the membership a security. Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 908-09,
13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
22. Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. Justice Traynor
reasoned that:
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities.
Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business for
profit [The promoters were to receive any profit left over from the construction
and operation of the club facilities.] The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely
because the interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks
his capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the benefit@
of club membership will materialize.
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188; see note 21 supra.
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commentator as a "chink in the armor" 23 of the Howey profit requirement,
2 4
has subsequently been adopted by several state courts.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the instant case, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had taken an equivocal position
concerning whether cooperative housing shares were securities. SEC Rule

235, exempting cooperative housing corporations from the registration
requirements of the Securities Acts under certain specified conditions, had
been interpreted as implying that all cooperative shares were securities
unless exempted. 25 However, this reading of the rule had not been vali23. Miller, supranote 15, at 477.
24. One of the most influential of the recent cases seeking to redefine Howey is
State Comm'r of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d
105 (1971). In this case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the Howey test as too
restrictive and mechanical and reformulated the definition of "investment contract"
as follows:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue
to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
The court acknowledged that this test was suggested by Professor Coffey in
his article analyzing the essential economic characteristics of security transactions. Id.
at 648 n.5, 485 P.2d at 109 n.5, citing Coffey, supra note 20, at 377. Professor Long
has also developed a definition of a security by specification rather than by enumeration.
Long, supra note 20, at 159-74. See also Long, Introduction to Symposium: Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST.
MARY's L.J. 96, 114-28 (1974). For a comparison of these two proposed tests, see
Long, supra note 20, at 174 n.170.

25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1973).
SEC Rule 235 exempts cooperative housing corporations from the registration
requirements of the Securities Acts if: 1) the corporation engages in no business
activity other than owning and leasing residential property, except that such other
businesses are allowable if "incidental" to owning and leasing residences; 2) the corporation permits transfers of stock only in connection with transfers of leases; and 3)
the total amount of stock offered to the public within any 12-month period may not
exceed $300,000. 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1973).
Some commentators have suggested that the SEC would not have exempted
certain types of cooperative housing stock from registration unless it believed that all
cooperative shares were securities. See, e.g., Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations
and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 127 (1971). However,
Professor Loss has stated that "it would be too facile to argue that this proves conclusively that such shares are securities under either the 1933 act or the 1934 act."
Loss, supra note 19, at 493-94.
The SEC's recent policy statement dealing with the applicability of the
Securities Acts to the offer and sale of interests in real estate is SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973). Release No. 5347 deals with "condominiums and other units," stating that while the offer of real estate as such does not
involve the offer of a security, an investment security may nevertheless be present where
the real estate is offered in conjunction with certain services. Id. The release indicates:
[T]he offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one of the
following will cause the offering to be viewed as an offering of securities in the
form of investment contracts:
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other similar service,
are offered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the pur-
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dated by any further SEC release. To further this confusion, it was not
clear whether the recent SEC policy statement dealing with the application
of the Securities Acts to real estate transactions - Release No. 5347
26
was applicable to cooperative housing ventures.
In response to this judicial and administrative uncertainty concerning
the status of cooperative housing shares under the federal securities laws,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case to address itself
to the problems inherent in this relatively new area of the law. 2 7 The
Court's analysis began with a brief discussion of the legislative history of
the definitional section of the Securities Act of 1933,28 and the purposes
which the federal securities laws were designed to serve, i.e., to eliminate
abuses in the trading of securities. 29 In determining whether shares of
Riverbay stock constituted "securities" within the meaning of these acts,
the Court refused to adopt the "literal approach" urged upon it by the
respondents and instead applied a substantive analysis. 30 Undertaking an
chaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a
third party designated or arranged for by the promoter, from rental
of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the purchaser
must hold his unit available for rental for any part of the year, must use
an exclusive rental agent or is otherwise materially restricted in his
occupancy or rental of his unit.
Id. at 1736 (emphasis added).
The release further indicates that the Securities Acts are inapposite to situations where commercial facilities are a part of the common elements of a residential project, if
(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area expenses
and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the project as a whole
and . . . not established as a primary income source for the individual owners
of a condominium or cooperative unit.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is unclear whether the SEC's reference to "other units" includes cooperatives; although the Commission expressly refers to "cooperative units" at one point,
the primary focus of the release appears to be on condominiums. See generally Berman
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums, Homes, and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAW. 411, 420-25 (1975).
If the release is read as applying only to condominiums, Rule 235 becomes
the sole embodiment of the SEC's views with respect to cooperative housing corporations. If Release No. 5347 does apply to cooperatives, shares of cooperative stock
would not be considered securities unless the offering fit into one of the three aforementioned categories. The SEC has yet to clarify this dilemma, despite the fact that
its own advisory committee on real estate has recommended that any differences
between condominiums and cooperatives are illusory for purposes of securities analysis.
See SEC, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADvISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND
ExCHANGE COMMISSION 1, 89-91 (1972).
26. 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973); see note 25 supra.
27. 421 U.S. at 847.
28. Id. at 847-48 & n.12, citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934),
and H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
29. 421 U.S. at 849.
30. The Court ruled that the name given to an instrument, although not irrelevant, was still not dispositive. Id. The Court also noted that respondents' reliance
upon Joiner (see text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra) as support for a literal
approach in defining a security was misplaced. Id. at 849-50. For a further discussion
of the Court's analysis of Joiner, see notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
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examination of the economic realities of the transaction, the Court concluded that the shares in question were not within the coverage of the
Securities Acts. 81
In analyzing the validity of the Second Circuit's decision that a share
of Riverbay was an "investment contract," the Court applied the Howey
definition 82 and determined that the "nonprofit" nature of Co-Op City
precluded this finding. 3 In so ruling, the Court necessarily dismissed the
three sources of "profit" upon which the Second Circuit had based its
determination that the transaction had in fact satisfied the Howey requirements.3 4 The Supreme Court then distinguished securities and consumer
goods, placing the Riverbay shares in the latter grouping and ruling that
they were beyond the scope of the Securities Acts.3 5 In the words of the
Court, "[T]he inducement [for a tenant] to purchase [these shares] was
solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to invest for
profit."36
Respondents attempted to circumvent the Howey profit requirement
by urging that the Court adopt the "risk capital" approach articulated by
the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills. 7 The Court, however, refused to address this argument and further stated that, even if they were
to adopt the California rule, it would not apply in this case since the purchase of apartments does not involve "the kind of risk of 'fluctuating' value
associated with securities investments."3 3 For these reasons the Supreme
31. 421 U.S. at 858. The Court ruled that the Riverbay shares lacked the most
common feature of stock: "the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." Id. at 851, citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967).
Continuing in this vein, the Court bolstered its finding by ruling that the shares also
lacked other characteristics commonly associated with stock: they were not negotiable;
they could not be pledged or hypothecated; they conferred no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and they could not appreciate in value. 421 U.S.
at 851.
32. For a discussion of the Howey definition of an investment contract, see
notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
33. The Court noted that, in reference to "profits," the Supreme Court has
generally meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the
initial investment or participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds.

421 U.S. at 852.
34. Id. at 854-57.

The Court reached the following conclusions. First, tax

deductions for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable to interest payments
on the project's mortgage were not "profits," and, that even if these deductions were
considered "profits," they did not result from the managerial efforts of others. Second,
the net income, if any, derived from the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities,
professional offices, and parking spaces, and its operation of community washing
machines, to be used to reduce rental costs, was far too speculative and insubstantial
to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts. The Court also observed
that these facilities had been established, not for profit, but to provide essential services
to residents of the huge complex. Third, savings based on the fact that Co-Op City
offered housing at a cost substantially below the going rental charges no more embodied income or profit attributes than did other types of government subsidies. Id.
35. Id. at 852-53.
36. Id. at 851.
37. Id. at 857 n.24. For a discussion of the Silver Hills opinion, see notes 21 & 22
and accompanying text supra.
38. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
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Court found that the transaction was not covered by the federal securities
laws and that respondents' claims were therefore not cognizable in federal
court.3 9

Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, concluded that the Riverbay interests constituted securities because they were both "stock" and
"investment contracts. '40 Expressing approval of each form of "profit"
set forth by the Second Circuit, 41 he objected to the majority's observation
that "profits" cannot assume forms other than appreciation of capital or
participation in earnings. 42 He continued by strenuously attacking the
majority's ruling that the nonprofit nature of Co-Op City precluded the
application of the securities laws. 43 In conclusion, Justice Brennan remarked that, until a different form of redress was devised to deal with
cooperative housing shares, investors in such stocks could not be denied
the protection which in his opinion the current securities laws plainly
allowed.

44

39. Due to its holding that there was no federal jurisdiction, the Court did not
address the merits of respondents' allegations of fraud. The Court also expressed
no opinion concerning whether the sale of cooperative shares should be protected by
federal securities regulation. Id. at 859.
40. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In so concluding, Justice Brennan was
compelled to answer the immunity defenses asserted by the State of New York and
the New York State Housing Finance Agency. The Second Circuit found such defenses unavailing, and Justice Brennan agreed with this result. Id. at 866 n.6. For
a discussion of this aspect of the Second Circuit's holding, see note 12 supra.
41. 421 U.S. at 861-63. For a summary of the majority's analysis of these
elements, see note 34 supra.
Beginning with the leasing of commercial and office space, Justice Brennan
noted that revenues well in excess of $1 million per year flowed into the corporation
from such activities. He concluded that, even after deductions for taxes and expenses, the residue could hardly be de minimis. He further characterized as fallacious
the majority's statement that this aspect of the corporation's activities was "speculative
and insubstantial." 421 U.S. at 861.
Turning to the "profits" resulting from the low cost of Co-Op City housing,
Justice Brennan objected to the majority's holding that the low rent derived solely
from substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York; rather, he
contended that management efficiency also entered into the equation. Justice Brennan
also noted that to the extent that tenant-shareholders did benefit in reduced charges
from government subsidies, this did not make these benefits any less a "profit" to
them. Id. at 861-62.
Justice Brennan finally addressed the last purported source of "profits" to
Co-Op City residents - the tax deductibility accorded to portions of their monthly
carrying charges. Although agreeing with the majority that these tax benefits were
the equivalent of those available to any homeowner, Justice Brennan distinguished
the two by asserting that the "profit" of the individual homeowner did not result
"solely from the efforts of others," whereas the "profit" from this source realized by
a Co-Op City resident did. These efforts were those of Co-Op City's management in
organizing and operating the project to realize the tax benefits for them. Id. at 862-63.
42. Id. at 863, citing P. SAMUESON, ECONOMIcs 618-26 (9th ed. 1973). Justice
Brennan further stated that all of the varieties of profit involved in the instant case
accrued to the tenant-shareholders in the form of money saved rather than money
earned. 421 U.S. at 863.
43. 421 U.S. at 867-68.
44. Id. at 868. He also remarked that the Securities and Exchange Commission
agreed with his position. Id. at 869.
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The Court's initial rejection of a literal reading of "stock" can be
supported by traditional canons of statutory construction 45 as well as by
prior judicial authority. 4 In citing dictum from Joiner to support its
application of a literal approach, 47 the Second Circuit had unfortunately
ignored the remainder of this opinion wherein the Joiner Court emphasized
the importance of considering an instrument within the context of the
entire transaction. 48 Consequently, the Supreme Court's position on this
matter represented a welcome return to the accepted practice of disregarding
form for substance, and of emphasizing the economic realities of the sit49
uation.
In determining whether Riverbay stock was an "investment contract"
under Howey, the Court limited the profit expectation requirement solely
to a monetary return.5 ° In doing this, the Court clearly rejected the
Second Circuit's expansive interpretation of "profit." 51 The Court summarily disposed of the Second Circuit's reliance on tax benefits from prorata deductions on mortgage payments, asserting that they knew of "no
45. The Supreme Court has long recognized "that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within ... the intention
of its makers." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
46. "With the exception of the Second Circuit, every Court of Appeals recently
to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach urged by respondents." 421 U.S.
at 849 n.14. The Seventh Circuit, for example, drew a distinction between commercial
and investment notes and held that commercial notes were beyond the realm of the
Securities Acts. C.N.S. Enter., Inc. v. G.&G. Enter., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362-63
(7th Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit has also distinguished between investment notes
and commercial notes, asserting jurisdiction over only the former. McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) ;
Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit,
emphasizing that all the definitions in the Securities Acts were prefaced by the words,
"unless the context so requires," found that certain promissory notes were not securities because they were not the kind of notes Congress intended to cover. Lino v. City
Inv. Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694 (3d Cir. 1973).
47. 500 F.2d at 1252, citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
351 (1943).
48. The Joiner Court noted that other rules of statutory construction
long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details
of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the
light of context and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words
fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed
legislative policy.
320 U.S. at 350-51 (footnote omitted).
49. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). The Second Circuit had observed:
[W]here one utilizes the outward and traditional manifestations of a "stock"
organization, the buyer may be led to believe that what he is buying is "stock"
as normally considered and which would be protected by the federal or state
securities laws. Indeed, the buyer of the purported "stock" may rely to some
extent on the notion that he will at least be protected by those laws.
500 F.2d at 1252; see note 30 and accompanying text supra.
50. For a statement of the majority's definition of "profit," see note 33 supra.
For a summary of Justice Brennan's criticism of this position, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
51. As one commentator has succinctly written: "[11n its attempt to spear
Co-Op City with the Howey test, the Second Circuit has badly bent [the profit] prong
of the test." 53 TEXAs L. REV. 623, 630 (1975).
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basis in law for the view that the payment of interest, with its consequent
deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes income or profits." 52 Although
the Court conceded that reduced carrying charges resulting from the leasing
of commercial enterprises upon the premises were conceptually "the kind
of profit traditionally associated with a security investment," 53 it felt that
the income from this source in the instant case was "far too speculative
and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the Securities
Acts."'5 4 In order to obtain the aforementioned tax deductions, no more
than 20% of the corporation's income could be derived from such outside
sources.55 Thus, it is unlikely that this source of income could ever provide
a substantial "profit" to any of Co-Op City's tenant-shareholders. The
last form of "profits" mentioned by the Second Circuit derived from Co-Op
City's offering of apartments at a cost substantially below the going rental
charges for comparable housing. However, the low rent resulted from the
substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York, a fact
pointed out by the majority, 56 and, as such, was not a source of "profit"
within the Howey rationale.

The Court declined to discuss the "risk capital" approach enunciated
in Silver Hills,57 reasoning that since Co-Op City tenant-shareholders could
recover their initial investment in full if dissatisfied with their apartments,
they had undertaken no material risk. 58 As Co-Op City could arguably be
distinguished from the more typical cooperative housing development in
this respect, the fact that the "risk capital" analysis was not appropriate
in the Co-Op City situation does not mean that it could not be correctly
applied in another setting. Unfortunately, the Forman Court's failure to
reach the "risk capital" issue prevented it from providing a much-needed
judicial gloss for future courts faced with the problems inherent in this
area of the law.
Had the Court felt compelled to address the "risk capital" concept, it
might have enunciated the criteria relevant to the application of this approach. A fertile starting point for this analysis would have been a discussion of the more representative cooperative housing project - one in
52. 421 U.S. at 855.
53. 421 U.S. at 856, citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
54. 421 U.S. at 856.
55. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 216(b) (1) (D). Furthermore, by statute, these
facilities could only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the housing project. See N.Y.
PRIv. HOUs. FIN. LAW § 12(5) (McKinney 1962), as amended (Supp. 1974-75). In
addition, if SEC Release No. 5347 applies to cooperative housing developments, profits
from these commercial rentals would have to be "incidental" to the cooperative itself
in order for the cooperative to be exempt from the registration requirements of the
Securities Acts. For a summary of the SEC's position on this matter, see note 25 supra.
56. 421 U.S. at 855. Justice Brennan strenuously objected to this reasoning.
Id. at 861-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. For a detailed summary of this case, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
58. 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. Co-Op City was an atypical cooperative housing project
due to the fact that it was subsidized by the State of New York and was therefore
subject to certain prohibitions not present in privately financed developments. The
prohibition against the resale of cooperative stock at a profit was one such restriction.
Id. at 842-43. For a discussion of other such provisions, see note 1 supra.
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which capital gain upon resale of cooperative shares is allowed by the
governing corporate body.5 9 The typical purchaser of these shares does
undertake a risk since he stands to lose his initial investment should it
become impossible for him to resell his shares or should the corporation go
bankrupt.0° Consequently, the Silver Hills "risk capital" approach might
very well apply to the private cooperative housing transaction. 61
The Court declined to discuss another issue which has vexed the
lower courts for quite some time, namely, whether the Howey requirement
that profits come "solely from the efforts of others" is to be read literally or
59. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g 365 F.
Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a Second Circuit case closely related to Forman, is
illustrative of a federal court's treatment of a privately financed cooperative housing
venture. In this case, a cooperative corporation and its shareholders alleged violations
of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts by the former owner-promoters who
had converted the building from rental to cooperative apartments. 503 F.2d at 1376.
Relying heavily upon its prior decision in Forman, the Second Circuit held that a
share in 1050 Corporation was both "stock" and an "investment contract" under the
federal securities laws. Id. at 1378. In discussing the requirement that there be an
expectation of "profits" or "economic inducements," the court ruled that the three
elements found to have been sufficient in Forman were likewise present and adequate
in the 1050 Tenants situation, namely: 1) nonresidential income used by the corporation to reduce monthly carrying charges; 2) substantial savings on personal income
taxes in the form of deductions for proportionate shares of the corporation's deductible
expenses; and 3) receipt of optimum services at the lowest possible cost. Id. Importantly, the court next added a fourth "profit" element that was notably absent in
Forman: "the shareholder-tenants of the 1050 Corporation ha[d] the expectation of
capital appreciation on a resale of their stock." Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court focused primarily on the nonprofit nature of Co-Op City
in ruling that the transaction in Forman was beyond the scope of the federal securities
laws. It appears likely that where a profit element is present, a court will find that the
transaction does involve the "fluctuating value" type of risk which brings an investment within the ambit of federal securities legislation. See text accompanying note 38
supra. The presence of a profit motive in most privately financed cooperative ventures
would therefore seem to bring this form of cooperative project within the protection
of the Securities Acts, even though nonprofit, state-subsidized cooperatives are not
similarly protected. The presence of a profit motive also seems to be a determinative
factor in situations other than those involving cooperative housing ventures. Cf. SEC
v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (1941) (contracts for the sale of small tracts of land said
to be suited for the cultivation of tung trees, whereby the corporation selling the land
agreed to cultivate the groves for the purchaser, deemed to be investment contracts
since investors were actually attracted by the income to accrue from the groves);
Hacker v. Goldberg, 263 Ill. App. 73 (1931) (membership in a country club not a
security where members had no right to share in the profits of the corporation). In
two other cases it was found that a contract of membership in an association which
gave the member the right to purchase goods from the association at a stipulated
percentage above cost, but which did not give the member the right to share in the
profits of the company, was not a security. See Lewis v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 409,
248 S.W. 1046 (1923); Creasey Corp. v. Enz Bros. Co., 177 Wis. 49, 187 N.W.
666 (1922).
60. Due to the fact that the State of New York had financed over 92% of the cost
of construction and had carefully regulated the development and operation of Co-Op
City, the Supreme Court felt that the chance of this project going bankrupt was an
"unrealistic possibility." 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
61- Since Justice Brennan found the profit expectation element of Howey satisfied
in the instant case, it was not necessary for him to discuss the Silver Hills "risk
capital" analysis.
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in a more flexible manner. 62 The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit had
construed the word "solely" in the latter sense, but refused to comment
upon this holding, asserting that this particular issue had not been presented in the instant case. 63 However, this question was presented in
Forman and the Court might have dispelled the uncertainty surrounding
the proper construction of this part of the Howey test by addressing this
issue. When discussing whether tax deductions to tenant-shareholders constituted a form of "profit" under Howey, the Court remarked that "[e]ven
if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would not be the
type associated with a security investment since they d [id] not result from
the managerial efforts of others."64 Similarly, in dismissing the second
source of "profit" articulated by the Second Circuit - that the lower
rental costs at Co-Op City were a profit to the tenant-shareholders - the
Court stated that "[t]his [was] an inappropriate theory of 'profits'....
This benefit [could] not be liquidated into cash; nor [did] it result from
the managerial efforts of others."65 In both of these instances the Court
applied the Howey requirement that "profits" must come "solely from the
managerial efforts of others."66 Unfortunately, however, the Court failed
to explain the standard which it employed in either defining or applying
the "solely" portion of this test. On the other hand, Justice Brennan had
no difficulty in finding that all three forms of profit articulated by the
Second Circuit came "solely from the efforts of third parties" - namely,
67
the Co-Op City management.
The final deficiency in the majority opinion lies in the manner in which
the Court summarily dismissed as insignificant the amicus curiae brief submitted by the SEC.68 The Court explained its action by remarking that
while "[t] raditionally the views of an agency charged with administering
the governing statute would be entitled to considerable weight," the fact
that the brief was diametrically opposed to the SEC's position in Release
No. 5347 militated against this traditional deference. 6 9 Since it is far from
certain that this release even applies to cooperative ventures, 70 the Court
was arguably too cursory in its dismissal of the brief. Furthermore, assuming the Court was correct in its belief that Release No. 5347 is relevant
to cooperatives, the possibility still existed that the SEC had changed its
71
position since the publication of this release.
62. For a discussion of how some lower courts have addressed this problem, see
note 20 supra.

63. 421 U.S. at 852 n.16, citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d

476, 482, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) ; see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
64. 421 U.S. at 855 n.20 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
66. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
67. 421 U.S. at 861-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

68. Id. at 858 n.25.
69. Id.
70. For a detailed analysis of this release, see note 25 supra.
71. This appears to be the position taken by Justice Brennan in his dissenting
opinion. See note 44 supra.
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In view of the fact that Co-Op City is not a representative housing
project,7 2 it is doubtful that the instant decision will have a significant
impact on the cooperative housing field. Since most of the Court's objections to applying the Securities Acts to cooperative housing shares seem
related to the unique factual situation presented by Co-Op City, 73 this
opinion would not seem to foreclose the possibility that shares of stock in
some privately owned cooperatives could fall within the ambit of federal
securities legislation. 74 Furthermore, as the Forman Court refused to
address the frequently litigated issues of "risk capital" and the breadth of
the Howey "solely" requirement, 75 the opinion will inject no order into
these very unsettled areas of the law.
While the Court correctly concluded that Co-Op City purchasers were
not intended to be safeguarded by the Securities Acts, it is submitted that
some measure of protection should be afforded these individuals. The major
impact which Forman may conceivably have is in spurring Congress into
enacting legislation to deal with the many problems unique to the cooperative housing industry. This prediction is based upon language in the opinion
wherein the Court expressed its reluctance to extend the securities laws
to real estate transactions, reasoning that this task was better left to Congress.76 It is hoped that Congress will soon accept this challenge and enact
legislation to provide for the regulation of the large variety of cooperative
housing schemes that are cropping up throughout the nation. 77
Susan M. Denbo
72. See note 58 supra.
73. These objections were the lack of a profit element in Forman, 421 U.S. at
854-57, and the fact that "investors" in Co-Op City could receive a full return of
their investment upon resale of their cooperative shares. Id. at 857 n.24.
74. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 58-67 and accompanying text supra.
76. 421 U.S. at 859 n.26.
77. The Court observed that Congress only recently instructed the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation and
study ...

with respect to ...

the problems, difficulties and abuses or potential abuses

applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Id., citing Act of August 22,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 821, 88 Stat. 740.
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